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  1. Kenneth Aizawa (2007). Understanding the Embodiment of Perception. Journal of Philosophy 104 (1):5-25.
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  2. Kenneth Aizawa (2006). Understanding the Embodiment of Perception. APA Proceedings and Addresses 79 (3):5-25.
    Obviously perception is embodied. After all, if creatures were entirely disembodied, how could physical processes in the environment, such as the propagation of light or sound, be transduced into a neurobiological currency capable of generating experience? Is there, however, any deeper, more subtle sense in which perception is embodied? Perhaps. Alva Nos (2004) theory of enactive perception provides one proposal. Where it is commonly thought that.
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  3. Kathleen Akins (ed.) (1996). Perception. Oxford University Press.
  4. Ulysses Albuquerque, Luciana Sousa Nascimento, Fabio Vieira, Cybelle Almeida, Marcelo Ramos & Ana Silva (2012). “Return” and Extension Actions After Ethnobotanical Research: The Perceptions and Expectations of a Rural Community in Semi-Arid Northeastern Brazil. [REVIEW] Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 25 (1):19-32.
    The scientific community has debated the importance of “return” activities after ethnobiological studies. This issue has provoked debate because it touches on the ethics of research and the relationships with the people involved in these studies. This case study aimed to investigate community perception of an ethnobotany research project that was carried out in the semi-arid region of northeastern Brazil. Furthermore, we reported how the residents of this rural community felt about participating in the activities of “return” that arose from (...)
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  5. Robin Allott (2001). [Book Chapter].
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  6. Robin Allott (2001). Language, Perception and Action: Philosophical Issues. In [Book Chapter].
    The earlier part of this book has been concerned with very specific questions arising in the field of linguistics (phonetics, semantics and syntax), with the results of research into visual perception (physiological and neurological) and with rather wider speculation about the organisation of bodily action and the relation between the bodily processes underlying action, vision and speech. The hypotheses, arguments, evidence and conclusions reached have not depended to any significant extent on philosophical doctrine or concepts and the question may be (...)
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  7. D. A. Allport (1987). Selection for Action: Some Behavioral and Neurophysiological Considerations of Attention and Action. In H. Heuer & H. F. Sanders (eds.), Perspectives on Perception and Action. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc. 395–419.
  8. Michael L. Anderson & Gregg H. Rosenberg (2008). Content and Action: The Guidance Theory of Representation. Journal of Mind and Behavior 29 (1-2):55-86.
    The current essay introduces the guidance theory of representation, according to which the content and intentionality of representations can be accounted for in terms of the way they provide guidance for action. The guidance theory offers a way of fixing representational content that gives the causal and evolutionary history of the subject only an indirect role, and an account of representational error, based on failure of action, that does not rely on any such notions as proper functions, ideal conditions, or (...)
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  9. Avery Archer (forthcoming). Do Desires Provide Reasons? An Argument Against the Cognitivist Strategy. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    According to the cognitivist strategy, the desire to bring about P provides reasons for intending to bring about P in a way analogous to how perceiving that P provides reasons for believing that P. However, while perceiving P provides reasons for believing P by representing P as true, desiring to bring about P provides reasons for intending to bring about P by representing P as good. This paper offers an argument against this view. My argument proceeds via an appeal to (...)
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  10. Donald F. Arnold, Richard A. Bernardi, Presha E. Neidermeyer & Josef Schmee (2007). The Effect of Country and Culture on Perceptions of Appropriate Ethical Actions Prescribed by Codes of Conduct: A Western European Perspective Among Accountants. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 70 (4):327 - 340.
    Recognizing the growing interdependence of the European Union and the importance of codes of conduct in companies’ operations, this research examines the effect of a country’s culture on the implementation of a code of conduct in a European context. We examine whether the perceptions of an activity’s ethicality relates to elements found in company codes of conduct vary by country or according to Hofstede’s (1980, Culture’s Consequences (Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, CA)) cultural constructs of: Uncertainty Avoidance, Masculinity/Femininity, Individualism, and Power (...)
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  11. M. R. Ayers (1969). Perception and Action. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 3:91-106.
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  12. M. R. Ayers (1969). Perception and Action: M. R. Ayers. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 3:91-106.
    There is an ancient and ambiguous philosophical doctrine that perception is passive. This can mean that the mind contributes nothing to the content of our sensory experience: its power of perception is a mere receptivity. In this sense the principle has often been questioned, and is indeed doubtful on empirical grounds, given one reasonable interpretation of what it would be for the mind to make such a contribution.
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  13. Thomas Baldwin (2003). Perception and Agency. In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press
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  14. Thomas Baldwin (2003). Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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  15. Dana Ballard (1996). On the Function of Visual Representation. In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press
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  16. Renate Bartsch (2002). Consciousness Emerging: The Dynamics of Perception, Imagination, Action, Memory, Thought, and Language. John Benjamins.
  17. Tim Bayne (2011). The Sense of Agency. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives.
    Where in cognitive architecture do experiences of agency lie? This chapter defends the claim that such states qualify as a species of perception. Reference to ‘the sense of agency’ should not be taken as a mere façon de parler but picks out a genuinely perceptual system. The chapter begins by outlining the perceptual model of agentive experience before turning to its two main rivals: the doxastic model, according to which agentive experience is really a species of belief, and the telic (...)
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  18. Tim Bayne (2008). The Phenomenology of Agency. Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.
    The phenomenology of agency has, until recently, been rather neglected, overlooked by both philosophers of action and philosophers of consciousness alike. Thankfully, all that has changed, and of late there has been an explosion of interest in what it is like to be an agent. 1 This burgeoning field crosses the traditional boundaries between disciplines: philosophers of psychopathology are speculating about the role that unusual experiences of agency might play in accounting for disorders of thought and action; cognitive scientists are (...)
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  19. M. Beaton (2016). Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):265-276.
    Context: Direct realism is a non-reductive, anti-representationalist theory of perception lying at the heart of mainstream analytic philosophy, where it is currently generating a lot of interest. For all that, it is widely held to be both controversial and anti-scientific. On the other hand, the sensorimotor theory of perception initially generated a lot of interest within enactive philosophy of cognitive science, but has arguably not yet delivered on its initial promise. Problem: I aim to show that the sensorimotor (...)
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  20. M. Beaton (2016). Author’s Response: The Personal Level in Sensorimotor Theory. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):289-297.
    Upshot: I offer responses to the commentaries on my target article in five short sections. The first section, about the plurality of lived worlds, concerns issues of quite general interest to readers of this journal. The second section presents some reasons for rejecting “enabling” as well as “constitutive” representational approaches to understanding the mind. In the remaining three sections, I clarify aspects of sensorimotor direct realism relating to the self, qualia, counterfactuals, and the notion of “mastery.”.
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  21. M. Beaton (2016). Crossing the Explanatory Gap by Legwork, Not by Fiat. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):364-366.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness” by Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto. Upshot: I strongly agree with Kirchhoff and Hutto that consciousness and embodied action are one and the same, but I disagree when they say this identity cannot be fully explained and must simply be posited. Here I attempt to sketch the outlines of just such an explanation.
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  22. Laura L. Beauvais, David E. Desplaces, David E. Melchar & Susan M. Bosco (2007). Business Faculty Perceptions and Actions Regarding Ethics Education. Journal of Academic Ethics 5 (1):121-136.
    This paper examines faculty perceptions regarding ethical behavior among colleagues and students, and faculty practices with regard to teaching ethics in three institutions over a 4-year period. Faculty reported an uneven pattern of unethical behavior among colleagues over the period. A majority of business courses included ethics, however as both a specific topic on the syllabus and within course discussions. The percentage of courses with ethics discussions increased in 2006, however, the time allocated to these discussions decreased. These results suggest (...)
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  23. Cécile Beauvillain & Pierre Pouget (2003). How Can Selection-for-Perception Be Decoupled From Selection-for-Action? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4):478-479.
    Evidence is presented for the notion that selection-for-perception and selection-for-action progress in parallel to become tightly coupled at the saccade target before the execution of the movement. Such a conception might be incorporated in the E-Z Reader model of eye-movement control in reading.
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  24. Lawrence A. Berger (2013). Varieties of Presence, by Alva Noë. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 34 (1):227-230.
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  25. Bi Bertenthal & Dl Bai (1989). Coupling of Perception and Action by Human Infants. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 27 (6):523-523.
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  26. A. Berthoz (2008). The Physiology and Phenomenology of Action. Oxford University Press.
    Though many philosophers of mind have taken an interest in the great developments in the brain sciences, the interest is seldom reciprocated by scientists, who frequently ignore the contributions philosophers have made to our understanding of the mind and brain. In a rare collaboration, a world famous brain scientist and an eminent philosopher have joined forces in an effort to understand how our brain interacts with the world. Does the brain behave as a calculator, combining sensory data before deciding how (...)
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  27. Madan M. Bhalla & D. Proffitt (2000). Geographical Slant Perception: Dissociation and Coordination Between Explicit Awareness and Visually Guided Actions. In Yves Rossetti & Antti Revonsuo (eds.), Beyond Dissociation: Interaction Between Dissociated Implicit and Explicit Processing. John Benjamins
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  28. Suzannah Biernoff (2002). Sight and Embodiment in the Middle Ages. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Sight and Embodiment in the Middle Ages breaks new ground by bringing postmodern writings on vision and embodiment into dialogue with medieval texts and images: an interdisciplinary strategy that illuminates and complicates both cultures. This is an invaluable reference work for anyone interested in the history and theory of visuality, and it is essential reading or scholars of art, science, or spirituality in the medieval period.
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  29. Ferdinand Binkofski, Kathrin Reetz & Annabelle Blangero (2007). Tactile Agnosia and Tactile Apraxia: Cross Talk Between the Action and Perception Streams in the Anterior Intraparietal Area. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (2):201-202.
    In the haptic domain, a double dissociation can be proposed on the basis of neurological deficits between tactile information for action, represented by tactile apraxia, and tactile information for perception, represented by tactile agnosia. We suggest that this dissociation comes from different networks, both involving the anterior intraparietal area of the posterior parietal cortex.
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  30. N. Block (2005). Review of Action in Perception, by Alva Noë. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 102 (5).
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  31. Ned Block (2005). Alva Noe¨: Action in Perception. Journal of Philosophy 102 (5).
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  32. Ned Block (2005). Review of Alva Noe, Action in Perception. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 102:259-272.
    This is a charming and engaging book that combines careful attention to the phenomenology of experience with an appreciation of the psychology and neuroscience of perception. In some of its aimsfor example, to show problems with a rigid version of a view of visual perception as an inverse optics process of constructing a static 3-D representation from static 2-D information on the retina--it succeeds admirably. As No points out, vision is a process that depends on interactions between the perceiver and (...)
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  33. Ned Block (2005). Action in Perception by Alva Noë. Journal of Philosophy 102 (5):259-272.
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  34. Jennifer Elizabeth Booth, Experience, Action and Affordance Perception.
    The aim for this thesis is to motivate, critically evaluate and defend the claim that subjects are able to consciously perceive the affordances of objects. I will present my protagonist, the ‘Conscious Affordance Theorist’, with what are two main obstacles to this claim. The first of these is that affordance perception correctly understood refers only to a kind of subpersonal visual processing, and not to a kind of conscious visual experience. I claim that this results in an explanatory gap at (...)
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  35. Bill Brewer (1993). Introduction: Action. In Naomi M. Eilan (ed.), Spatial Representation. Cambridge: Blackwell
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  36. Robert Briscoe (forthcoming). Bodily Action and Distal Attribution in Sensory Substitution. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), Sensory Substitution and Augmentation. Proceedings of the British Academy
    According to proponents of the sensorimotor contingency theory of perception (Hurley & Noë 2003, Noë 2004, O’Regan 2011), active control of camera movement is necessary for the emergence of distal attribution in tactile-visual sensory substitution (TVSS) because it enables the subject to acquire knowledge of the way stimulation in the substituting modality varies as a function of self-initiated, bodily action. This chapter, by contrast, approaches distal attribution as a solution to a causal inference problem faced by the subject’s perceptual systems. (...)
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  37. Robert Briscoe (2014). Spatial Content and Motoric Significance. Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):199-216.
    According to “actionism” (Noë 2010), perception constitutively depends on implicit knowledge of the way sensory stimulations vary as a consequence of the perceiver’s self-movement. My aim in this contribution is to develop an alternative conception of the role of action in perception present in the work of Gareth Evans using resources provided by Ruth Millikan’s biosemantic theory of mental representation.
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  38. Robert Briscoe (2011). The Elusive Experience of Agency. Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):262-267.
    I here present some doubts about whether Mandik’s (2010) proposed intermediacy and recurrence constraints are necessary and sufficient for agentive experience. I also argue that in order to vindicate the conclusion that agentive experience is an exclusively perceptual phenomenon (Prinz, 2007), it is not enough to show that the predictions produced by forward models of planned motor actions are conveyed by mock sensory signals. Rather, it must also be shown that the outputs of “comparator” mechanisms that compare these predictions against (...)
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  39. Robert Briscoe (2009). Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):423-460.
    Neuropsychological findings used to motivate the "two visual systems" hypothesis have been taken to endanger a pair of widely accepted claims about spatial representation in conscious visual experience. The first is the claim that visual experience represents 3-D space around the perceiver using an egocentric frame of reference. The second is the claim that there is a constitutive link between the spatial contents of visual experience and the perceiver's bodily actions. In this paper, I review and assess three main sources (...)
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  40. Robert Briscoe (2008). Vision, Action, and Make‐Perceive. Mind and Language 23 (4):457-497.
    In this paper, I critically assess the enactive account of visual perception recently defended by Alva Noë (2004). I argue inter alia that the enactive account falsely identifies an object’s apparent shape with its 2D perspectival shape; that it mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception and volumetric object recognition; and that it seriously misrepresents the constitutive role of bodily action in visual awareness. I argue further that noticing an object’s perspectival shape involves a hybrid experience combining both perceptual and imaginative elements (...)
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  41. Robert Briscoe & Rick Grush (2015). Action-Based Theories of Perception. In The Stanford Encylcopedia of Philosophy. 1-66.
    Action is a means of acquiring perceptual information about the environment. Turning around, for example, alters your spatial relations to surrounding objects and, hence, which of their properties you visually perceive. Moving your hand over an object’s surface enables you to feel its shape, temperature, and texture. Sniffing and walking around a room enables you to track down the source of an unpleasant smell. Active or passive movements of the body can also generate useful sources of perceptual information (Gibson 1966, (...)
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  42. Robert Briscoe & John Schwenkler (2015). Conscious Vision in Action. Cognitive Science 39 (7):1435-1467.
    It is natural to assume that the fine-grained and highly accurate spatial information present in visual experience is often used to guide our bodily actions. Yet this assumption has been challenged by proponents of the Two Visual Systems Hypothesis , according to which visuomotor programming is the responsibility of a “zombie” processing stream whose sources of bottom-up spatial information are entirely non-conscious . In many formulations of TVSH, the role of conscious vision in action is limited to “recognizing objects, selecting (...)
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  43. Berit Brogaard (2011). Conscious Vision for Action Versus Unconscious Vision for Action? Cognitive Science 35 (6):1076-1104.
    David Milner and Melvyn Goodales dissociation hypothesis is commonly taken to state that there are two functionally specialized cortical streams of visual processing originating in striate ( (...)V1) cortex: a dorsal, action-relatedunconsciousstream and a ventral, perception-relatedconsciousstream. As Milner and Goodale acknowledge, findings from blindsight studies suggest a more sophisticated picture that replaces the distinction between unconscious vision for action and conscious vision for perception with a tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. The combination excluded by the tripartite division is the possibility of conscious vision for action. But are there good grounds for concluding that there is no conscious vision for action? There is now overwhelming evidence that illusions and perceived size can have a significant effect on action (Bruno & Franz, 2009; Dassonville & Bala, 2004; Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008; McIntosh & Lashley, 2008). There is also suggestive evidence that any sophisticated visual behavior requires collaboration between the two visual streams at every stage of the process (Schenk & McIntosh, 2010). I nonetheless want to make a case for the tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. My aim here is not to refute the evidence showing that conscious vision can affect action but rather to argue (a) that we cannot gain cognitive access to action-guiding dorsal stream representations, and (b) that these representations do not correlate with phenomenal consciousness. This vindicates the semi-conservative view that the dissociation hypothesis is best understood as a tripartite division. (shrink)
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  44. Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.) (2005). Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press.
    This volume provides an up to date and comprehensive overview of the philosophy and neuroscience movement, which applies the methods of neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and uses philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience. At the heart of the movement is the conviction that basic questions about human cognition, many of which have been studied for millennia, can be answered only by a philosophically sophisticated grasp of neuroscience's insights into the processing of information by the human brain. Essays in (...)
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  45. Elliot Clayton Brown, Jan Roelf Wiersema, Gilles Pourtois & Martin Brüne (2013). Modulation of Motor Cortex Activity When Observing Rewarding and Punishing Actions. Neuropsychologia 51 (1):52-58.
    Interpreting others' actions is essential for understanding the intentions and goals in social interactions. Activity in the motor cortex is evoked when we see another person performing actions, which can also be influenced by the intentions and context of the observed action. No study has directly explored the influence of reward and punishment on motor cortex activity when observing others' actions, which is likely to have substantial relevance in different social contexts. In this experiment, EEG was recorded while participants watched (...)
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  46. Claudio Brozzoli, Alessandro Farnè & Yves Rossetti (2007). Divide Et Impera? Towards Integrated Multisensory Perception and Action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (2):202-203.
    A visual analogue, two-route model of somatosensory processing is advanced in this commentary. Touch for perception is seen as separate from, although interconnected with, touch for action. Separate modules are additionally proposed for internal (body) and external (object-related) somatosensation. Here we ask whether dissociation (divide) guarantees better efficiency (impera) in terms of the heuristic model within the somatosensory modality and across modalities.
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  47. Brian Bruya (ed.) (2010). Effortless Attention: A New Perspective in the Cognitive Science of Attention and Action. MIT Press.
    This is the first book to explore the cognitive science of effortless attention and action. Attention and action are generally understood to require effort, and the expectation is that under normal circumstances effort increases to meet rising demand. Sometimes, however, attention and action seem to flow effortlessly despite high demand. Effortless attention and action have been documented across a range of normal activities--from rock climbing to chess playing--and yet fundamental questions about the cognitive science of effortlessness have gone largely unasked. (...)
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  48. Tom Burke (2004). Ecological Psychology in Context: James Gibson, Roger Barker, and the Legacy of William James's Radical Empiricism. [REVIEW] Newsletter of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy 32 (99):54-57.
  49. Ron Cacioppe, Nick Forster & Michael Fox (2008). A Survey of Managers' Perceptions of Corporate Ethics and Social Responsibility and Actions That May Affect Companies' Success. Journal of Business Ethics 82 (3):681 - 700.
    This exploratory study examines how managers and professionals regard the ethical and social responsibility reputations of 60 well-known Australian and International companies, and how this in turn influences their attitudes and behaviour towards these organisations. More than 350 MBA, other postgraduate business students, and participants in Australian Institute of Management (Western Australia) management education programmes were surveyed to evaluate how ethical and socially responsible they believed the 60 organisations to be. The survey sought to determine what these participants considered ‘ethical’ (...)
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  50. John Campbell (2008). Sensorimotor Knowledge and Naïve Realism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):666-673.
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