The concept of intentional action: A case study in the uses of folk psychology

Philosophical Studies 130 (2):203-231 (2006)
Abstract
It is widely believed that the primary function of folk psychology lies in the prediction, explanation and control of behavior. A question arises, however, as to whether folk psychology has also been shaped in fundamental ways by the various other roles it plays in people’s lives. Here I approach that question by considering one particular aspect of folk psychology – the distinction between intentional and unintentional behaviors. The aim is to determine whether this distinction is best understood as a tool used in prediction, explanation and control or whether it has been shaped in fundamental ways by some other aspect of its use.
Keywords Action  Behavior  Folk Psychology  Intention  Metaphysics
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