David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Foundations of Science 15 (1):49-78 (2010)
This paper argues that scientific studies distinguish themselves from other studies by a combination of their processes, their (knowledge) elements and the roles of these elements. This is supported by constructing a process model. An illustrative example based on Newtonian mechanics shows how scientific knowledge is structured according to the process model. To distinguish scientific studies from research and scientific research, two additional process models are built for such processes. We apply these process models: (1) to argue that scientific progress should emphasize both the process of change and the content of change; (2) to chart the major stages of scientific study development; and (3) to define “science”.
|Keywords||Process model Methodology Philosophy of science Knowledge management|
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References found in this work BETA
Karl R. Popper (1972). Objective Knowledge. Oxford,Clarendon Press.
Thomas S. Kuhn (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Vol. The University of Chicago Press.
Imre Lakatos (1978). The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. Cambridge University Press.
David Zaret (1977). The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 90 (1):146-149.
Citations of this work BETA
Robert W. P. Luk (forthcoming). A Theory of Scientific Study. Foundations of Science:1-28.
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