David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Foundations of Science 15 (1):49-78 (2010)
This paper argues that scientific studies distinguish themselves from other studies by a combination of their processes, their (knowledge) elements and the roles of these elements. This is supported by constructing a process model. An illustrative example based on Newtonian mechanics shows how scientific knowledge is structured according to the process model. To distinguish scientific studies from research and scientific research, two additional process models are built for such processes. We apply these process models: (1) to argue that scientific progress should emphasize both the process of change and the content of change; (2) to chart the major stages of scientific study development; and (3) to define “science”.
|Keywords||Process model Methodology Philosophy of science Knowledge management|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Peter Achinstein (1965). Theoretical Models. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (62):102-120.
Peter Alexander (1958). Theory-Construction and Theory-Testing. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 9 (33):29-38.
Atocha Aliseda (2004). Logics in Scientific Discovery. Foundations of Science 9 (3):339-363.
D. M. Bailer-Jones (1999). Creative Strategies Employed in Modelling: A Case Study. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 4 (4):375-388.
Daniela M. Bailer-Jones (2003). When Scientific Models Represent. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (1):59 – 74.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Xiang Chen (2007). The Object Bias and the Study of Scientific Revolutions: Lessons From Developmental Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):479 – 503.
David B. Resnik (2008). Scientific Autonomy and Public Oversight. Episteme 5 (2):pp. 220-238.
R. P. Farrell & C. A. Hooker (2009). Error, Error-Statistics and Self-Directed Anticipative Learning. Foundations of Science 14 (4):249-271.
Michael Bradie (1990). The Evolution of Scientific Lineages. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:245 - 254.
Zamora Bonilla & P. Jesús (2006). Science Studies and the Theory of Games. Perspectives on Science 14 (4).
M. Rosaria Nucci Pearce & David Pearce (1989). Technology Vs. Science: The Cognitive Fallacy. Synthese 81 (3):405 - 419.
Patricia H. Miller (2001). Developmental Issues in Model-Based Reasoning During Childhood. Mind and Society 2 (2):49-58.
Paul Humphreys (1995). Computational Science and Scientific Method. Minds and Machines 5 (4):499-512.
Demetris P. Portides (2005). A Theory of Scientific Model Construction: The Conceptual Process of Abstraction and Concretisation. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 10 (1):67-88.
Stephan Hartmann (1995). Models as a Tool for Theory Construction: Some Strategies of Preliminary Physics. In William Herfel et al (ed.), Theories and Models in Scientific Processes. Rodopi.
Added to index2010-01-16
Total downloads25 ( #74,007 of 1,101,884 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #52,459 of 1,101,884 )
How can I increase my downloads?