David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):3-22 (1993)
If psychology requires a taxonomy that categorizes mental states according to their causal powers, the common sense method of individuating mental states (a taxonomy by intentional content) is unacceptable because mental states can have different intentional content, but identical causal powers. This difference threatens both the vindication of belief/desire psychology and the viability of scientific theories whose posits include intentional states. To resolve this conflict, Fodor has proposed that for scientific purposes mental states should be classified by their narrow content. Such a classification is supposed to correspond to a classification by causal powers. Yet a state's narrow content is also supposed to determine its (broad) intentional content whenever that state is 'anchored' to a context. I examine the two most plausible accounts of narrow content implicit in Fodor's work, arguing that neither account can accomplish both goals
|Keywords||Belief Causality Mental States Metaphysics Psychology Science Fodor, J|
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References found in this work BETA
Stephen P. Stich (1983). From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief. MIT Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
Tyler Burge (1986). Individualism and Psychology. Philosophical Review 95 (January):3-45.
Jerry A. Fodor (1974). Special Sciences. Synthese 28 (2):97-115.
Jerry A. Fodor (1991). A Modal Argument for Narrow Content. Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):5-26.
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