David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):49-72 (2005)
Studies that compare human and animal behaviour suspend prejudices about mind, body and their relation, by approaching thinking in terms of behaviour. Yet comparative approaches typically engage another prejudice, motivated by human social and bodily experience: taking the lone animal as the unit of comparison. This prejudice informs Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s comparative studies, and conceals something important: that animals moving as a group in an environment can develop new sorts of “sense.” The study of animal group-life suggests a new way of thinking about the creation of sense, about the body, the brain, and the relation between thinking and nature
|Keywords||animal cognition embodiment Merleau-Ponty Heidegger nature|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Bruno Latour (1987). Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society. Harvard University Press.
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (2011). The Primacy of Movement. John Benjamins Pub..
Henri Bergson (2007). Creative Evolution. Palgrave Macmillan.
Citations of this work BETA
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (2007). Finding Common Ground Between Evolutionary Biology and Continental Philosophy. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):327-348.
Alejandro Arango (forthcoming). Animal Groups and Social Ontology: An Argument From the Phenomenology of Behavior. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-20.
Similar books and articles
Mauro Carbone (2004). The Thinking of the Sensible: Merleau-Ponty's a-Philosophy. Northwestern University Press.
David Morris (2010). The Place of Animal Being: Following Animal Embryogenesis and Navigation to the Hollow of Being in Merleau-Ponty. Research in Phenomenology 40 (2):188-218.
Shlomit Tamari (2011). How Merleau-Ponty Can Provide a Philosophical Foundation for Vandana Shiva's Views on Biodiversity. Comparative and Continental Philosophy 2 (2):275-289.
Glen Mazis (2008). Humans, Animals, Machines: Blurring Boundaries. State University of New York.
Kirsten Jacobson (2009). A Developed Nature: A Phenomenological Account of the Experience of Home. Continental Philosophy Review 42 (3):355-373.
David Morris (2007). Faces and the Invisible of the Visible: Toward an Animal Ontology. Phaenex 2 (2):124-169.
Kelly Oliver (2009). Animal Lessons: How They Teach Us to Be Human. Columbia University Press.
Kelly Oliver (2008). Strange Kinship. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 (1):101-120.
Bryan Bannon (2007). Reading the Living Signs: A Proposal for a Merleau-Pontian Concept of Species. Chiasmi International 9:96-111.
Brett Buchanan (2008). Onto-Ethologies: The Animal Environments of Uexküll, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze. State University of New York Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads109 ( #34,297 of 1,793,170 )
Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #71,633 of 1,793,170 )
How can I increase my downloads?