David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 134 (2):211 - 234 (2007)
In this paper, I argue that those who accept the conceptualist view in the philosophy of perception should reject the traditional view that colour indiscriminability is non-transitive. I start by outlining the general strategy that conceptualists have adopted in response to the familiar ‘fineness of grain’ objection, and I show why a commitment to what I call the indiscriminability claim seems to form a natural part of this strategy. I then show how together, the indiscriminability claim and the non-transitivity claim –the claim that colour indiscriminability is non-transitive –entail a further, suspicious-looking claim that I call the problematic claim. My argument then splits into two parts. In the first part, I show why the conceptualist does indeed need to reject the problematic claim. Given that this claim is jointly entailed by the indiscriminability claim and the non-transitivity claim, the conceptualist is then left with a straight choice: reject the indiscriminability claim, or reject the non-transitivity claim. In the second part, I then explain why the conceptualist should choose the latter option
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy of Religion Philosophy of Mind Epistemology Logic Philosophy|
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References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
J. Campbell (2002). Reference and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Bill Brewer (1999). Perception and Reason. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Diana Raffman (2012). Indiscriminability and Phenomenal Continua. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):309-322.
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