Non-consequentialism and universalizability

Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):175-190 (2000)
If non-consequentialists are to embrace the requirement of universalizability, then they will have to adopt a surprisingly relativistic stance. Not only will they say, in familiar vein, that the premises adduced in moral argument may be only agent-relative in force, that is, may involve the use of an indexical – as in the consideration that this or that option would advance my commitments, discharge my duty, or benefit my children – and may provide reasons only for the indexically relevant agent, in this case me. They will also have to construe the consideration adduced in typical moral conclusions to the effect that this or that option is right or ought to be chosen, or whatever, as itself only agent-relative in force. So at any rate I argue.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00178
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 22,062
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Tom Dougherty (2013). Agent-Neutral Deontology. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):527-537.
Timothy Chappell (2007). Integrity and Demandingness. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):255 - 265.
Timothy Chappell (2001). A Way Out of Pettit's Dilemma. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):95-99.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

90 ( #48,930 of 1,934,701 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

8 ( #66,332 of 1,934,701 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.