David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):175-190 (2000)
If non-consequentialists are to embrace the requirement of universalizability, then they will have to adopt a surprisingly relativistic stance. Not only will they say, in familiar vein, that the premises adduced in moral argument may be only agent-relative in force, that is, may involve the use of an indexical – as in the consideration that this or that option would advance my commitments, discharge my duty, or beneﬁt my children – and may provide reasons only for the indexically relevant agent, in this case me. They will also have to construe the consideration adduced in typical moral conclusions to the eﬀect that this or that option is right or ought to be chosen, or whatever, as itself only agent-relative in force. So at any rate I argue.
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References found in this work BETA
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Citations of this work BETA
Tom Dougherty (2013). Agent-Neutral Deontology. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):527-537.
Jennie Louise (2004). Relativity of Value and the Consequentialist Umbrella. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):518–536.
Axel Gosseries (2001). Child Versus Childmaker: Future Persons and Present Duties in Ethics and the Law (Review). [REVIEW] Ethics and the Environment 6 (2):114-118.
Timothy Chappell (2001). A Way Out of Pettit's Dilemma. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):95-99.
Chris Provis (2010). Virtuous Decision Making for Business Ethics. Journal of Business Ethics 91 (1):3 - 16.
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