Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||The semantic theory of expressivism has been applied within metaethics to evaluative words like ‘good’ and ‘wrong’, within epistemology to words like ‘knows’, and within the philosophy of language, to words like ‘true’, to epistemic modals like ‘might’, ‘must’, and ‘probably’, and to indicative conditionals. For each topic, expressivism promises the advantage of giving us the resources to say what sentences involving these words mean by telling us what it is to believe these things, rather than by telling us what it would be for them to be true. This, in turn, absolves these theories of the burden of holding that there is any general answer to what it is for these sentences to be true. However, expressivism is famously subject to a deep and general problem about how to account for the meanings of complex sentences – a problem variously known as the ‘Frege-Geach’ or ‘embedding’ problem. In this paper I will be interested in whether there are reasons to think that the embedding problem looks less difficult for some of these applications for expressivism, than for others. In particular, in this paper I will be interested in the prospects for expressivism about what I will call epistemics – a class which I take to include epistemic modals like ‘might’ and ‘must’, sentential adverbs like ‘probably’, adjectives like ‘likely’ and ‘improbable’, and so-called ‘open’ indicative conditionals like ‘if the Fed doesn’t intervene, then the economy will enter a deflationary spiral’. There are several reasons to be particularly interested in expressivism about epistemics, relating both to the philosophical payoffs of such a view, and relating to the technical prospects for making it work. In other work I’ve touched on the especially interesting philosophical payoffs which make expressivism about epistemics interesting; in this paper I will be interested primarily in evaluating the possibility that there are better prospects for making expressivism about epistemics work than there are for making expressivism work about other topics. There are two main reasons why one might suspect that expressivism about epistemics will have better prospects than expressivism about many other topics, including in metaethics..|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Mark Schroeder (forthcoming). Hard Cases for Combining Expressivism and Deflationist Truth: Conditionals and Epistemic Modals. In Steven Gross & Michael Williams (eds.), (unknown). Oxford.
Matthew Chrisman (2012). Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophy Compass 7 (2):118-126.
Mark Andrew Schroeder (2008). Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism. Oxford University Press.
Benjamin Schnieder (2010). Expressivism Concerning Epistemic Modals. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):601-615.
Matthew Chrisman (2010). Expressivism, Inferentialism, and the Theory of Meaning. In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave-Macmillan.
Mark Schroeder (2008). Expression for Expressivists. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):86–116.
Klemens Kappel (2010). Expressivism About Knowledge and the Value of Knowledge. Acta Analytica 25 (2):175-194.
Klemens Kappel (2011). Is Epistemic Expressivism Dialectically Incoherent? Dialectica 65 (1):49-69.
Christos Kyriacou (2012). Habits-Expressivism About Epistemic Justification. Philosophical Papers 41 (2):209 - 237.
Neil Sinclair (2012). Expressivism and the Value of Truth. Philosophia 40 (4):877-883.
Terence Cuneo (2007). The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism. Oxford University Press.
John Eriksson (2009). Homage to Hare: Ecumenism and the Frege‐Geach Problem. Ethics 120 (1):8-35.
Nate Charlow (forthcoming). The Problem with the Frege–Geach Problem. Philosophical Studies:1-31.
Mark Schroeder (forthcoming). Tempered Expressivism. Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2000). Expressivism and Embedding. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):677-693.
Added to index2011-07-12
Total downloads69 ( #15,491 of 740,795 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #17,233 of 740,795 )
How can I increase my downloads?