Philosophical Topics 38 (1):205-222 (2010)
|Abstract||Argues that the answer is yes. The epistemic assumptions of moral theory deprive us of resources needed to resist the challenge of moral disagreement, which its practice at the same time makes vivid. The paper ends by sketching a kind of epistemology that can respond to disagreement without skepticism: one in which the fundamental standards of justification for moral belief are biased toward the truth|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Christopher Martin (2011). Education Without Moral Worth? Kantian Moral Theory and the Obligation to Educate Others. Journal of Philosophy of Education 45 (3):475-492.
Robert Audi (2008). Rational Disagreement as a Challenge to Practical Ethics and Moral Theory : An Essay in Moral Epistemology. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
Ralph Wedgwood (2010). The Moral Evil Demons. In Richard Feldman & Ted Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford University Press.
David Enoch (2009). How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism? Journal of Ethics 13 (1):15 - 50.
Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson (2000). Why Deliberative Democracy is Different. Social Philosophy and Policy 17 (01):161-.
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2006). Moral Skepticisms. Oxford University Press.
L. W. C. Tavecchio (1999). Moral Judgement and Delinquency in Homeless Youth. Journal of Moral Education 28 (1):63-79.
T. H. Irwin (2008). The Threefold Cord: Reconciling Strategies in Moral Theory. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1part2):121-133.
Bernward Gesang (2010). Are Moral Philosophers Moral Experts? Bioethics 24 (4):153-159.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads108 ( #5,241 of 551,054 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,370 of 551,054 )
How can I increase my downloads?