Does Moral Theory Corrupt Youth?

Philosophical Topics 38 (1):205-222 (2010)
Argues that the answer is yes. The epistemic assumptions of moral theory deprive us of resources needed to resist the challenge of moral disagreement, which its practice at the same time makes vivid. The paper ends by sketching a kind of epistemology that can respond to disagreement without skepticism: one in which the fundamental standards of justification for moral belief are biased toward the truth
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DOI 10.5840/philtopics201038110
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