University Press of America (2010)
|Abstract||This book argues that moral desert should be excluded as a consideration in normative and applied ethics, as it is likely that no-one ever morally deserves anything for their actions and, if they do, it is in most cases impossible to know what. I also explain how moral deliberation in relation to punishment, distributive justice and personal morality can proceed without appeals to moral desert.|
|Keywords||Moral desert Moral responsibility Punishment Blame Reward Distributive justice Determinism Retributivism Utilitarianism|
|Buy the book||$10.59 used (61% off) $26.16 new (2% off) $27.99 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||BJ1500.M47.S56 2010|
|Through your library||Configure|
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