Analysis 70 (4):638-644 (2010)
|Abstract||A sort of 'modal problem of the many' applies to reference to Harry Potter and Sherlock Holmes. An indefinite number of possible beings completely satisfy the stories. Which one of them is Harry? No principled answer seems possible. This led Kripke to deny that names of fictional characters denote possible people. I argue that a supervaluationist theory of the the truth of claims about fictional characters solves Kripke's problem.|
|Keywords||metaphysics reference to fictional objects supervaluation problem of the many|
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