David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy Compass 4 (5):768-779 (2009)
This paper explores the so-called buck-passing accounts of value. These views attempt to use normative notions, such as reasons and ought to explain evaluative notions, such as goodness and value . Thus, according to Scanlon's well-known view, the property of being good is the formal, higher-order property of having some more basic properties that provide reasons to have certain kind of valuing attitudes towards the objects. I begin by tracing some of the long history of such accounts. I then describe the arguments which are typically used to motivate these views. The rest of this article investigates how some of the central details of the buck-passing accounts should be specified, and what kind of problems these views face.
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References found in this work BETA
Richard J. Arneson (2002). The End of Welfare As We Know It? Scanlon Versus Welfarist Consequentialism. Social Theory and Practice 28 (2):315-336.
Richard B. Brandt (1946). Moral Valuation. Ethics 56 (2):106-121.
Roderick M. Chisholm (1986). Brentano and Intrinsic Value. Cambridge University Press.
Philip Cook (2008). An Augmented Buck-Passing Account of Reasons and Value: Scanlon and Crisp on What Stops the Buck. Utilitas 20 (4):490-507.
Citations of this work BETA
John Brunero (2013). Reasons as Explanations. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):805-824.
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