David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy Compass 4 (5):768-779 (2009)
This paper explores the so-called buck-passing accounts of value. These views attempt to use normative notions, such as reasons and ought to explain evaluative notions, such as goodness and value . Thus, according to Scanlon's well-known view, the property of being good is the formal, higher-order property of having some more basic properties that provide reasons to have certain kind of valuing attitudes towards the objects. I begin by tracing some of the long history of such accounts. I then describe the arguments which are typically used to motivate these views. The rest of this article investigates how some of the central details of the buck-passing accounts should be specified, and what kind of problems these views face.
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References found in this work BETA
John Rawls (1971/2005). A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press.
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
John Rawls (2009/2005). A Theory of Justice. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Philosophy and Rhetoric. Oxford University Press 133-135.
Immanuel Kant (2007). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Late Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings with Commentary. Blackwell Pub. Ltd.
Shelly Kagan (1989). The Limits of Morality. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Richard Rowland (forthcoming). In Defence of Good Simpliciter. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
John Brunero (2013). Reasons as Explanations. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):805-824.
Richard Rowland (2015). Reasons as the Unity Among the Varieties of Goodness. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):n/a-n/a.
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