Coin flips, credences and the Reflection Principle
Analysis 72 (3):478-488 (2012)
| Abstract | One recent topic of debate in Bayesian epistemology has been the question of whether imprecise credences can be rational. I argue that one account of imprecise credences, the orthodox treatment as defended by James M. Joyce, is untenable. Despite Joyce’s claims to the contrary, a puzzle introduced by Roger White shows that the orthodox account, when paired with Bas C. van Fraassen’s Reflection Principle, can lead to inconsistent beliefs. Proponents of imprecise credences, then, must either provide a compelling reason to reject Reflection or admit that the rational credences in White’s case are precise | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,701 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesDaniel Rothschild (2012). Expressing Credences. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):99-114.
Dylan Dodd (2013). Roger White's Argument Against Imprecise Credences. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):69-77.
James M. Joyce (2010). A Defense of Imprecise Credences in Inference and Decision Making1. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):281-323.
Miriam Schoenfield (2012). Chilling Out on Epistemic Rationality. Philosophical Studies 158 (2):197-219.
Jonathan Weisberg (2007). Conditionalization, Reflection, and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 135 (2):179-97.
Adam Elga (2013). The Puzzle of the Unmarked Clock and the New Rational Reflection Principle. Philosophical Studies 164 (1):127-139.
Seamus Bradley (2012). Dutch Book Arguments and Imprecise Probabilities. In Dennis Dieks, Stephan Hartmann, Michael Stoeltzner & Marcel Weber (eds.), Probabilities, Laws and Structures. Springer.
Sarah Moss (2011). Scoring Rules and Epistemic Compromise. Mind 120 (480):1053-1069.
Jill North (2010). An Empirical Approach to Symmetry and Probability. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 41 (1):27-40.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2012-06-03Total downloads27 ( #45,781 of 549,093 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,317 of 549,093 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
