In the analysis of Aquinas, instrumental causation is central to his doctrine of providence, yet their connection is not widely understood. On the one hand, early modern thinkers like Nicolas Malebranche claim that any notion of instrumental causation is unintelligible as a mode of divine operation. Alternatively, certain Thomists commit Aquinas to the doctrine of premotion, which partially resolves the problem of instrumental causation, but only at the cost of eliminating the causal freedom of creatures. In this paper I address (...) these two issues. After providing an outline of Aquinas’s position on instrumental causation, I first argue that Thomistic instrumentalism is not the target of Malebranche’s objections, for Malebranche endorses a view very much like that of Aquinas. Secondly, I discuss the doctrine of premotion and offer some reasons for thinking that Aquinas was not a premotionist. (shrink)

The ArgumentLevi ben Gerson, also known as Gersonides or Leo de Balneolis, was one of the most original Jewish thinkers of the Middle Ages, and he wrote on logic, philosophy, biblical exegesis, mathematics, and astronomy. During the last years of his life he maintained relations with the papal court of Clement VI (1342–52) at Avignon, and collaborated in the translation into Latin of hisSefer Tekhuna(Book of Astronomy). The object of this paper is to establish the main stages of the redaction (...) of the Hebrew and Latin extant versions of his astronomical work. Although Levi declares that the work was finished in 1328,1 argue that this text was the preliminary draft of the preserved one, most of which was composed after 1338. A thorough revision of the work was undertaken at an indeterminate date before 1344. It is also argued that the final form of the work was probably due to the request of solar and lunar tables made to Levi by “great and noble Christians” around 1332. (shrink)

There is a traditional view, maintained by Aquinas and others, which holds that there is a mutual entailment between the power to Create Ex Nihilo and the property of omnipotence. In his Metaphysical Disputations, however, Suarez attacks the traditional view by pointing out a seriousflaw in Aquinas’s argument. Suarez claims that there is no reason in principle why God cannot miraculously bestow CEN-power to creatures––albeit in a limitedform––even on the assumption that God cannot make creatures omnipotent. In this paper the (...) authors argue that the debate can be resolved in favor of Aquinas;that CEN-power does indeed strictly imply omnipotence. After clarifying a sufficient condition for the property of omnipotence, the authors argue that attention to amodest possible worlds semantics and some interesting properties of counterfactuals are together sufficient to show that beings with CEN-power are in every case beings that are omnipotent. (shrink)

Quarum causas in orbibus sub suppremo collocatis indagantes, in suppremo enim uniformitas semper cernitur, exploratum habuerunt id prouenire ex motibus giratiuis lulabinis appellatis, factis quidem a permistione motus orbis super suis polis cum motu eiusdem super polis alterius, itaque ex multis motibus simul collectis unus fit motus. Quae quidem theorica phisicis conformis rationibus cunctis ueteribus ad Aristotelem philosophorum principem usque uigebat, quin immo sui summi acie ingenii eam 2 de coelo textu commentario 35 teste Auerroe innuere non desinit. Qalo Qalonymos.

The main focus of this dissertation is the late medieval doctrine of Concurrentism. Concurrentists hold that God is immediately, causally involved in every event in nature, and yet so are creatures: For any natural effect to obtain, both God and creature must make a genuine causal contribution to the effect. Yet the presence of God's immanent activity in nature is claimed to not overdetermine or render otiose the real and necessary causal input of creatures. I develop and defend this view (...) as follows. First, I explain that---for the theist---any proper account of secondary causation can be given only against the backdrop of God's primary causation, which is best described as God's causal providence. Next, I offer a traditional interpretation of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, one that sharply distinguishes it in kind from ordinary, natural efficient causality or production. Given this interpretation, I argue that simply in virtue of being committed to creation ex nihilo, the theist is thereby committed to a theory of primary causation that I call The Strong View of Divine Providence . SP entails that God must not only sustain or conserve that which He creates, but also act directly in the operations of His creatures, and in the production of their effects. I then employ SP to evaluate the various theories of secondary causation available. Of the three possible contenders---Mere Conservationism, Occasionalism, and Concurrentism---I argue that only the latter two are compatible with SP. I then provide objections to occasionalism, showing how the doctrine either undermines its commitments to both divine providence and human freedom---so is philosophically and theologically unacceptable---or is better categorized as a version of one of the other two theories. Since mere conservationism is ruled out, simply given the conditions of SP, it follows that the most plausible view for the traditional theist to hold is some version of concurrentism. I then offer a positive analysis of concurrentism by explaining why God must concur with creatures, what God's concurrence amounts to, and then describe a simple model to explain how God concurs with creatures. (shrink)

Defenders of the strong view of divine conservation hold that nothing that God creates is capable of sustaining its own existence from one moment to the next without His immediate and continual influence. Assuming a traditional view about efficient causality, I demonstrate that simply in virtue of being committedto creation ex nihilo, the theist is thereby committed to this strong view of conservation.