Introduction; Aidos in Homer; From Hesiod to the Fifth Century; Aeschylus; Sophocles; Euripides; The Sophists, Plato, and Aristotle; References; Glossary; Index of Principal Passages; General Index.

This volume, the fourth in the Edinburgh Leventis Studies series, comprises a selection of papers from the conference held in Edinburgh March 2005 in conjunction with Professor Terry Penner's tenure of the A. G. Leventis Visiting Research Chair in Greek. It brings together contributions from leading Plato scholars from Britain, Europe and North America on a closely defined topic central to Plato's thought and to Ancient Philosophy--Plato's Form of the Good. The importance of the collection lies in the combination and (...) presentation in one place of a range of different approaches to the good in Plato's Republic, and different solutions to the problems posed and proposed by these approaches. The two central issues, which form an underlying thread throughout the collection, are: first whether Plato's Republic is centred on what is good for individual humans, or on some quasi-moral good; and secondly, what the Form of the Good is. Pursuing the Good goes beyond recent studies in the field, and will appeal to classicists and philosophers alike. To the advanced student, it represents a wide-ranging introduction to central issues of Plato's philosophy; for the academic it will provide stimulus through antithetical and controversial solutions to questions old and new. (shrink)

An introduction to a collection of nine papers on contempt, bringing contemporary philosophical approaches to the phenomenon into relation with its construction and presentation in the four classical cultures of China, Greece, India, and Rome. The introduction offers a brief summary of the papers and places the issues that they explore in the wider research context of the historical and cross-cultural study of emotion.

12 essays by international specialists in classical antiquity create a period-specific interdisciplinary introduction to distributed cognition and the cognitive humanities - The first book in an ambitious 4-volume set looking at distributed cognition in the history of thought - Includes essays on archaeology, art history, rhetoric, literature, philosophy, science, medicine and technology -For students and scholars in classics, cognitive humanities, philosophy of mind and ancient philosophy -Includes essays by international specialists in classics, ancient history and archaeology This collection explores how (...) cognition is explicitly or implicitly conceived of as distributed across brain, body and world in Greek and Roman technology, science, medicine, material culture, philosophy and literary studies. A range of models emerge, which vary both in terms of whether cognition is just embodied or involves tools or objects in the world. As many of the texts and practices discussed have influenced Western European society and culture, this collection reveals the historical foundations of our theoretical and practical attempts to comprehend the distributed nature of human cognition. (shrink)

The Edinburgh History of Distributed Cognition (Series Editor(s): Miranda Anderson, Douglas Cairns) -/- Questions the barriers between the humanities and the cognitive sciences. -/- Cognitive science is finding increasing evidence that cognition is distributed across brain, body and world. This series calls for a reappraisal of historical concepts of cognition in light of these findings. It engages with recent debates about the various strong or weak models of distributed cognition and brings them into discourse with research in the humanities. Together, (...) the books in this series give a wide-ranging examination of the parallels (and divergences) from these models in cultural, philosophical and scientific works, from antiquity to the mid-20th century. -/- Key Features: * Opens up our reading of Western European works in the fields of history of ideas, history of science, material culture and literary studies by bringing recent insights in cognitive science to bear on the distributed nature of cognition * Explores how sociocultural and environmental contexts lead to the manifestation of particular forms of cognitive paradigms or to their suppression * Traces the interconnections between and particular divergences across Western European history among the various concepts of distributed cognition -/- . (shrink)

CairnsDouglas Tragedy and Redress in Western Literature: A Philosophical Perspective Routledge. 2018. pp. ix, 412. £125.

Este artículo explora aspectos de lo que llamaré piedad o compasión en Homero (especialmente en _Ilíada_ 24) y Aristóteles (sobre todo en la _Retórica_), pero sin depender de una precisa terminología. Los fenómenos que abarcan términos como “compasión”, “simpatía”, “empatía” y “lástima” (y sus análogos, cuando existen, en otras lenguas) constituyen una familia en la que las semejanzas son a menudo bastante estrechas en la práctica (aunque determinados miembros del grupo entren y salgan de moda y adquieran una serie de (...) connotaciones diferentes en distintas épocas y contextos). Al concentrarme en la teoría y la práctica de la literatura, no ofrezco un relato sintético de la piedad griega antigua, sino que me centro principalmente en dos autores, Homero y Aristóteles, y procedo principalmente mediante una confrontación entre la representación de la piedad en el libro final de la _Ilíada_ y la teorización de esa emoción en la _Retórica_ y la _Poética_ de Aristóteles. Comienzo con Homero, pero inmediatamente pongo en relación la narración homérica con el relato de la piedad de Aristóteles en la _Retórica._ Esto llevará a algunas reflexiones sobre la naturaleza de la piedad y la compasión en Homero en general, antes de volver al contraste entre Homero y Aristóteles (con énfasis en la _Poética),_ un contraste que en cierto modo se ve subrayado por ciertas diferencias entre Aristóteles y Platón sobre los efectos emocionales de la poesía épica y trágica. Un aspecto de especial atención será la vinculación que hace Aristóteles de la piedad con el tipo de cosas que uno temería si le ocurrieran a uno mismo, por contraste con la conexión, en Homero y Platón, entre la piedad por los demás y la experiencia del dolor, tanto propio como ajeno. (shrink)

This volume is the result of a three-year collaboration (funded by the American Council of Learned Societies and the British Academy) between scholars of early China and of ancient/Hellenistic Greece to investigate the emergent discourses of emotions in philosophy, medicine, and literature from around the fifth century BCE to the second century CE. It brings together scholars working on the history and philosophy of emotions in the two ancient traditions, and with different areas of expertise, to investigate the emotions and (...) their conceptualization at a crucial period in the cultural and intellectual development of both cultures. The project was motivated by a desire to make an intervention in the existing scholarship on emotions in both fields, which stands to benefit from a greater methodological self-awareness about the category of emotions and the kinds of commitments it entails. The volume aims to explore how the tools of cross-cultural and cross-disciplinary investigation might be deployed to advance our understanding of the emotions in the two ancient societies and to use that understanding as a contribution to current research on the emotions more generally. (shrink)

This discussion concentrates on the meaning of Nausicaa's words in lines 286–8, in particular on the force of the phrase κα δ' λλ κτλ. and the sense of the verb μσγηται. On the latter Hainsworth comments, ‘In later usage the simple verb in such a context is used as a euphemism for the sexual act. The line must have sounded most odd to the classical age.’ Thus he translates ‘associate with’, citing Odyssey 7.247 as an exact parallel; since, in that (...) place, the verb refers to nothing more than ordinary human intercourse , with no further connotations, one must conclude that Hainsworth sees no innuendo whatever in 6.288. (shrink)

This discussion concentrates on the meaning of Nausicaa's words in lines 286–8, in particular on the force of the phrase κα δ' λλ κτλ. and the sense of the verb μσγηται. On the latter Hainsworth comments, ‘In later usage the simple verb in such a context is used as a euphemism for the sexual act. The line must have sounded most odd to the classical age.’ Thus he translates ‘associate with’, citing Odyssey 7.247 as an exact parallel; since, in that (...) place, the verb refers to nothing more than ordinary human intercourse, with no further connotations, one must conclude that Hainsworth sees no innuendo whatever in 6.288. (shrink)

Confronted with the suggestion that he contrived to see Candaules’ wife naked, Gyges immediately expresses his horror.

Confronted with the suggestion that he contrived to see Candaules’ wife naked, Gyges immediately expresses his horror.

In Politics 5.1–3, Aristotle sees different conceptions of proportional equality and justice as the fundamental causes of stasis and metabolē. His account shows what happens to notions of ‘particular’ justice when they become causes of individual and collective action in pursuit of moral and political revolution. The whole discussion of the causes of stasis should be read through the filter of individual/group motivation – as a reflection of what goes on in the heads of those who engage in stasis. Movements (...) towards political change are motivated by ingrained conceptions of proportional equality and fair distribution of honour and wealth. Aristotle’s approach, therefore, may be compared to Axel Honneth’s, that social justice should be seen in terms of the distribution of dignity and respect as well as of material resources. (shrink)

We reply to the objections raised in Polis 40 (2023) by Ryan Balot and Manuel Knoll to our original paper ‘Recognition and Redistribution in Aristotle’s Account of Stasis’, published in Polis 39 (2022). We argue that Knoll is correct in arguing that Aristotle distinguishes between democratic views of distributive justice and his own, but wrong to argue that this wholly resolves a tension in Aristotle’s exposition between views of democratic justice as, in one sense, based on equality ‘according to worth’ (...) and in another based on arithmetic equality. Balot, we contend, misconstrues our original argument when he represents us as claiming that, according to Aristotle, the injustice which leads agents to engage in stasis exists entirely in their own minds. We did not and do not hold that view and therefore (pace Balot) are in no way committed to any of its alleged implications. Balot’s misunderstanding on that point entails a wholesale misrepresentation of our original argument. (shrink)