First, the approaches of 'Diskursethik' (Discourse ethics) and of Modern Political Economy are described. While the latter investigates political decision processes, the former is concerned with the discourse process which takes place before a decision is made. This is shown by using referenda as an example. The discourse which takes place before referenda obviously does not conform to the ideal conditions defined in Diskursethik, but discourse and decisions in the context of referenda come nearer to the intentions of Diskursethik and (...) Political Economy than other decision procedures which are used in representative democracies. (shrink)

In this paper it is asked whether it is meaningful to state a ‘right to work’ as a basic human right to be written down in the constitution, for example, whether working time should generally be reduced, and whether those who do not have (or find) a job should get a guaranteed minimal income. All three demands have to be rejected, at least in the radical form in which they are often stated. They cannot be realised at all or at (...) least not without impairing other basic human rights. Finally, it is asked what can be retained from these (usually well-intended) demands. (shrink)

First, the role of markets as co-ordination mechanisms and, more generally, the role of exchange relations in a society is discussed. We consider illegal markets as well as markets where transactions are performed not using money but some other exchange medium. Secondly, we ask for the political possibilities to intervene into such markets. Finally, we discuss the increasing,economising of social relations' and possible reasons for it.

I first discuss two aspects of a social order and cooperation which might be of high relevance: the problem of a spontaneous emerging of a social order, and the relation between exchange and cooperation. In doing so, I also discuss the role of production in separating areas of cooperation from those of competition. Second, I look more closely at the motivations for cooperative behaviour. It is argued that of the four kinds of motivation mentioned by Leist only two, self-interest and (...) altruism, are really necessary to explain cooperation. (shrink)

The article starts out with a sketch of the model of Individual behaviour, basic for modern economic theory, including the consideration of typical criticisms. The model then is examined in its application first to micro- and macroeconomic theorizing, then to the economic analysis of politics and of law. It concludes by pointing out some drawbacks inherent in the economic approach to the social sciences: economic imperialism, conservativism and the illusion of manageability.

First it is shown that in order to function well markets depend on some preconditions even if there are no external effects and there is complete information. One of these conditions is that individuals follow some moral norms. Then it is asked whether these norms are non-consequentialist. There might be some norms for which no consequentialist foundation can be constructed. However, these are not the norms which have to be followed in order that a market system functions well. Such norm-following-behaviour (...) can successfully be analysed with the economic model of behaviour, if the motivational assumption of this model is not artificially restricted to consider only financial incentives. Finally it is pointed to the fact that it is reasonable to employ the economic model of behaviour not only for analysing social processes but also for developing policy recommendations. (shrink)

After a short description of the economic model of behaviour it is shown that there are two reasons why problems arise if this model is applied to political processes and decisions. First, such decisions are often ‘low cost’, i.e. ‘wrong’ decisions have hardly any impact on the decision maker. Second, the behaviour of single individuals or small groups of individuals is to be explained. The common root of this problem is the difficulty to predict behaviour which is mainly preference governed (...) and not guided by (changing) restrictions. Nevertheless, this should not lead to abolish the economic model because (i) it can be usefully applied also in this area and (ii) a better alternative is hardly available. (shrink)