Mr. Hulton has made interesting comments, 139–42) on my earlier article, 1–10), from which I note that he is in favour of the construction, and also sees emphatic meaning in some examples. I am afraid, however, that I do not find his arguments convincing. Perhaps some brief remarks on them may be helpful.

The use of and roughly ‘to be as naught’, and of the comparable phrases employing nominally, is well known, especially in tragedy, and has been frequently commented upon. None the less I think there is still some misapprehension about the nature of the use, seen in its most acute form where and μη- occur in conjunction. We may think of Soph. Aj. 1231 on which much ink has been spilt.

There are in iambic trimeters a number of examples of hiatus where is followed by forms of , mainly in Comedy but also in Tragedy. These are notable because they fall outside the usual range of hiatus in drama, which covers passages with interrogative and , invocatory exclamations such as , and interjections. The use seems to deserve closer attention.

The following notes are the result of an examination of all the early Epic passages containing λλ which I made for the purposes of the lexicon of Homer and the older Epic now under preparation by the Archiv für griechische Lexikographie at Hamburg. The texts surveyed were Homer, including the Hymns, Hesiod, and the Epic fragments. I also examined Apollonius Rhodius for the purpose of comparison.

It will be best to explain here, at the start, that I do not propose new etymologies for the words εὒξεινος and πόντος. I regard, then, εὒξεινος πόντος as meaning ‘the hospitable way’. My purpose is to show how such a name came to be given to the Black Sea by the Greeks. First, the word πόντος. The familiar explanation connects it with a series of words, of which I give the most important: Gk. πάτος ‘trodden path’; Skt. pάnthā ‘way’, (...) fem. pathyā ‘id.’; Zend paθ ‘id.’; Arm. hun ‘ford, road’; Lat. pons ‘bridge’. Further, as a verb the root appears in Gk. πατεν ‘tread down’ and is given in Walde-Pokorny as *pent- ‘tread, go’: W.-P. points out that the derived nouns mean ‘way’, and particularly a way that goes over or through water, as can be seen from the Armenian and Latin. (shrink)

It is one of the attractions of Greek syntax that it provides an abundance of usages which require careful discrimination, if we are to appreciate their value; and which at the same time present problems of interpretation which have not been completely solved. This is particularly the case with the use of the negatives, and it is one of these constructions with which we are concerned here.

Etymology, especially that of an ancient language like Greek, is not as a rule a field in which one expects to get conclusive demonstration; and between rival explanations one is often provided with a choice which cannot be made with much confidence. But despite this I think that I should reply to the article by W. S. Allen on ‘The Name of the Black Sea in Greek’ , pp. 86–8), which has raised again the question dealt with in my article (...) ‘The Name of the Euxine Pontus’ , pp. 123–8). This is not so much because I do not feel satisfied with Allen's explanation , as because this particular etymology has considerable historical, in addition to linguistic, interest. (shrink)

occurs in two classical contexts. They are: Alc. 320 L.-P. Democr. 156 Diels Elm. Sec. Hipp. 1. 2.

The construction of ν with the future has been hotly denied as impossible, so far as Attic Greek and indeed post-Homeric Greek generally are concerned. The opponents of the construction have had among their number such scholars as Dawes and Cobet; and of late, it seems, editors of texts generally. The view of Cobet is given on p. 469 of his Miscellanea Critica, with reference to Demosth. 9. 70 πάλαι τις δέως ν σως ρωτήσων κάθηται. Cobet, who has been followed (...) by later editors, altered ρωτήσων to ρωτήσας, commenting ‘ubi semel Constiterit δέως ν ρωτήσω, δέως ν πεύσομα aut simile quid pro ρωτήσαιμι vel πυθοίμην recte dici, turn demum librorum lectioni acquiescemus. quod equidem nunquam futurum esse satis scio.’ This view, which must of course be understood as excepting Homer from its scope, is nothing more than a blank denial of the possibility of the construction. We see more of an argument in Kühner-Gerth , where it is remarked that the construction, frequent in Homer, was later given up because ν with the optative was sufficient to express a future possibility; and that possibly emenders have done right to alter passages in Attic which contain it. This is not expressed with any great certainty. Nevertheless it has become to such an extent the prevailing view among editors that in modern texts it is extremely rare to find the construction allowed to remain. (shrink)

The root *pent-1 has achieved wide distribution in the IE. languages. In the course of its long history considerable modification of meaning has affected it, both as a primary verb and as it appears in derivative nouns, and here I refer particularly to Go. finpan ‘find’ and to Gk. πάτη ‘deceit’. With little ingenuity—against mere ingenuity, of course, the etymologist is bound to be on his guard—it is possible to trace the train of thought that connects the various forms. But (...) though the explanations here offered may well seem obvious, they have not, so far as I am aware, been previously published. The familiar dictionaries of Boisacq, Walde-Hofmann, and Walde-Pokorny do provide attempts at explanation, but these have little power of convincing. (shrink)

The question of the source of the pronominal forms , and of the later fully declined forms, presents an unusual situation. It seems clear from earlier work that we should not look for the answer outside Greek, nor probably even outside colloquial Attic Greek of the fifth century. These are strong advantages, but despite them one cannot have much confidence in the solutions so far provided, and there is room for a fresh approach. In addition to this, the usage of (...) the forms does not seem to have been explained satisfactorily, and I shall attempt to clarify it. (shrink)

In line 1171 of Aeschylus' Agamemnon the MSS. read μ The remainder of the sentence, after μ, is much disputed, but I am not concerned with finding the true reading of it. The whole sentence runs, in the MSS., as follows: κος δ' οδν πρκεσαντ μ πλιν μν σπερ ον χει παθεν: which appears in Thomson's Oresteia as:… πρκεσεν τ μ ok χειν πλιν μν σπερ ον χει. It is the note on this passage in Thomson to which I wish (...) to draw attention. It is from Headlam, and says, in justification of reading μ οκ, that in such phrases the scribes, finding μο, constantly omitted ο as περιττν. It adds that ο should always be restored, at any rate where there is any trace of it. (shrink)

Aristotle, in chapter 22 of the Poetics , has some remarks on poetic diction. He lays it down that, while poetry should be clear in meaning, it should avoid meanness of expression, σεμν δ κα ξαλλττουσα τò διωτικòν τος ξενικος κεχρημνη—it becomes dignified and elevated above the commonplace when it employs unusual words; ξενικòν δ λγω γλτταν κα μεταφορν κα πκτασιν κα πν τò παρ τò κριον—and examples of unusual words are rare words, metaphors, lengthened forms, and everything that differs (...) from normal speech. He then gives specimens of poetry, to show how the poetic effect can be spoilt by the substitution of τ κρια for τ ξενικ, and of these the two that follow are taken from the Odyssey. The first is Od. 9. 515. (shrink)

Ethics support staff help others to deal with moral challenges. However, they themselves can also experience moral challenges such as issues regarding (breaching) confidentiality when practicing ethics support. Currently there is no insight in these confidentiality issues and also no professional guidance for dealing with them. To gain insight into moral challenges related to Moral Case Deliberation (MCD), we studied a) beliefs and experiences of MCD facilitators regarding breaching confidentiality, b) considerations for (not) breaching confidentiality, and c) needs for an (...) ethics support tool. Data collection consisted of qualitative research methods: six semi-structured interviews; analyses of a) two recorded MCD sessions, and b) a focus group with MCD facilitators. Findings: MCD facilitators mention different conceptions and interpretations of confidentiality and various moral challenges. Questions concerning confidentiality ultimately cause reflections on roles and responsibilities of facilitators. Needs for ethics support vary from seeking advice to procedural and sometimes normative guidance for MCD facilitators. Education for MCD facilitators should focus on developing a concrete tool that stimulates awareness and reflection(skills). (shrink)

Prison work creates ethical challenges for which a training program was initiated for Dutch prison staff to foster their Moral Craftsmanship (MCS). The concept of MCS is not yet defined and operationalized in literature. This explorative study aims to 1) define MCS, 2) identify conceptual elements of MCS, and 3) develop a measurement tool for MCS. A document and literature study provided input for the definition and selection of conceptual elements related within DCIA policy documents, identifying three conceptual levels of (...) MCS: individual (cognition, attitude, and actions), team, and leadership. This first MCSQ consists of seventy-one items distributed across the domains: values and norms, judgment and reasoning, consultation, implementation, looking back, interactions, and leadership. We tested its usability via ‘think-aloud interviews.’ Validation of the current version of the MCS-Questionnaire and consensus among experts about what to include or exclude in the concept of MCS are needed for further development. (shrink)

The relative indifference to Kant's interpretation of aesthetics and teleology can no doubt be accounted for in several ways. Partly, it is simply that the natural approach to Kant is to begin with the Prolegomena, and then depending on one's interests, to move directly to Kant's treatment of the problem of knowledge or ethical action--thereby leaving Kant's independent analysis of judgment for last, if at all. Moreover, it is impossible to grasp the complexity of the problem of judgment without a (...) substantial understanding of Kant's first two inquiries. (shrink)

SummaryI examine an internal tension between Quine's empiricist methodology and his doctrine of naturalism — a tension that bears on his well‐known thesis of empirical underdetermination of scientific theory., viz., that there can be empirically equivalent but logically incompatible formulations of comprehensive scientific theory. Quine recognizes the tension and tries to resolve it via his distinction between the conditions that justify belief in a theory and the conditions that warrant the attribution of truth to a theory. I argue that Quine's (...) resolution is unsatisfactory, but that there is a more defensible resolution via Quine's own theory of ontological relativity; and moreover, the latter mode of resolution avoids certain undesirable aspects of Quine's problematic notion of evidence.Summary RésuméJ'examine la tension interne entre la méthodologie empiriciste de Quine et sa doctrine naturaliste — tension qui porte sur sa thèse de la sous‐détermination des théories scientifiques, these qui affirme qu'il peut y avoir des formulations empiriquement équivalentes, mais logiquement incompatibles de grandes théories scientifiques. Quine admet cette tension et cherche à la résoudre par sa distinction entre des conditions qui justifient la croyance en une théorie et d'autres qui garantissent l'attribution d'une valeur de véritéà cette théorie. Je prétends que la solution de Quine est insatisfaisante, mais on peut en proposer une autre, plus défendable, en se basant sur sa propre théorie de la relativité ontologique. En outre, cette dernière solution évite certains aspects indésirables de la notion, problématique chez Quine, d'évidence empirique.ZusammenfassungIch untersuche ein internes Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Quines empirischer Méthodologie und seiner naturalistischen Doktrin — ein Spannungsverhältnis, das in seiner bekannten These der empirischen Unterdeterminiertheit einer wissenschaftlichen Theorie begründet liegt, d.h. in der These, wonach es empirisch äquivalente, aber logisch inkompatible Formulierungen einer umfassenden wissenschaftlichen Theorie geben kann. Quine erkennt diese Spannung und versucht, sie durch seine Unterscheidung zwischen den Bedingungen, die den Glauben in eine Théorie rechtfertigen, und den Bedingungen, die die Zuschreibung von Wahrheit an diese Théorie begründen, aufzulösen. Ich argumentiere, dass Quines Lösung unbefriedigend ist, aber dass eine besser verteidigbare Lösung existiert, die an Quines eigene Theorie der ontologischen Relativität anknüpft; zudem vermeidet die letztgenannte Lösung gewisse unerwünschte Aspekte von Quines problematischem Begriff eines empirischen Belegs. (shrink)