Unethical employee behavior (UEB), an important organizational phenomenon, is dynamic and multi-faceted. Recent renewed interest in the role of emotion in ethical decision-making (EDM) suggests that unethical behaviors are neither always rationally derived nor deliberately undertaken. This study explores how to integrate the conscious and nonconscious dimensions of unethical decision-making. By broadening the scope of inquiry, we explore how integral affect—the emotion tied to anticipated decision outcomes for the employee engaging in misconduct—can shed light on UEB. We review related literature (...) on affect and EDM and propose a model in which we assert that at a decision point, an employee experiences multiple integral affects that are either persuasive or dissuasive toward UEB. We further posit that among these integral affects, a dominant integral affect (DIA) emerges, determining the nature and direction of unethical behavior. In addition, our model considers the role of affective residue and the influence of other factors, such as incidental affect, disposition, context, and retrospection, to derive propositions. Our DIA model can help managers gain a comprehensive understanding of how affect, characterized by its locus (self or other orientation) and valence (enhancing or harming), determines the characteristics of UEB. (shrink)

Plasma membrane lipid composition must be maintained during growth and under environmental insult. In yeast, signaling mediated by TOR Complex 2 -dependent protein kinase Ypk1 controls lipid abundance and distribution in response to membrane stress. Ypk1, among other actions, alleviates negative regulation of L-serine:palmitoyl-CoA acyltransferase, upregulating production of long-chain base precursors to sphingolipids. To explore other roles for TORC2-Ypk1 signaling in membrane homeostasis, we devised a three-tiered genome-wide screen to identify additional Ypk1 substrates, which pinpointed both catalytic subunits of the (...) ceramide synthase complex. Ypk1-dependent phosphorylation of both proteins increased upon either sphingolipid depletion or heat shock and was important for cell survival. Sphingolipidomics, other biochemical measurements and genetic analysis demonstrated that these modifications of ceramide synthase increased its specific activity and stimulated channeling of long-chain base precursors into sphingolipid end-products. Control at this branch point also prevents accumulation of intermediates that could compromise cell growth by stimulating autophagy. (shrink)

In this paper, we compare firm-specific attributes including outside director remuneration for two groups of firms. One of these groups consists of 96 firms that did not give stock options to the CEO during the sample period 1992 2001, while the other group of 571 firms granted stock options on a consistent basis during these years. Our results indicate that for the group with stock option grants, the remuneration to outside directors was significantly higher and the CEO had longer tenure (...) compared to the other group. These results are robust even after controlling for other economic attributes associated with the decision to grant stock options. (shrink)

Both W9 and OP3‐4 were known to bind the receptor activator of NF‐κB ligand (RANKL), inhibiting osteoclastogenesis. Recently, both peptides were shown to stimulate osteoblast differentiation; however, the mechanism underlying the activity of these peptides remains to be clarified. A primary osteoblast culture showed that rapamycin, an mTORC1 inhibitor, which was recently demonstrated to be an important serine/threonine kinase for bone formation, inhibited the peptide‐induced alkaline phosphatase activity. Furthermore, both peptides promoted the phosphorylation of Akt and S6K1, an upstream molecule (...) of mTORC1 and the effector molecule of mTORC1, respectively. In the in vivo calvarial defect model, W9 and OP3‐4 accelerated BMP‐2‐induced bone formation to a similar extent, which was confirmed by histomorphometric analyses using fluorescence images of undecalcified sections. Our data suggest that these RANKL‐binding peptides could stimulate the mTORC1 activity, which might play a role in the acceleration of BMP‐2‐induced bone regeneration by the RANKL‐binding peptides. (shrink)

Murali Ramachandran has kindly provided me with four (alleged) counterexamples to the theory of causation which I recently put forward in Mind (Ramachandran 2000; Noordhof 1999). Space is limited for a response. Since this note will be published Ramachandran's paper, I will not set out the cases he gives. I refer the reader to the appropriate descriptions. I will also presume knowledge of the framework of my paper and just give page references in case this is helpful. (...) I will try to couch the discussion with as little reference to the technical apparatus of my paper as possible. Maybe the ideas will stand out more clearly that way. (shrink)

Three-dimensional protein structures usually contain regions of local order, called secondary structure, such as α-helices and β-sheets. Secondary structure is characterized by the local rotational state of the protein backbone, quantified by two dihedral angles called Øand Ψ. Particular types of secondary structure can generally be described by a single location on a two-dimensional plot drawn in the space of the angles Ø andΨ, called a Ramachandran plot. By contrast, a recently-discovered nanomaterial made from peptoids, structural isomers of peptides, (...) displays a secondary-structure motif corresponding to two regions on the Ramachandran plot [Mannige et al., Nature 526, 415 ]. In order to describe such 'higher-order' secondary structure in a compact way we introduce here a means of describing regions on the Ramachandran plot in terms of a single Ramachandran number, R, which is a structurally meaningful combination of Ø andΨ. We show that the potential applications of R are numerous: it can be used to describe the geometric content of protein structures, and can be used to draw diagrams that reveal, at a glance, the frequency of occurrence of regular secondary structures and disordered regions in large protein datasets. We propose that R might be used as an order parameter for protein geometry for a wide range of applications. (shrink)

[opening paragraph]: Ramachandran and Hirstein in their article, ‘The Science of Art: A Neurological Theory of Aesthetic Experience’ make the grandiose claim of having developed a theory of human aesthetic experience, while reducing that very experience to meaningless terms. As a practising artist whose work is informed by contemporary theory as well as a Buddhist practice, I find it hard to take their argument seriously. Clearly, it is necessary to examine one's assumptions about the nature of the artistic experience (...) before attempting to develop grand theory. (shrink)

Ramachandran and Hubbard's superb article on 'Synaesthesia: A window into perception, thought and language' fills a gap in our understanding of a phenomenon that many of my students have asked me to fill. Up to now I have failed to have a satisfactory answer. It really does no good to say that somewhere in the brain or brain stem 'representations' must be able to get together. The evidence presented that cortical connectivity is involved provides an entree into the process (...) that raises important issues. (shrink)

E. J. Lowe; Reply to ramachandran on conditionals and transitivity, Analysis, Volume 52, Issue 2, 1 April 1992, Pages 77–80, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/52.2.

The article on synaesthesia by Ramachandran and Hubbard is comprehensive and intellectually stimulating. In this commentary, I would like to present some empirical data not discussed in R&H and to raise some theoretical questions relating to ideas proposed in this article. My comments will be divided into three sections, or - rather - three stories, which correspond to three, independent and different, occasions in my career in which I found myself dealing with synaesthesia. Each of these stories carries a (...) moral that adds to the picture of synaesthesia drawn in R&H. (shrink)

To the historian of art, it is evident that the two authors’ notion of ‘art’ is of very recent date, and not shared by everybody. They claim: ‘The purpose of art, surely, is not merely to depict or represent reality -- for that can be accomplished very easily with a camera -- but to enhance, transcend, or even to distort reality’ . They do not explain how one could photograph Paradise or Hell, the Creation of the World, the Passion of (...) Christ, or the escapades of the ancient gods -- all subjects that can be found represented in our museums. Nor is it more legitimate to generalize from certain Indian conventions of representing the female nude than it is for the academic tradition to take the Venus de Medici for the same purpose. Even a fleeting visit to one of the great museums might serve to convince the authors that few of the exhibits conform to the laws of art they postulate. [followed by response from V.S. Ramachandran]. (shrink)

Neuroaesthetics is the study of the brain’s response to artistic stimuli. The neuroscientist V.S. Ramachandran contends that art is primarily “caricature” or “exaggeration.” Exaggerated forms hyperactivate neurons in viewers’ brains, which in turn produce specific, “universal” responses. Ramachandran identifies a precursor for his theory in the concept of rasa (literally “juice”) from classical Hindu aesthetics, which he associates with “exaggeration.” The canonical Sanskrit texts of Bharata Muni’s Natya Shastra and Abhinavagupta’s Abhinavabharati, however, do not support Ramachandran’s conclusions. (...) They present audiences as dynamic co-creators, not passive recipients. I believe we could more accurately model the neurology of Hindu aesthetic experiences if we took indigenous rasa theory more seriously as qualitative data that could inform future research. (shrink)

It is a common assumption in contemporary cognitive neuroscience that discovering a putative realized kind to be dissociably realized (i.e., to be realized in each instance by two or more distinct realizers) mandates splitting that kind. Here I explore some limits on this inference using two deceptively similar examples: the dissociation of declarative and procedural memory and Ramachandran's argument that the self is an illusion.

Smythies and Ramachandran claim that the direct realist theory of perception has been refuted by recent psychophysics. This paper takes up the psychophysics, and the definition of direct realism employed by Smythies and Ramachandran, to show that direct realism has not been so refuted. I argue that the direct realist may grant that perceptual images are constructed by the central nervous system, without treating those images as “phenomenal objects.” Until phenomenal objects are shown to be distinct from extra-mental (...) objects, and the only objects of perception properly so-called, the direct realist will remain generally edified by the relevant psychophysics. (shrink)

In recent years, interest in the scientific basis of religious experience has resurged. In particular, research and publications by V. S. Ramachandran and by Eugene d’Aquili and Andrew Newberg have sparked considerable curiosity and debate over the reality and basis of religious experience. This article puts such research into a broader context and examines the extent to which scientific research supports or undermines particular religious and theological claims. I argue that such experiments show that religious experience has some biological (...) basis and is not simply a product of cultural suggestion. At the same time, such experiences are not completely self–interpreting, so that cultural context, including theological claims, are needed to make sense of such experiences. By itself, scientific research does not prove or disprove the reality of religious experiences generally, but it does shape how we think of the possibilities and interpretations of such experiences. (shrink)

Ramachandran and Hirstein offer a number of interesting ideas about aesthetic preference. In this commentary I shall focus mainly on their ideas concerning peak shift and prototypicality. The authors give the example of a rat rewarded for responding to a rectangle and not rewarded for responding to a longer triangle . They argue that the rat will respond even more to a more elongated rectangle. In fact, two phenomena are involved here. Peak shift refers to the fact that the (...) rat responds more to a supernormal stimulus . Behavioural contrast refers to the fact that the rat responds more to the S++ than it did to the S+ before discrimination training took place. It does not detract from the authors’ main point, but we would be unlikely to find peak shift in the hypothetical experiment described. Peak shift only occurs when the S+ and the S- are very similar to each other . Let us say that we train a rat to respond to a 1000 Hz tone and not to respond to a 500 Hz tone. No peak shift will be found. We will find peak shift if the S+ is 1000 Hz and the S- is 950 Hz. The conventional explanation for this is that the animal shows generalization. A rat trained simply to respond to a 1000 Hz tone will also respond a bit less to one of 990 Hz, even less to one of 980 Hz, and so on. In discrimination training, our rat would have a strong tendency to respond to a 1000 Hz tone but, because of generalization from the 950 Hz tone, it would also have some tendency not to respond to it. If we subtract the inhibitory gradient around 950 Hz from the excitatory gradient around 1000 Hz, we will end up with maximal responding around, say, 1010 Hz . Intuitively, we would expect the rat to respond more to the S++ but also less vigorously than it had to the S+ before discrimination training was begun. This is because the inhibitory gradient has been subtracted from the excitatory gradient. Surprisingly, we find behavioural contrast; the rat responds more vigorously to the S++ than it had to the S+. Grossberg argues that this is because there is a tendency to keep amount of activation on a layer of cortex constant. (shrink)

[opening paragraph]: Drs. Ramachandran and Hirstein break new ground in ‘The Science of Art: A Neurological Theory of Aesthetic Experience', by setting out an unprecedented theory of how the brain processes and responds to art. There is much to be learned here about vision, the act of seeing and its relationship to the body's limbic system.

[opening paragraph]: Dr. Ramachandran is a distinguished researcher in the field of cognitive neuroscience whose work is grounded in impressive clinical data. As a scientific materialist, he has provided powerful arguments against the metaphysical notion of the ‘self', suggesting that our consciousness is really a biological function of the brain. He and his collaborator, William Hirstein, have now turned to human artistic activity, putting forward the argument that it is essentially a product of neural mechanism. They employ the experimental (...) ‘peak shift effect’ to sustain this hypothesis. The experiment demonstrates that a rat's cognitive achievements are related to the reward it receives for discriminating different shapes. Applying this principle to human responses to the visual image, they argue that certain simplified and exaggerated images, as for instance, caricature, appeal to our emotions and have the innate ability to give us pleasure. Furthermore, the binding of correlated features creates unitary objects that provide further grounds for aesthetic appeal. This is because, given our limited ability to concentrate, the most appealing art is one that produces heightened activity within a single dimension. (shrink)

[opening paragraph]: Ramachandran and Hirstein claim that ‘peak shift', or exaggeration of salient features, ‘explains not only caricatures but all art.’ I would like to test the peak shift hypothesis in a case that at first glance seems to support it. Edmond Rostand's play Cyrano de Bergerac is the tragicomic tale of a grand poetic wit of Paris in the 17th. century, a noble fighter and master of fencing who loves with all his heart, but feels he is unlovable (...) for one very prominent reason: his wondrously prognathous nose. When a challenger pokes fun at Cyrano's most notable facial feature, the latter contemptuously provides a lesson in satiric exaggeration. (shrink)

Many philosophers, following David Lewis, believe that we should look to counterpart theory, not quantified modal logic, as a means of understanding modal discourse. We argue that this is a mistake. Significant parts of modal discourse involve either implicit or explicit reference to what is actually the case, raising the question of how talk about actuality is to be represented counterpart-theoretically. By considering possible modifications of Lewis's counterpart theory, including actual modifications due to Graeme Forbes and Murali Ramachandran, we (...) argue that no coherent version of counterpart theory can provide a plausible representation of talk about actuality, and so, we conclude, counterpart theory should be rejected. (shrink)

Philosophers have long been fascinated by the connection between cause and effect: are 'causes' things we can experience, or are they concepts provided by our minds? The study of causation goes back to Aristotle, but resurged with David Hume and Immanuel Kant, and is now one of the most important topics in metaphysics. Most of the recent work done in this area has attempted to place causation in a deterministic, scientific, worldview. But what about the unpredictable and chancey world we (...) actually live in: can one theory of causation cover all instances of cause and effect? _Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World _is a collection of specially written papers by world-class metaphysicians. Its focus is the problem facing the 'reductionist' approach to causation: the attempt to cover all types of causation, deterministic and indeterministic, with one basic theory. Contributors: Stephen Barker, Helen Beebee, Phil Dowe, Dorothy Edgington, Doug Ehring, Chris Hitchcock, Igal Kwart, Paul Noordhof, Murali Ramachandran and Michael Tooley. (shrink)

Science is often thought of as a methodical but dull activity. But the finest science, the breakthroughs most admired and respected by scientists themselves, is characterized by elegance." "What does elegance mean in the context of science? Economy is a considerable part of it; creativity too. Sometimes, a suggested solution is so simple and neat that it elicits an exclamation of wonder from the observer. The greatest science, whether primarily theoretical or experimental, reflects a creative imagination." "In this book, the (...) distinguished physiologist and writer Ian Glynn explores some of the finest examples of elegance in science: the delightful simplicity of the laws discovered by Kepler and Newton in the motion of the planets; Galileo's experiments with an inclined plane; the remarkable work of Thomas Young on light; dazzling insights into the counterintuitive workings of our perception demonstrated by Richard Gregory and Vilayanur Ramachandran; and the several breakthroughs that led to Crick and Watson's unravelling of the structure and function of DNA. The result is a fascinating tour through some of the most important episodes in the history of science."--BOOK JACKET. (shrink)

V.S. Ramachandran and William Hirstein's thought-provoking article ‘The science of art: a neurological theory of aesthetic experience’ and the accompanying commentaries raise serious questions about what a science of art is. Unfortunately this short piece will only be able to address them broadly. Overall the problems arise from the exclusion of neurological studies of artists, the exclusion of the artist's experience, and the premises of the theory, which are based on problematic valuations related to aesthetics and spirituality. With these (...) valuations, for which there is no scientific proof, the model is unable to sufficiently address the scope of what artists do and what art forms are. While it is my view that the Ramachandran and Hirstein theory is fundamentally flawed, it is likely the flaws are due to implicit assumptions rather than explicit intentions. (shrink)

It is being increasingly recognized that the Saussurean dictum of “the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign” is in conflict with the pervasiveness of the phenomenon commonly known as “sound symbolism”. After first presenting a historical overview of the debate, however, we conclude that both positions have been exaggerated, and that an adequate explanation of sound symbolism is still lacking. How can there, for example, be (perceived) similarity between expressionsand contents across different sensory modalities? We offer an answer, based on the (...) Peircian notion of iconic ground, and G. Sonesson’s distinction betweenprimary and secondary iconicity. Furthermore, we describe an experimental study, in a paradigm first pioneered by W. Kohler, and recently popularized by V.Ramachandran, in which we varied vowels and consonants in fictive word-forms, and conclude that both types of sounds play a role in perceiving an iconic ground between the word-forms and visual figures. The combination of historical conceptual analysis, semiotic explication and psychological experimentationpresented in this article is characteristic of the emerging paradigm of cognitive semiotics. (shrink)

This paper is a presentation and critical introduction to the monographic section “Knowledge, Memory and Perception”. Three of the papers included in this section deal with questions concerning the sources and forms of empirical knowledge. Two of them (Olga Fernández, Jordi Fernández) focus on the problem of the intentional content of perception and of episodic memory, respectively. Manuel Liz, in turn, intends to develop a stable version of direct realism about perception. Murali Ramachandran, in contrast, looks for a definition (...) of knowledge that is immune to Gettier-style counterexamples. Against Williamson, he holds this is a genuine and important problem. These contributions to the monographic section are exposed, commented, and criticized in detail. (shrink)

Among the book's arguments: Aesthetic property relativism, as described by Alan Goldman, requires subjects to make judgments based on prima facie preferences for determinable properties (eg being curved, being blue). These judgments are not bona fide because they do not require acquaintance with objects. Value concepts and aesthetic (thick) concepts relate contingently. We can be aesthetic property realists, or quasi-realists, without being aesthetic value realists. Contains epistemological arguments against neuro-aesthetics (Ramachandran), aesthetic sense theory (Hutcheson), physiological theories (Burke), and Hume's (...) realism. (shrink)

Partial consistency statements can be expressed as polynomial-size propositional formulas. Frege proof systems have polynomial-size partial self-consistency proofs. Frege proof systems have polynomial-size proofs of partial consistency of extended Frege proof systems if and only if Frege proof systems polynomially simulate extended Frege proof systems. We give a new proof of Reckhow's theorem that any two Frege proof systems p-simulate each other. The proofs depend on polynomial size propositional formulas defining the truth of propositional formulas. These are already known to (...) exist since the Boolean formula value problem is in alternating logarithmic time; this paper presents a proof of this fact based on a construction which is somewhat simpler than the prior proofs of Buss and of Buss-Cook- Gupta-Ramachandran. (shrink)

Arguments against the Russellian theory of definite descriptions based on cases that involve failures of uniqueness are a recurrent theme in the relevant literature. In this paper, I discuss a number of such arguments, from Strawson (1950), Ramachandran (1993) and Szabo (2005). I argue that the Russellian has resources to account for these data by deploying a variety of mechanisms of quantifier domain restrictions. Finally, I present a case that is more problematic for the Russellian. While the previous cases (...) all involve referential uses of descriptions (or some variations of such uses), the most effective objection to the uniqueness condition draws on genuine attributive uses. (shrink)

In response to counterexamples involving late preemption, David Lewis (1986) revised his original (1973) counterfactual analysis of causation to include the notion of quasi-dependence. Jonardon Ganeri, Paul Noordhof and Murali Ramachandran (1998) argue that their ‘PCA*-analysis’ of causation solves the problem of late preemption and is superior to Lewis’s analysis. I show that neither quasi-dependence nor the PCA*-analysis solves the problem of late preemption.

This article addresses the phenomenology of aesthetic experience. It first, critically, considers one of the most influential approaches to the psychophysics of aesthetic perception, viz. neuroaesthetics. Hereafter, it outlines constitutive tenets of aesthetic perception in terms of a particular intentional relation to the object. The argument comes in three steps. First, I show the inadequacies of the neuroaesthetics of beauty in general and Semir Zeki’s and V.J. Ramachandran’s versions of it in particular. The neuroaesthetics of beauty falls short, because (...) it develops hypotheses of aesthetic experience which have no consequences for the understanding of what art is, that is, how artists produce visual meaning effects in their works. This is so because they make the rewarding feeling of beauty the cornerstone of aesthetic experience. Next, I show why and how aesthetic experience should be defined relative to its object and the tools for meaning-making specific to that object, and not relative to the feeling (of beauty) it may elicit. Finally, I sketch the import this fact may have on a research program in empirical aesthetics. (shrink)

In ‘The Science of Art’ Ramachandran and Hirstein have written a vigorous, thought provoking paper. It raises many issues, but in the interest of brevity, I can only consider a few of them here.

Consciousness is known to be limited in processing capacity and often described in terms of a unique processing stream across a single dimension: time. In this paper, we discuss a purely temporal pattern code, functionally decoupled from spatial signals, for conscious state generation in the brain. Arguments in favour of such a code include Dehaene et al.'s long-distance reverberation postulate, Ramachandran's remapping hypothesis, evidence for a temporal coherence index and coincidence detectors, and Grossberg's Adaptive Resonance Theory. A time-bin resonance (...) model is developed, where temporal signatures of conscious states are generated on the basis of signal reverberation across large distances in highly plastic neural circuits. The temporal signatures are delivered by neural activity patterns which, beyond a certain statistical threshold, activate, maintain, and terminate a conscious brain state like a bar code would activate, maintain, or inactivate the electronic locks of a safe. Such temporal resonance would reflect a higher level of neural processing, independent from sensorial or perceptual brain mechanisms. (shrink)

1. I want to discuss a new area of scientific research called neuro-aesthetics, which is the study of art by neuroscientists. The most prominent champions of neuroaesthetics are V.S. Ramachandran and Semir Zeki, both of whom have both made ambitious claims about their work. Ramachandran says boldly that he has discovered “the key to understanding what art really is”, and that his theory of art can be tested by brain imaging experiments, although he does not describe these experiments, (...) or explain what results the theory predicts (Ramachandran and Hirstein 1999, 17). Zeki, who originally coined the term “neuro-aesthetics”, claims to have laid the foundations for understanding “the biological basis of aesthetic experience”, and to have formulated a “neurobiological definition of art” (Zeki 1999, 2, 22). If these claims are true, we are at the dawn of a new age in the study of art. Up to now, most of the people studying art have been historians, some of whom can read Latin, but hardly any of whom have mastered even the rudiments of brain science. And aesthetics has been in the hands of philosophers, who still disagree among themselves about ideas that were stated in the fourth century BC. Neuroaesthetics is different. As Ramachandran (2000, 19) says: “These ideas have the advantage that, unlike the vague notions of philosophers and art historians, they can be tested experimentally”. So, is neuro-aesthetics the next big thing? I want to assess its prospects, starting with Ramachandran. (shrink)

No two individuals with the autism diagnosis are ever the same—yet many practitioners and parents can recognize signs of ASD very rapidly with the naked eye. What, then, is this phenotype of autism that shows itself across such distinct clinical presentations and heterogeneous developments? The “signs” seem notoriously slippery and resistant to the behavioral threshold categories that make up current assessment tools. Part of the problem is that cognitive and behavioral “abilities” typically are theorized as high-level disembodied and modular functions—that (...) are assessed discretely (impaired, normal, enhanced) to define a spectral syndrome. Even as biology reminds us that organic developing bodies are not made up of independent switches, we remain often seduced by the simplicity of mechanistic and cognitive models. Developmental disorders such as autism have accordingly been theorized as due to different modular dysfunctions—typically of cortical origin, i.e., failures of “theory of mind” (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), of the “mirror neuron system” (Ramachandran and Oberman, 2006), of “weak central coherence” (Happe and Frith, 2006) or of the balance of “empathizing” and “systemizing” (Baron-Cohen, 2009), just to list a few. -/- The broad array of autonomic (Ming et al., 2005; Cheshire, 2012) and sensorimotor (Damasio and Maurer, 1978; Maurer and Damasio, 1982; Donnellan and Leary, 1995; Leary and Hill, 1996; Donnellan and Leary, 2012; Donnellan et al., 2012) differences experienced and reported by people with autism have by such theories typically been sidelined as “co-morbidities,” possibly sharing genetic causes, but rendered as incidental and decisively behaviorally irrelevant symptoms—surely disconnected from cognition. But what if the development of cortically based mental processes and autonomous control relies on the complexities and proper function of the peripheral nervous systems? Through such an “embodied” lens the heterogeneous symptoms of autism invites new interpretations. We propose here that many behavioral-level findings can be re-defined as downstream effects of how developing nervous systems attempt to cope and adapt to the challenges of having various noisy, unpredictable, and unreliable peripheral inputs. (shrink)

Consciousness is known to be limited in processing capacity and often described in terms of a unique processing stream across a single dimension: time. In this paper, we discuss a purely temporal pattern code, functionally decoupled from spatial signals, for conscious state generation in the brain. Arguments in favour of such a code include Dehaene et al.’s long-distance reverberation postulate, Ramachandran’s remapping hypothesis, evidence for a temporal coherence index and coincidence detectors, and Grossberg’s Adaptive Resonance Theory. A time-bin resonance (...) model is developed, where temporal signatures of conscious states are generated on the basis of signal reverberation across large distances in highly plastic neural circuits. The temporal signatures are delivered by neural activity patterns which, beyond a certain statistical threshold, activate, maintain, and terminate a conscious brain state like a bar code would activate, maintain, or inactivate the electronic locks of a safe. Such temporal resonance would reflect a higher level of neural processing, one that is independent from sensorial or perceptual brain mechanisms. (shrink)

This review provides a commentary on coloured-hearing arising on hearing music: music-colour synaesthesia. Although traditionally explained by the hyperconnectivity theory (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001a) and the disinhibited feedback theory (Grossenbacher & Lovelace, 2001) as a purely perceptual phenomenon, the review of eight coloured-hearing neuroimaging studies shows that it may not be assumed that these explanations are directly translatable to music-colour synaesthesia. The concept of 'ideaesthesia' (Nikolić, 2009) and the role of conceptual and semantic inducers challenge the likelihood of a (...) single mechanism underlying the cause of synaesthesia and argue for a move away from a purely sensory to sensory explanation. Finally, music-colour synaesthesia forms a challenge for established philosophical theories and the position of synaesthesia is considered within the larger context of musical qualia. (shrink)