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  1. added 2018-12-22
    Das Kontingenzpostulat der Wahrheit.Gregor Damschen - 2005 - Hegel-Jahrbuch 7 (1):320-325.
    The Contingency Postulate of Truth. - Is there a statement that cannot be false under any contingent conditions? Two well-known philosophical schools have given contradictory answers to this question about the existence of a necessarily true statement: Fallibilists (Albert, Keuth) have denied its existence, transcendental pragmatists (Apel, Kuhlmann) and objective idealists (Wandschneider, Hösle) have affirmed it. Dieter Wandschneider has (following Vittorio Hösle) translated the principle of fallibilism, according to which every statement is fallible, into a thesis which he calls the (...)
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  2. added 2017-07-10
    Katz’s Revisability Paradox Dissolved.Allard Tamminga & Sander Verhaegh - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):771-784.
    Quine's holistic empiricist account of scientific inquiry can be characterized by three constitutive principles: *noncontradiction*, *universal revisability* and *pragmatic ordering*. We show that these constitutive principles cannot be regarded as statements within a holistic empiricist's scientific theory of the world. This claim is a corollary of our refutation of Katz's [1998, 2002] argument that holistic empiricism suffers from what he calls the Revisability Paradox. According to Katz, Quine's empiricism is incoherent because its constitutive principles cannot themselves be rationally revised. Using (...)
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  3. added 2015-05-27
    Why Did Weyl Think That Dedekind’s Norm of Belief in Mathematics is Perverse?Iulian D. Toader - 2016 - In Early Analytic Philosophy – New Perspectives on the Tradition. The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol. 80,. pp. 445-451.
    This paper discusses an intriguing, though rather overlooked case of normative disagreement in the history of philosophy of mathematics: Weyl's criticism of Dedekind’s famous principle that "In science, what is provable ought not to be believed without proof." This criticism, as I see it, challenges not only a logicist norm of belief in mathematics, but also a realist view about whether there is a fact of the matter as to what norms of belief are correct.
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  4. added 2014-03-19
    Mathematics as a Quasi-Empirical Science.Gianluigi Oliveri - 2004 - Foundations of Science 11 (1-2):41-79.
    The present paper aims at showing that there are times when set theoretical knowledge increases in a non-cumulative way. In other words, what we call ‘set theory’ is not one theory which grows by simple addition of a theorem after the other, but a finite sequence of theories T1, ..., Tn in which Ti+1, for 1 ≤ i < n, supersedes Ti. This thesis has a great philosophical significance because it implies that there is a sense in which mathematical theories, (...)
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  5. added 2011-08-16
    Paradigm Transitions in Mathematics.Claire L. Parkinson - 1987 - Philosophia Mathematica (2):127-150.
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