The Folk Psychology of Consciousness

Mind and Language 26 (3):327-352 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper proposes the ‘AGENCY model’ of conscious state attribution, according to which an entity's displaying certain relatively simple features (e.g. eyes, distinctive motions, interactive behavior) automatically triggers a disposition to attribute conscious states to that entity. To test the model's predictions, participants completed a speeded object/attribution task, in which they responded positively or negatively to attributions of mental properties (including conscious and non-conscious states) to different sorts of entities (insects, plants, artifacts, etc.). As predicted, participants responded positively to conscious state attributions only for those entities that typically display the simple features identified in the AGENCY model (eyes, distinctive motion, interaction) and took longer to deny conscious states to those entities

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,779

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-06-02

Downloads
247 (#84,352)

6 months
19 (#182,589)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Adam Arico
University of Alabama
Shaun Nichols
Cornell University

Citations of this work

Intuition.Joel Pust - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Intuitions about consciousness: Experimental studies.Joshua Knobe & Jesse Prinz - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):67-83.
Zombie intuitions.Eugen Fischer & Justin Sytsma - 2021 - Cognition 215 (C):104807.

View all 41 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.Thomas Reid - 1785 - University Park, Pa.: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Derek R. Brookes & Knud Haakonssen.
The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1983 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.
Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism.Christopher S. Hill - 1991 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

View all 33 references / Add more references