Are intentions reasons?

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (4):424–444 (2007)
Abstract
This paper presents an objection to the view that intentions provide reasons and shows how this objection is also inherited by the more commonly accepted Tie-Breaker view, according to which intentions provide reasons only in tie-break situations. The paper also considers and rejects T. M. Scanlon's argument for the Tie-Breaker view and argues that philosophers might be drawn to accept the problematic Tie-Breaker view by confusing it with a very similar, unproblematic view about the relation between intentions and reasons in tie-break situations.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00301.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,071
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Coherent and the Rational.Errol Lord - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (2):151-175.
Desires as Additional Reasons? The Case of Tie-Breaking.Attila Tanyi - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):209-227.
Promising-Part 1.Ulrike Heuer - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (12):832-841.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

96 ( #53,552 of 2,171,692 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #118,057 of 2,171,692 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums