Frege's Regress

Abstract

In his essay 'Thoughts',' Frege is to be found employing a regress-argument against the correspondence theory of truth. He seems to have felt that the argument is not only completely destructive of the correspondence theory, but that it could be deployed equally well against any attempt to provide a general definition of the notion of truth. In my view neither conclusion is warranted. But Frege's Regress can, nevertheless, be developed into an argument of the greatest significance.

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2011-05-29

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Peter Carruthers
University of Maryland, College Park

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Pluralism and the Absence of Truth.Jeremy Wyatt - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Connecticut
Conceptual Pragmatism.Peter Carruthers - 1987 - Synthese 73 (2):205 - 224.

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