The Pitfalls of Interest-Relative Invariantism

Acta Analytica 31 (3):253-261 (2016)

Authors
David Coss
Indiana University Kokomo
Abstract
In this paper, I present and extend Neta’s : 180–187 2007) counter-example against interest-relative invariantism. I first outline IRI, briefly explaining the content of the view and illustrating how it diverges from more classical approaches to epistemology. I then distinguish between two forms the view can take: a strong and a moderate formulation. After this, I argue that Neta’s counter-example only succeeds at undermining the strongest variant, leaving the weaker counterpart unscathed. After all of this is accomplished, I extend Neta-style counter-examples to undermine a more moderate variant. I close the paper by considering and responding to several objections.
Keywords Pragmatic encroachment  Interest-relative invarianism  Neta
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-015-0276-6
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.
Anti-Intellectualism and the Knowledge-Action Principle. [REVIEW]Ram Neta - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):180–187.

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