The anti-zombie argument

Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):650–666 (2007)
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Abstract

In recent years the 'zombie argument' has come to occupy a central role in the case against physicalist views of consciousness, in large part because of the powerful advocacy it has received from David Chalmers.1 In this paper I seek to neutralize it by showing that a parallel argument can be run for physicalism, an argument turning on the conceivability of what I shall call anti-zombies. I shall argue that the result is a stand-off, and that the zombie argument offers no independent reason to reject physicalism.

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Keith Frankish
University of Sheffield

Citations of this work

Zombies.Robert Kirk - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A causal argument for dualism.Bradford Saad - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2475-2506.

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References found in this work

Consciousness and its place in nature.David Chalmers - 2003 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 102--142.
The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief.David Chalmers - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 220--72.
Materialism and the metaphysics of modality.David J. Chalmers - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):473-96.
Phenomenal states.Brian Loar - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.
What experience teaches.David K. Lewis - 1990 - In William G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition. Blackwell. pp. 29--57.

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