The anti-zombie argument

Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):650–666 (2007)
In recent years the 'zombie argument' has come to occupy a central role in the case against physicalist views of consciousness, in large part because of the powerful advocacy it has received from David Chalmers.1 In this paper I seek to neutralize it by showing that a parallel argument can be run for physicalism, an argument turning on the conceivability of what I shall call anti-zombies. I shall argue that the result is a stand-off, and that the zombie argument offers no independent reason to reject physicalism.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.510.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 29,308
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality.David J. Chalmers - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):473-96.
Review: Concepts and Consciousness. [REVIEW]Stephen Yablo - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):455 - 463.
Zombies Versus Materialists: The Battle for Conceivability.Peter Marton - 1998 - Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (1):131-138.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Zombies and Epiphenomenalism.Andrew R. Bailey - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (1):129.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index

Total downloads
240 ( #15,310 of 2,180,176 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
17 ( #14,050 of 2,180,176 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums