The anti-zombie argument

Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):650–666 (2007)
Keith Frankish
University of Sheffield
In recent years the 'zombie argument' has come to occupy a central role in the case against physicalist views of consciousness, in large part because of the powerful advocacy it has received from David Chalmers.1 In this paper I seek to neutralize it by showing that a parallel argument can be run for physicalism, an argument turning on the conceivability of what I shall call anti-zombies. I shall argue that the result is a stand-off, and that the zombie argument offers no independent reason to reject physicalism.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.510.x
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References found in this work BETA

Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality.David J. Chalmers - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):473-96.
Concepts and Consciousness.Stephen Yablo - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):455-463.
Zombies Versus Materialists: The Battle for Conceivability.Peter Marton - 1998 - Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (1):131-138.
Review: Concepts and Consciousness. [REVIEW]Stephen Yablo - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):455 - 463.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Causal Argument for Dualism.Bradford Saad - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2475-2506.
Zombies and Epiphenomenalism.Andrew R. Bailey - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (1):129.

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