How causal knowledge simplifies decision-making

Minds and Machines 16 (3):365-380 (2006)
Making decisions can be hard, but it can also be facilitated. Simple heuristics are fast and frugal but nevertheless fairly accurate decision rules that people can use to compensate for their limitations in computational capacity, time, and knowledge when they make decisions [Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P. M., & the ABC Research Group (1999). Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart. New York: Oxford University Press.]. These heuristics are effective to the extent that they can exploit the structure of information in the environment in which they operate. Specifically, they require knowledge about the predictive value of probabilistic cues. However, it is often difficult to keep track of all the available cues in the environment and how they relate to any relevant criterion. This problem becomes even more critical if compound cues are considered. We submit that knowledge about the causal structure of the environment helps decision makers focus on a manageable subset of cues, thus effectively reducing the potential computational complexity inherent in even relatively simple decision-making tasks. We review experimental evidence that tested this hypothesis and report the results of a simulation study. We conclude that causal knowledge can act as a meta-cue for identifying highly valid cues, either individual or compound, and helps in the estimation of their validities.
Keywords Causal knowledge  Compound cue  Cue selection  Fast and frugal heuristics  Search processes  Take the Best  Take the Best Configural  Validity estimation
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DOI 10.1007/s11023-006-9035-1
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References found in this work BETA
Peter Spirtes, Clark Glymour & Richard Scheines (1996). Causation, Prediction, and Search. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (1):113-123.

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