Why Purists Should Be Infallibilists

Philosophical Studies:1-16 (forthcoming)

Authors
Michael Hannon
Nottingham University
Abstract
Two of the most orthodox ideas in epistemology are fallibilism and purism. According to the fallibilist, one can know that a particular claim is true even though one’s justification for that claim is less than fully conclusive. According to the purist, knowledge does not depend on practical factors. Fallibilism and purism are widely assumed to be compatible; in fact, the combination of these views has been called the ‘ho-hum,’ obvious, traditional view of knowledge. But I will argue that fallibilism and purism are incompatible. The best explanation for fallibilism requires one to reject purism, while maintaining purism should lead one to reject fallibilism. It follows that the orthodox view of knowledge is deeply mistaken.
Keywords knowledge  purism  fallibilism  justification  pragmatic encroachment
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-018-1200-x
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References found in this work BETA

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Why Purists Should Be Infallibilists.Michael Hannon - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-16.

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