Authors
Gilbert Harman
Princeton University
Abstract
The problem of induction is sometimes motivated via a comparison between rules of induction and rules of deduction. Valid deductive rules are necessarily truth preserving, while inductive rules are not.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00583.x
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References found in this work BETA

Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Reflective Equilibrium.Daniels Norman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Conditionals and Consequences.Gregory Wheeler, Henry E. Kyburg & Choh Man Teng - 2007 - Journal of Applied Logic 5 (4):638-650.
Applied Logic Without Psychologism.Gregory Wheeler - 2008 - Studia Logica 88 (1):137-156.

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