Williamson's casual approach to probabilism

In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009)
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Mark Kaplan
Indiana University, Bloomington

Citations of this work

In defense of modest probabilism.Mark Kaplan - 2010 - Synthese 176 (1):41 - 55.
Coming to Terms with our Human Fallibility: Christensen on the Preface.Mark Kaplan - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):1-35.

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