Truth and directness in pictorial assertion

Linguistics and Philosophy 46 (6):1441–1465 (2023)
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Abstract

This paper develops an account of accuracy and truth in pictorial assertion. It argues that there are two ways in which pictorial assertions can be indirect: with respect to their content and with respect to their target. This twofold indirectness explains how accurate, unedited pictures can be used to make false pictorial assertions. It captures the fishiness of true pictorial assertions involving target-indirectness, such as true pictorial assertions involving outdated pictures. And it raises the question whether target-indirectness may also arise in linguistic assertion.

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Author Profiles

Lukas Lewerentz
Justus Liebig University Giessen
Emanuel Viebahn
Freie Universität Berlin

Citations of this work

Non-literal lies are not exculpatory.Hüseyin Güngör - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.

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References found in this work

Situations and attitudes.Jon Barwise & John Perry - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668-691.
Attitudes de dicto and de se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
Lying with Presuppositions.Emanuel Viebahn - 2020 - Noûs 54 (3):731-751.
Knowing and asserting.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489-523.

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