Reflective awareness, phenomenal conservatism, and phenomenal explanationism

Abstract

Kevin McCain and Luca Moretti (2021) argue that a drawback of Phenomenal Conservatism is the problem of reflective awareness: if a subject S becomes reflectively aware of an appearance, the appearance loses its justifying power. This paper provides a novel argument to the same conclusion. Furthermore, it contends that the argument does not apply to Phenomenal Explanationism, the view defended by McCain and Moretti (2021), which is immune to the problem of reflective awareness.

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Author Profiles

Kevin McCain
University of Alabama, Birmingham
Luca Moretti
University of Aberdeen

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