Reasons or Fittingness First?

Ethics 128 (1):212-229 (2017)
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Abstract

Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way argue that we should put fittingness rather than reasons first because we can provide an account of the evaluative in terms of the normative only if we put fittingness rather than reasons first. I argue that it is no more difficult to provide an account of the evaluative in terms of the normative if we put reasons rather than fittingness first.

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Rach Cosker-Rowland
University of Leeds

Citations of this work

Fittingness.Christopher Howard - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (11):e12542.
Fittingness: A User’s Guide.Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland - 2023 - In Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. OUP.
Who’s on first.Daniel Wodak - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15.
Fittingness first?: Reasons to withhold belief.Wooram Lee - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3565-3581.

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References found in this work

Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The domain of reasons.John Skorupski - 2010 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fittingness First.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):575-606.

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