Propositional knowledge

Philosophical Studies 20 (3):33 - 43 (1969)
Abstract
The received definition of knowledge (as true, evident belief) has recently been questioned by Edmund Gettier with an example whose principle is as follows. A proposition, p, is both evident to and accepted by someone S, who sees that its truth entails (would entail) (that either p is true or q is true). This last is thereby made evident to him, and he accepts it, but it happens to be true only because q is true, since p is in fact false. Hence, inasmuch as he has no evidence for the proposition q, S can hardly be said to know (that either p is true or q is true). Here then is a formula for true, evident beliefs that are not cases of knowledge. I discuss the possibility of adding a fourth condition to this triad.
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DOI 10.1007/BF02224943
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge, Truth and Evidence.Keith Lehrer - 1965 - Analysis 25 (5):168 - 175.
The Logic of Knowing.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (25):773-795.
Lehrer on Knowledge.Gilbert H. Harman - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (9):241-247.

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