On Gupta-Belnap revision theories of truth, Kripkean fixed points, and the next stable set

Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7 (3):345-360 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

We consider various concepts associated with the revision theory of truth of Gupta and Belnap. We categorize the notions definable using their theory of circular definitions as those notions universally definable over the next stable set. We give a simplified account of varied revision sequences-as a generalised algorithmic theory of truth. This enables something of a unification with the Kripkean theory of truth using supervaluation schemes.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.2307/2687753

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,774

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

On revision operators.P. D. Welch - 2003 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 68 (2):689-711.
Comparing More Revision and Fixed-Point Theories of Truth.Qiqing Lin & Hu Liu - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (4):615-671.
The Revision Theory of Truth.A. Gupta & N. D. Belnap - 1993 - MIT Press.
How Truth Behaves When There’s No Vicious Reference.Philip Kremer - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (4):345-367.
Revision Without Revision Sequences: Circular Definitions.Edoardo Rivello - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):57-85.
Revision Without Revision Sequences: Self-Referential Truth.Edoardo Rivello - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):523-551.
Revision Revisited.Leon Horsten, Graham E. Leigh, Hannes Leitgeb & Philip Welch - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):642-664.
Comparing fixed-point and revision theories of truth.Philip Kremer - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (4):363-403.
Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap, The Revision Theory of Truth. [REVIEW]Philip Kremer - 1995 - Philosophy in Review 15 (1):39-42.
Book Review: Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap. The Revision Theory of Truth. [REVIEW]Robert C. Koons - 1994 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (4):606-631.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
83 (#69,098)

6 months
22 (#694,291)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.
Solovay-Type Theorems for Circular Definitions.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):467-487.
Revision Without Revision Sequences: Self-Referential Truth.Edoardo Rivello - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):523-551.
Some Notes on Truths and Comprehension.Thomas Schindler - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (3):449-479.
Guest Editors’ Introduction.Riccardo Bruni & Shawn Standefer - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):1-9.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Truth and paradox.Anil Gupta - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):1-60.
Set Theory.Keith J. Devlin - 1981 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 46 (4):876-877.
Notes on naive semantics.Hans Herzberger - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):61 - 102.
The truth is never simple.John P. Burgess - 1986 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (3):663-681.
Gupta's rule of revision theory of truth.Nuel D. Belnap - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):103-116.

View all 13 references / Add more references