Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7 (3):345-360 (2001)

Abstract
We consider various concepts associated with the revision theory of truth of Gupta and Belnap. We categorize the notions definable using their theory of circular definitions as those notions universally definable over the next stable set. We give a simplified account of varied revision sequences-as a generalised algorithmic theory of truth. This enables something of a unification with the Kripkean theory of truth using supervaluation schemes.
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DOI 10.2307/2687753
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References found in this work BETA

The Revision Theory of Truth.Vann McGee - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):727-730.
Truth and Paradox.Anil Gupta - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):1-60.
Set Theory.Keith J. Devlin - 1981 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 46 (4):876-877.
Notes on Naive Semantics.Hans G. Herzberger - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):61 - 102.
The Truth is Never Simple.John P. Burgess - 1986 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (3):663-681.

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Citations of this work BETA

Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.
Guest Editors’ Introduction.Riccardo Bruni & Shawn Standefer - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):1-9.
Revision Revisited.Leon Horsten, Graham E. Leigh, Hannes Leitgeb & Philip Welch - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):642-664.
Revision Without Revision Sequences: Self-Referential Truth.Edoardo Rivello - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):523-551.
Supertasks.Jon Pérez Laraudogoitia - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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