The relationship between the two classical Sāṃkhya paradigms of the conditions and the intellectual creation has been a matter of debate since the early days of modern Indology. The precise role of each of these paradigms in the broader Sāṃkhya system, as well as the relationship between them, is unclear from the text of Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s Sāṃkhyakārikā, and most of the classical commentaries on this text offer little clarification. Of these commentaries, the anonymous Yuktidīpikā provides the most detailed and extensive information (...) on many philosophical issues, including the nature of the bhāvas and the pratyayasarga. This article aims to show that previous attempts by scholars to explain the relationship between these two paradigms have not taken the evidence of the Yuktidīpikā fully into account, and to reconstruct a more adequate understanding on the basis of this evidence. (shrink)

(2014). The Rāga Bhāva in the Sāṁkhya Kārikā: Rectifying an Age-Old Mistake. Asian Philosophy: Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 133-146. doi: 10.1080/09552367.2014.917831.

The relationship between the two classical Sāṃkhya paradigms of the conditions and the intellectual creation has been a matter of debate since the early days of modern Indology. The precise role of each of these paradigms in the broader Sāṃkhya system, as well as the relationship between them, is unclear from the text of Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s Sāṃ khyakārikā, and most of the classical commentaries on this text offer little clarification. Of these commentaries, the anonymous Yuktidīpikā provides the most detailed and extensive (...) information on many philosophical issues, including the nature of the bhāvas and the pratyayasarga. This article aims to show that previous attempts by scholars to explain the relationship between these two paradigms have not taken the evidence of the Yuktidīpikā fully into account, and to reconstruct a more adequate understanding on the basis of this evidence. (shrink)

This paper seeks to reconstruct the meaning of existence in the Pāli discourses of the Buddha by considering how the notion is used in the most systematic contexts in which it appears, and how it could be best interpreted. The discourses are concerned with how existence is used to support and consolidate a certain attitude of ownership, appropriation, and entitlement over contents of experience, in virtue of which one can claim that this or that is ‘mine’. The problem with this (...) move is that it seems to require a degree of stability that is at odds with the fundamental uncertainty (anicca) of all conditioned realities. Existence is used to somehow cover up uncertainty, and thus allow for a semblance of genuine ownership and possession, while in fact possession and ownership are just deluded views doomed to be contradicted by the structural uncertainty of actual experience. This reading entails that the early discourses do share with later traditions an anti-realist inspiration, which is worth exploring in its own right. (shrink)

Supercommentary on Tattvacintāmaṇi, classical work on Navya Nyaya philosophy by Gaṅgeśa, active 13th century and its commentaries Didhiti by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and Tattvacintāmaṇidīdhitiprakāśa by Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa with complete text.

Research articles on Pali Buddhist and Sanskrit literature.

Includes complete text in Sanskrit with English translation.

The devotional literatures across the Hindu bhakti traditions of medieval India are shaped by distinctive styles of affective responses to the divine reality. A theme which recurs in several layers of their songs is a theological dialectic between divine majesty and divine accessibility; the divine is not only simply transcendent in the sense of being a distant deity but is also immanently present in and through a range of human sensitivities, emotions, and affectivities. We will highlight the dialectic in the (...) devotional songs of three medieval figures, Tulsīdās, Sūrdās, and Mādhavadeva, which are structured primarily by the devotional attitude of a servant towards the Lord. As we will see, this theological servitude is not to be understood as a form of abject servility, for the three poets, in their somewhat distinctive ways, can not only speak of the Lord as a friend and as a lover, but can even level various kinds of complaints, challenges, and accusations at the Lord. Thus, if the Lord’s transcendental sovereignty is emphasised by the devotee through the modes of self-censure, the Lord’s immanent availability is also highlighted through the protests that the devotee fervently makes to the seemingly uncaring Lord. (shrink)

Bhāvas, or comprehensive states of mental and emotional awareness, manifest different guṇas, or attributes, of the Lord. These attributes are wholly composed of saccidānanda, but due to variations in their bearers (ādhāra), which is to say in the antaḥkaraṇa of different speakers and listeners, they are affected, expressed, and experienced differently. In this way, bhāvas cannot exist without the Lord’s divine attributes, nor can they exist in the absence of the individual jīva. They are eternal because they belong to the (...) Lord but become meaningful only because the individual through the senses can realize them. They thus serve as a fulcrum between the human and divine, and it is at this delicate point of balance that līlā is played out. (shrink)

This is a brief review of the Rasa theory of Indian aesthetics and the works I have done on the same. A major source of the Indian system of classification of emotional states comes from the ‘Natyasastra’, the ancient Indian treatise on the performing arts, which dates back to the 2nd Century AD (or much earlier, pg. LXXXVI: Natyasastra, Ghosh, 1951). The ‘Natyasastra’ speaks about ‘sentiments’ or ‘Rasas’ (pg.102: Natyasastra, Ghosh, 1951) which are produced when certain ‘dominant states’ (sthayi Bhava), (...) ‘transitory states’ (vyabhicari Bhava) and ‘temperamental states’ (sattvika Bhava) of emotions come together (pgs.102, 105: Natyasastra, Ghosh, 1951). This Rasa theory, which is still widely followed in classical Indian performing arts, classifies eight Rasas or sentiments which are: Sringara (erotic), Hasya (comic), Karuna (pathetic), Raudra (furious), Vira (heroic), Bhayanaka (terrible), Bibhatsa (odious) and Adbhuta (marvellous). There was a later addition of the ninth sentiment or Rasa called Santa (peace) in later Sanskrit poetics (pg.102: Natyasastra, Ghosh, 1951). According to ancient Indian aesthetics (especially in the context of Bharatas’ ‘Natyasastra’, Anandavardhana’s ‘Dhvanyaloka’ and Abhinavagupta’s ‘Abhinavabharati’), ‘Rasa’ is the relishable state of elemental human emotions called ‘Bhavas’. Bharata’s ‘Natyasastra’ originally spoke of eight Rasas. The concept of the 9th Rasa was a later interpolation by the Kashmiri Shaivist Abhinavagupta (10th Century AD) and also his predecessor Anandavardhana (9th Century AD). Abhinavagupta extends the eight Rasas by adding the concept of the Santa Rasa which he regards as the essence of all Rasas. It is this 9th Rasa which according to Abhinavagupta lets the Rasika attain the aesthetic detachment and savour the essences of all other Rasas and therefore the true aesthetic delight. The introduction of 9th Rasa integrates the concepts of Bharata’s Rasasutra and Patanjali’s Yoga theory – the detachment necessary to introspect inwards into the inherent state of freedom and bliss (aesthetic consciousness). (shrink)

In this paper, Nāgārjuna’s philosophical interpretation of the terms kāraṇa and kārya is analysed after having methodologically confined the specific field of interest to the MMK. From the study of all the occurrences of kāraṇa and kārya in the MMK (listed in paragraph 2), it emerges that Nāgārjuna makes use of these two terms to refer to skandhas as causes (kāraṇa) of further skandhas as effects (kārya), hence conveying with this words the idea of, so to speak, subjectivity and (re)birth. (...) From the principal commentaries on the MMK (particularly Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti), we know also that, even when the reference of kāraṇa and kārya to skandhas is not explicitly pointed out by Nāgārjuna, it nonetheless can be inferred from the peculiar context in which these terms are employed. This conclusion seems to be confirmed also by the crosscheck analysis of the philosophical usage of the parallel terms hetu and phala, which refer either to, so to speak, objective (i.e., concerning general bhāvas) causes and effects, or – in the case of phala as consequence of karman/kriyā – to moral results (these two meanings are confirmed also by some passages from the Vigrahavyāvartanī), but in no cases Nāgārjuna makes recurse to hetu and phala to refer to what could be called a subjective (i.e., concerning skandhas) level of causality. To the paper an addendum is added, in which the commentaries on MMK 8.4 are taken into consideration. From this excursus it appears that at least Buddhapālita, Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti, by ‘overinterpreting’ the meaning of hetu in the kārika, are consequently forced to readapt the philosophical significance of kāraṇa and kārya in a way that does not fit so much with Nāgārjuna’s original message. (shrink)

Indian psychology scholars have primarily focused on developing triguṇa-based personality models. However, triguṇa-based personality models are not epistemologically consistent with Sāṁkhya. This article offers a bhāva-based conception of personality that is epistemologically consistent with Sāṁkhya. It proposes svabhāva as a personality-like construct that refers to individual-specific arrangements of prākṛtika and vaikṛtika bhava. This article contributes to both Indian psychology and Sāṁkhya scholarship.

In the Chinese text of the *Vimuttimagga, namely the Ji?tu? dào lùn, the word ji? is used as a technical abhidhamma term. It is used to refer to an initial cognitive activity through the five material sense organs. In the published English translation, the term is not understood clearly. There are similarities and differences between the two terms, ji? and visayappavatti. They are linked to similar doctrinal structures and technical terminology, especially the concept of bhava?ga, which is a distinctive doctrine (...) of Sri Lankan Therav?da. On the other hand, visayappavatti implies an initial cognitive activity by any of the six sense organs, while the term ji? refers to an initial cognitive activity only through the five material sense organs. A comparative study of the two terms proposes the following implications. Firstly, the text *Vimuttimagga is related to Sri Lankan P?li abhidhamma because the orientation of the two terms is more than similar. Secondly, the text represents an early phase of the extant P?li abhidhamma because the term ji? is less mature terminology than the term visayappavatti. (shrink)

Classical Sāṃkhya has usually been interpreted as an intellectualist school. Its presumed method for the attainment of liberation is essentially characterized by rational inquiry into reality, which involves the intellectual understanding of the distinction between two principles: the conscious and the material. Some have argued that this liberating process is not only theoretical, but that it entails yogic practice, or that it is the natural outcome of existential forces that tend toward freedom. However, recent studies in Sāṃkhya involving detailed analysis (...) of an anonymous commentary of the Sāṃkhyakārikā, the Yuktidīpikā, suggest a more complex picture. The external functions of the five vital winds in relation to the sources of action and dispositions of being seem to play an important role in the liberating path. In this paper, I review the relation between bhāvas, karmayonis, and the five prāṇas by considering the social, moral, and interpersonal aspects of the five vital winds as described in the Yuktidīpikā. It will be shown how the external functions of prāṇa are related to the moral cultivation of vitality, leading to the enactment and manifestation of dispositions of being that bring about the realization of oneself as a knower in the ethical engagement with others. It is this unique way of understanding prāṇa in the Yuktidīpikā that makes the Sāṃkhya path for liberation something more than a theoretical cognitive method or a spontaneous and predetermined realization of one’s self. (shrink)

Pt. 1. Raghunāthaśiromaṇikr̥taḥ Ākhyātavādaḥ Bhavānandasiddhāntavāgīśakr̥tā Ākhyātavādaṭippanī -- pt. 2. Raghunāthaśiromaṇikr̥taḥ Nañvādaḥ Bhavānandasiddhāntavāgīśakr̥tā Nañvādaṭippaṇī.

As one of the most pivotal thinkers in the history Mahāyāna Buddhism, the writings of Nāgārjuna have long attracted the attention of scholars aiming to interpret in declarative terms the meaning of the arguments contained therein. However, the very aim of such an endeavor that seeks to ascribe to Nāgārjuna a philosophical position is fundamentally at odds with the unwaveringly critical nature of his project. In order to illustrate the singular character of Nāgārjuna’s methodology, this article seeks to clarify three (...) crucial points concerning his thought: (1) the central concept in his philosophical works, dependent origination (_pratītyasamutpāda_), ironically denotes the non-origination (_anutpāda_) of any entity (_bhāva_) whatsoever and is universal in scope; (2) emptiness (_śūnyatā_) is not a meaningful predicate of any entity, meaning that no entity exists that can be identified as being empty; and (3) the Two Truths (_satyadvaya_) are not a philosophically significant device for Nāgārjuna and subsequently do not provide a means by which to mitigate the radical consequences of his arguments. As a result, we can understand Nāgārjuna’s claim to have no postulative thesis (_pratijñā_) as a statement that he predicates no quality (_dharma_) of any subject (_dharmin_), and that his methodology is strictly critical, offering us no constructive theory by which to make sense of reality. (shrink)

This essay focuses on a neglected and important text, the Nāgarasarvasva of Padmaśrī, as an index to the changing contours of kāmaśāstra in the early second millennium (1000-1500) CE. Focusing on a number of themes which linked Padmaśrī’s work with contemporary treatises, the essay argues that kāmaśāstra incorporated several new conceptions of the body and related para-technologies as well as elements of material and aesthetic culture which had become prominent in the cosmopolitan, courtly milieu. Rather than seeing this development as (...) an attenuation of the earlier science as constituted by Vātsyāyana’s Kāmasūtra, it is possible to see that kāmaśāstra actually developed closer relations with fields of knowledge that had long developed alongside it. (shrink)