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  1.  51
    Why Free Market Rights Are Not Basic Liberties.C. M. Melenovsky & Justin Bernstein - 2015 - Journal of Value Inquiry 49 (1-2):47-67.
    Most liberals agree that governments should protect certain basic liberties, such as freedom of speech, freedom of religion and freedom of the person. Liberals disagree, however, about whether free market rights should also be protected. By “free market rights,” we mean those rights typically associated with laissez-faire economic systems such as freedom of contract, a right to market returns, and claims to privately own the means of production.We do not use the phrase “economic liberties,” as Tomasi does, because it does (...)
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  2.  44
    The Basic Structure as a System of Social Practices.C. M. Melenovsky - 2013 - Social Theory and Practice 39 (4):599-624.
    In his own writings, Rawls purposively used only a loose characterization of the basic structure, but two prominent misinterpretations highlight the current need for a more detailed account. First, G.A. Cohen argues that the Rawlsian focus on the basic structure is arbitrary due to the Rawlsian appeal to profound effects. Second, some theorists conflate the justification of coercion with the assessment of a basic structure by defining the basic structure as the coercive structure. Both misinterpretations can be corrected by carefully (...)
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  3.  10
    Promises, Practices, and Reciprocity.C. M. Melenovsky - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266):106-126.
    The dominant conventionalist view explains the wrong of breaking a promise as failing to do our fair share in supporting the practice of promise-keeping. Yet, this account fails to explain any unique moral standing that a promisee has to demand that the promisor keep the promise. In this paper, I provide a conventionalist response to this problem. In any cooperative practice, participants stand as both beneficiary and contributor. As a beneficiary, they are morally required to follow the rules of the (...)
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  4.  17
    Conventionalism and Legitimate Expectations.C. M. Melenovsky - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 18 (2):108-130.
    To be a conventionalist about a specific obligation or right is to believe that the obligation or right is dependent on the existence of a social practice. A conventionalist about property, for example, believes that a moral right to property is generated by conventional norms rather than by any natural right. One problem with dominant conventionalist theories is that they do not adequately justify conventional moral claims. They can justify why it is wrong to steal, for example, but they do (...)
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  5.  20
    Incentives, Conventionalism, and Constructivism.C. M. Melenovsky - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):549-574.
    Rawlsians argue for principles of justice that apply exclusively to the basic structure of society, but it can seem strange that those who accept these principles should not also regulate their choices by them. Valid moral principles should seemingly identify ideals for both institutions and individuals. What justifies this nonintuitive distinction between institutional and individual principles is not a moral division of labor but Rawls’s dual commitments to conventionalism and constructivism. Conventionalism distinguishes the relevant ideals for evaluating institutions from those (...)
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  6.  24
    Not All Political Lies Are Morally Equal.C. M. Melenovsky - 2018 - Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (2):294-314.
    This paper examines the conflict between conventional and non-conventional moral obligations by focusing on the specific case of political lies. It argues that political candidates are under a conventional obligation to try and win their election, and sometimes the most moral way to discharge this obligation involves lying. In such cases, candidates face a conflict between the conventional obligation to try and win and the non-conventional obligation to not lie. Oftentimes, candidates that face this conflict should lie because because voters, (...)
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  7.  27
    Rawlsian Objectivity.C. M. Melenovsky - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (4):545-564.
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  8.  18
    The Value of a Non-Ideal.C. M. Melenovsky - 2019 - Social Theory and Practice 45 (3):427-450.
    In The Tyranny of the Ideal, Gerald Gaus gives an extended argument on behalf of the “Open Society.” Instead of claiming that it is uniquely best from some privileged moral perspective, he argues for the Open Society by showing why it is acceptable to many perspectives. In this way, Gaus argues for a liberal market-based society in a way that treats deep diversity as a fundamental feature of social life. However, the argument falters at four important points. When taken together, (...)
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