4 found
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  1.  44
    Making Folk Psychology Explicit.Derek W. Strijbos & Leon C. de Bruin - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (1):139-163.
    One of the central explananda in the debate on social cognition is the interpretation of other people in terms of reasons for action. There is a growing dissatisfaction among participants in the debate concerning the descriptive adequacy of the traditional belief-desire model of action interpretation. Applying this model as an explanatory model at the subpersonal level threatens to leave the original explanandum largely unarticulated. Against this background we show how Brandom’s deontic scorekeeping model can be used as a valuable descriptive (...)
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  2.  59
    Universal Belief-Desire Psychology? A Dilemma for Theory Theory and Simulation Theory.Derek W. Strijbos & Leon C. de Bruin - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):744-764.
    In this article we take issue with theory theory and simulation theory accounts of folk psychology committed to (i) the belief-desire (BD) model and (ii) the assumption of universality (AU). Recent studies cast doubt on the compatibility of these commitments because they reveal considerable cross-cultural differences in folk psychologies. We present both theory theory and simulation theory with the following dilemma: either (i) keep the BD-model as an account of the surface properties of specific explicit folk psychologies and give up (...)
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  3.  70
    Folk Psychology Without Principles: An Alternative to the Belief–Desire Model of Action Interpretation.Leon C. de Bruin & Derek W. Strijbos - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):257-274.
    In this paper, we take issue with the belief?desire model of second- and third-person action interpretation as it is presented by both theory theories and cognitivist versions of simulation theory. These accounts take action interpretation to consist in the (tacit) attribution of proper belief?desire pairs that mirror the structure of formally valid practical inferences. We argue that the belief?desire model rests on the unwarranted assumption that the interpreter can only reach the agent's practical context of action through inference. This assumption (...)
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  4.  12
    Reason Attribution Without Belief-Desire Ascription.Derek W. Strijbos & Leon C. de Bruin - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):157-180.