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  1. added 2018-03-05
    A Unified Account of General Learning Mechanisms and Theory‐of‐Mind Development.Theodore Bach - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (3):351-381.
    Modularity theorists have challenged that there are, or could be, general learning mechanisms that explain theory-of-mind development. In response, supporters of the ‘scientific theory-theory’ account of theory-of-mind development have appealed to children's use of auxiliary hypotheses and probabilistic causal modeling. This article argues that these general learning mechanisms are not sufficient to meet the modularist's challenge. The article then explores an alternative domain-general learning mechanism by proposing that children grasp the concept belief through the progressive alignment of relational structure that (...)
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  2. added 2018-02-17
    The Theory Theory Thrice Over: The Child as Scientist, Superscientist or Social Institution?Michael A. Bishop & Stephen M. Downes - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (1):117-132.
    Alison Gopnik and Andrew Meltzoff have argued for a view they call the ‘theory theory’: theory change in science and children are similar. While their version of the theory theory has been criticized for depending on a number of disputed claims, we argue that there is a fundamental problem which is much more basic: the theory theory is multiply ambiguous. We show that it might be claiming that a similarity holds between theory change in children and (i) individual scientists, (ii) (...)
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  3. added 2018-02-17
    Android Epistemology for Babies: Relections on Words, Thoughts and Theories.Clark Glymour - 2000 - Synthese 122 (1-2):53-68.
    Words, Thoughts and Theories arguesthat infants and children discover the physical and psychological featuresof the world by a process akin to scientific inquiry, more or less asconceived by philosophers of science in the 1960s (the theory theory).This essay discusses some of the philosophical background to analternative, more popular, ``modular'''' or ``maturational'''' account ofdevelopment, dismisses an array of philosophical objections to the theorytheory, suggests that the theory theory offers an undeveloped project forartificial intelligence, and, relying on recent psychological work oncausation, offers (...)
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  4. added 2018-02-16
    Chomsky and His Critics.Louise M. Antony & Norbert Hornstein (eds.) - 2003 - Wiley-Blackwell.
  5. added 2018-02-16
    18 The Baby in the Lab-Coat: Why Child Development is Not an Adequate Model for Understanding the Development of Science.Luc Faucher, Ron Mallon, Daniel Nazer, Shaun Nichols, Aaron Ruby, Stephen Stich & Jonathan Weinberg - 2002 - In Peter Carruthers, Stephen P. Stich & Michael Siegal (eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science. Cambridge University Press.
    Alison Gopnik and her collaborators have recently proposed a bold and intriguing hypothesis about the relationship between scientific cognition and cognitive development in childhood. According to this view, the processes underlying cognitive development in infants and children and the processes underlying scientific cognition are _identical_. We argue that Gopnik’s bold hypothesis is untenable because it, along with much of cognitive science, neglects the many important ways in which human minds are designed to operate within a social environment. This leads to (...)
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  6. added 2017-07-18
    Universal Belief-Desire Psychology? A Dilemma for Theory Theory and Simulation Theory.Derek W. Strijbos & Leon C. de Bruin - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):744-764.
    In this article we take issue with theory theory and simulation theory accounts of folk psychology committed to (i) the belief-desire (BD) model and (ii) the assumption of universality (AU). Recent studies cast doubt on the compatibility of these commitments because they reveal considerable cross-cultural differences in folk psychologies. We present both theory theory and simulation theory with the following dilemma: either (i) keep the BD-model as an account of the surface properties of specific explicit folk psychologies and give up (...)
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  7. added 2017-07-18
    Matthew Ratcliffe, Rethinking Commonsense Psychology: A Critique of Folk Psychology, Theory of Mind and Simulation.Mary Beth Morrissey - 2010 - Schutzian Research. A Yearbook of Lifeworldly Phenomenology and Qualitative Social Science:218-226.
  8. added 2017-07-18
    Folk Psychology as a Theory.Ian Martin Ravenscroft - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Many philosophers and cognitive scientists claim that our everyday or "folk" understanding of mental states constitutes a theory of mind. That theory is widely called "folk psychology" (sometimes "commonsense" psychology). The terms in which folk psychology is couched are the familiar ones of "belief" and "desire", "hunger", "pain" and so forth. According to many theorists, folk psychology plays a central role in our capacity to predict and explain the behavior of ourselves and others. However, the nature and status of folk (...)
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  9. added 2017-07-18
    Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading.Alvin L. Goldman - 2008 - Oup Usa.
    People are minded creatures; we have thoughts, feelings and emotions. More intriguingly, we grasp our own mental states, and conduct the business of ascribing them to ourselves and others without instruction in formal psychology. How do we do this? And what are the dimensions of our grasp of the mental realm? In this book, Alvin I. Goldman explores these questions with the tools of philosophy, developmental psychology, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience. He refines an approach called simulation theory, which starts (...)
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  10. added 2017-07-18
    The Role of the Position Effect in Theory and Simulation.Anton Kühberger, Christoph Kogler, H. U. G. Angelika & Evelyne Mösl - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (5):610–625.
    We contribute to the empirical debate on whether we understand and predict mental states by using simulation (simulation theory) or by relying on a folk psychological theory (theory theory). To decide between these two fundamental positions, it has been argued that failure to predict other people's choices would be challenging evidence against the simulation view. We test the specific claim that people prefer the rightmost position in choosing among equally valued objects, and whether or not this position bias can be (...)
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  11. added 2017-07-18
    Some Reflections on the Theory Theory - Simulation Theory Discussion.Ruth G. Millikan - 2005 - In Susan Hurley & Nick Chater (eds.), Perspectives on Imitation: From Mirror Neurons to Memes, Vol II. MIT Press.
  12. added 2017-07-18
    How Anti-Introspectionist is Theory Theory?Josef Quitterer - unknown
    Introspection is often seen as criterion to distinguish between theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST). Many empirical arguments against ST rely upon the thesis that ST is introspectionist and that it presupposes the Cartesian dictum that the mind is transparent to itself. According to Perner 1999 the capacity to introspect is so important for ST that it can be seen as the criterion that distinguishes ST from TT: "These two positions and their sub-varieties differ as to whether they presuppose (...)
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  13. added 2017-07-18
    Framing and the Theory-Simulation Controversy. Predicting People's Decisions.Josef Perner & Anton Kühberger - 2002 - Mind and Society 3 (2):65-80.
    We introduce a particular way of drawing the distinction between the use of theory and simulation in the prediction of people's decisions and describe an empirical method to test whether theory or simulation is used in a particular case. We demonstrate this method with two effects of decision making involving the choice between a safe option (take amount X) and a risky option (take double the amount X with probability 1/2). People's predictions of choice frequencies for trivial (€ 0.75) as (...)
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  14. added 2017-07-18
    Folk Psychology Meets the Frame Problem.Dominic Murphy - 2001 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 32 (3):565-573.
  15. added 2017-07-18
    Mental Simulation, Tacit Theory, and the Threat of Collapse.Tony Stone - 2001 - Philosophical Topics 29 (1/2):127-173.
    According to the theory theory of folk psychology, our engagement in the folk psychological practices of prediction, interpretation and explanation draws on a rich body of knowledge about psychological matters. According to the simulation theory, in apparent contrast, a fundamental role is played by our ability to identify with another person in imagination and to replicate or re-enact aspects of the other person’s mental life. But amongst theory theorists, and amongst simulation theorists, there are significant differences of approach.
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  16. added 2017-07-18
    Simulation, Theory, and Cut Elimination.G. Graham White - 1999 - The Monist 82 (1):165--184.
    This paper is concerned. with the contrast between simulation- and deduction-based approaches to reasoning about physical objects. We show that linear logic can give a unified account of both simulation and deduction concerning physical objects; it also allows us to draw a principled distinction between simulation and deduction, since simulations correspond to cut-free proofs, whereas deductions correspond to proofs in general.
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  17. added 2017-07-18
    Folk Psychology and Mental Simulation.Tony Stone & Martin Davies - 1998 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43:53-82.
    This paper is about the contemporary debate concerning folk psychology – the debate between the proponents of the theory theory of folk psychology and the friends of the simulation alternative.1 At the outset, we need to ask: What should we mean by this term ‘folk psychology’?
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  18. added 2017-07-18
    Navigating the Social World: Simulation Versus Theory.Kim Sterelny - 1997 - Philosophical Books 38 (1):011-029.
  19. added 2017-07-18
    Pretending and Believing: Issues in the Theory of ToMM.Alan M. Leslie - 1994 - Cognition 50 (1-3):211-238.
  20. added 2017-07-18
    Folk Psychology: Simulation Versus Tacit Theory.S. Stich & S. Nichols - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):29-65.
  21. added 2017-07-18
    Natural Theories of Mind Evolution, Development and Simulation of Everyday Mindreading.Andrew Whiten - 1991
  22. added 2017-04-03
    Do You See What I See? How Social Differences Influence Mindreading.Spaulding Shannon - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):4009-4030.
    Disagreeing with others about how to interpret a social interaction is a common occurrence. We often find ourselves offering divergent interpretations of others’ motives, intentions, beliefs, and emotions. Remarkably, philosophical accounts of how we understand others do not explain, or even attempt to explain such disagreements. I argue these disparities in social interpretation stem, in large part, from the effect of social categorization and our goals in social interactions, phenomena long studied by social psychologists. I argue we ought to expand (...)
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  23. added 2017-01-19
    Commentary on Alison Gopnik's "the Scientist as Child".Miriam Solomon - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (4):547-551.
  24. added 2016-12-08
    Simulation, Theory and Collapse.Bill Wringe - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (2):223-232.
    Recent philosophical discussions of our capacity to attribute mental states to other human beings, and to produce accurate predictions and informative explanations of their behavior which make reference to the content of those states have focused on two apparently contrasting ways in which we might hope to account for these abilities. The first is that of regarding our competence as being under-girded by our grasp of a tacit psychological theory. The second builds on the idea that in trying to get (...)
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  25. added 2016-12-08
    Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications.David Lewis - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):249-258.
  26. added 2015-12-14
    Let’s Be Flexible: Our Interpretive/Explanatory Toolbox, or In Praise of Using a Range of Tools.David Henderson - 2011 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 5 (2):261-299.
    This paper explores the role and limits of cognitive simulation in understanding or explaining others. In simulation, one puts one's own cognitive processes to work on pretend input similar to that one supposes that the other plausibly had. Such a process is highly useful. However, it is also limited in important ways. Several limitations fall out from the various forms of cognitive diversity. Some of this diversity results from cultural differences, or from differences in individuals' cognitive biographies. Such diversity is (...)
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  27. added 2015-12-14
    Matthew Ratcliffe: Rethinking Commonsense Psychology: A Critique of Folk Psychology, Theory of Mind and Simulation. [REVIEW]Mark Johnson - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):313-315.
  28. added 2015-12-14
    Starting Without Theory: Confronting the Paradox of Conceptual Development.Daniel D. Hutto - 2005 - In B. Malle & S. Hodges (eds.), Other Minds: How Humans Bridge the Gap Between Self and Others. Guilford. pp. 56--72.
    There is a paradox about how our social understanding develops if we take seriously both theory theory and the cognitivist dictum that all skilful interaction has robust conceptual underpinnings. On the one hand, it is clear that young infants demonstrate a capacity to reliably detect and respond to other’s intentions. For example, recent experimental evidence confirms that they have the capacity to appropriately parse what would otherwise be an undifferentiated behaviour stream at its mentalistic joints. If we follow the cognitivist (...)
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  29. added 2015-12-14
    A Theory of the Child's Theory of Mind.J. A. Fodor - 1992 - Cognition 44 (3):283-296.
  30. added 2015-12-14
    Without a Theory of Mind One Cannot Participate in a Conversation.Simon Baron-Cohen - 1988 - Cognition 29 (1):83-84.
  31. added 2015-12-14
    Does the Autistic Child Have a “Theory of Mind”?Simon Baron-Cohen, Alan M. Leslie & Uta Frith - 1985 - Cognition 21 (1):37-46.
    We use a new model of metarepresentational development to predict a cognitive deficit which could explain a crucial component of the social impairment in childhood autism. One of the manifestations of a basic metarepresentational capacity is a ‘ theory of mind ’. We have reason to believe that autistic children lack such a ‘ theory ’. If this were so, then they would be unable to impute beliefs to others and to predict their behaviour. This hypothesis was tested using Wimmer (...)
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  32. added 2015-08-30
    Mapping Others: Representation and Mindreading.Adam Green - 2014 - Essays in Philosophy 15 (2):279-298.
    Thinking about the representational qualities of maps and models allows one to offer a new perspective on the nature of mindreading. The recent critiques of our dominant paradigms for mindreading, theory theory and simulation theory by enactivists such as Daniel Hutto reveal a flaw in the standard options for thinking about how we think about others. Views that rely on theorizing or simulation to account for the way in which we understand others often appear to over-intellectualize social interaction. In contrast, (...)
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  33. added 2015-08-29
    Review: Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness and Understanding Other Minds. [REVIEW]J. Heal - 2005 - Mind 114 (453):181-184.
  34. added 2015-08-29
    No Simulation Without (Some) Theory (Somewhere, Some Kind): Comments on Henderson.Richard E. Grandy - 1996 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (S1):95-98.
  35. added 2015-08-29
    From Simulation to Folk Psychology: The Case for Development.Paul L. Harris - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):120-144.
  36. added 2015-07-31
    The Simulation Theory and the Theory Theory.R. Gordon - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):11-35.
  37. added 2015-07-20
    The Phenomenology and Development of Social Perspectives.Thomas Fuchs - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):655-683.
    The paper first gives a conceptual distinction of the first, second and third person perspectives in social cognition research and connects them to the major present theories of understanding others (simulation, interaction and theory theory). It then argues for a foundational role of second person interactions for the development of social perspectives. To support this thesis, the paper analyzes in detail how infants, in particular through triangular interactions with persons and objects, expand their understanding of perspectives and arrive at a (...)
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  38. added 2015-07-20
    Understanding Others Through Primary Interaction and Narrative Practice.Shaun Gallagher & Daniel D. Hutto - 2008 - In J. Zlatev, T. Racine, C. Sinha & E. Itkonen (eds.), The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity. John Benjamins. pp. 17–38.
    We argue that theory-of-mind (ToM) approaches, such as “theory theory” and “simulation theory”, are both problematic and not needed. They account for neither our primary and pervasive way of engaging with others nor the true basis of our folk psychological understanding, even when narrowly construed. Developmental evidence shows that young infants are capable of grasping the purposeful intentions of others through the perception of bodily movements, gestures, facial expressions etc. Trevarthen’s notion of primary intersubjectivity can provide a theoretical framework for (...)
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  39. added 2015-07-20
    Inference or Interaction: Social Cognition Without Precursors.Shaun Gallagher - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):163 – 174.
    In this paper I defend interaction theory (IT) as an alternative to both theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST). IT opposes the basic suppositions that both TT and ST depend upon. I argue that the various capacities for primary and secondary intersubjectivity found in infancy and early childhood should not be thought of as precursors to later developing capacities for using folk psychology or simulation routines. They are not replaced or displaced by such capacities in adulthood, but rather continue (...)
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  40. added 2015-07-20
    Beyond Mindreading.Robert M. Gordon - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):219 – 222.
    I argue that there is no conflict between the simulation theory, once it is freed from certain constraints carried over from theory theory, and Gallagher's view that our primary and pervasive way of engaging with others rests on 'direct', non-mentalizing perception of the 'meanings' of others' facial expressions, gestures, and intentional actions.
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  41. added 2015-07-20
    Intentionality, Mind and Folk Psychology.W. H. Dittrich & S. E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.
    The comment addresses central issues of a "theory theory" approach as exemplified in Gopnik' and Goldman's BBS-articles. Gopnik, on the one hand, tries to demonstrate that empirical evidence from developmental psychology supports the view of a "theory theory" in which common sense beliefs are constructed to explain ourselves and others. Focusing the informational processing routes possibly involved we would like to argue that his main thesis (e.g. idea of intentionality as a cognitive construct) lacks support at least for two reasons: (...)
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  42. added 2015-07-06
    ""Banishing" I" and" We" From Accounts of Metacognition.Peter Carruthers - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):148.
    SHORT ABSTRACT: A number of accounts of the relationship between third-person mindreading and first-person metacognition are compared and evaluated. While three of these accounts endorse the existence of introspection for propositional attitudes, the fourth (defended here) claims that our knowledge of our own attitudes results from turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves. The different types of theory are developed and evaluated, and multiple lines of evidence are reviewed, including evolutionary and comparative data, evidence of confabulation when self-attributing attitudes, phenomenological evidence (...)
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  43. added 2015-07-06
    The Social Folk Theorist: Insights From Social and Cultural Psychology on The.Daniel R. Ames, Eric D. Knowles, Michael W. Morris, Charles W. Kalish, Andrea D. Rosati & Alison Gopnik - 2001 - In Bertram Malle, L. J. Moses & Dare Baldwin (eds.), Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition. MIT Press.
  44. added 2015-07-06
    Psychological Explanation: Tacit Theory or Simulation?Angela Joan Arkway - 1995 - Dissertation, City University of New York
    In this dissertation an attempt is made to find a satisfactory account of the nature of commonsense psychological explanation of behavior. The starting point is the current debate in philosophy of mind between the theory theory of folk psychology and the simulation theory. The discussion in the first chapter shows that although simulationists claim that their view can replace the theory theory across the board, their arguments are directed merely at the strand of the theory theory that is to do (...)
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  45. added 2015-07-06
    Review: Recent Work in Folk Psychology. [REVIEW]George Botterill - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):246 - 251.
  46. added 2015-04-05
    Alison Gopnik and Andrew N. Meltzoff, Words, Thoughts, and Theories. [REVIEW]Timothy Bayne - 1997 - Philosophy in Review 17:254-256.
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  47. added 2015-03-23
    Alison Gopnik and Andrew N. Meltzoff, Words, Thoughts, and Theories Reviewed By.Timothy Bayne - 1997 - Philosophy in Review 17 (4):254-256.
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  48. added 2015-03-16
    Symposium on S. Butterfill and I. Apperly, "How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind".Stephen Butterfill, Ian Apperly, Hannes Rakoczy, Shannon Spaulding & Tadeusz Zawidzki - 2013 - Mind and Language Symposia at the Brains Blog.
  49. added 2014-07-31
    Why Desire Reasoning is Developmentally Prior to Belief Reasoning.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & John Michael - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (5):526-549.
    The predominant view in developmental psychology is that young children are able to reason with the concept of desire prior to being able to reason with the concept of belief. We propose an explanation of this phenomenon that focuses on the cognitive tasks that competence with the belief and desire concepts enable young children to perform. We show that cognitive tasks that are typically considered fundamental to our competence with the belief and desire concepts can be performed with the concept (...)
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  50. added 2014-03-30
    Animals, Consciousness, and I-Thoughts.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2009 - In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press. pp. 184--200.
    I argue that recent developments in animal cognition support the conclusion that HOT theory is consistent with animal consciousness. There seems to be growing evidence that many animals are indeed capable of having I-thoughts, including episodic memory, as well as have the ability to understand the mental states of others.
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