The article analyzes volume 19, 1793, of Neueste Critische Nachrichten, in which an anonymous review of Kant’s Religion within the boundaries of mere reason was published. Evidence is presented to establish that the review was authored by Samuel Bernhard Wilcke, a young lecturer at the University of Greifswald, who passed away the following year. After examining Wilcke’s Essay of invitation to his lectures on Kantian philosophy, the review itself is commented upon. Finally, the reviewer’s critique is related to Kant’s reply (...) in the Preface to the second edition of the Religion. (shrink)

Die Beitrage des Sammelbandes widmen sich aus theologisch-philosophischer Perspektive der historischen Rezeption und der systematischen Relevanz des Freiheitsstreits zwischen Martin Luther und Erasmus von Rotterdam. Im systematischen Zentrum steht das jeweilige freiheitstheoretische Verstandnis des Menschen, seiner epistemischen und voluntativen Vermogen und seines metaphysischen Ortes innerhalb der Schopfung, besonders sein Verhaltnis zu Gott. Aus historischer Perspektive wird die Rezeption von Luthers Freiheitsbegriff durch Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Schelling und in der analytischen Philosophie untersucht. Mit Beitragen von Christine Axt-Piscalar, Frank Dettinger, Thomas Frisch, (...) Volker Gerhardt, Friedrich Hermanni, Amit Kravitz, Jorg Noller, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Birgit Recki, Georg Sans SJ, Ruben Schneider und Gunther Wenz. (shrink)

Die Selbstzweckformel des kategorischen Imperativs gebietet, einen Menschen jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloß als Mittel zu gebrauchen. Gerold Prauss zufolge hätte Kant genauer zwischen nicht bloß als Mittel, sondern zugleich als Zweck? und gar nicht als Mittel, sondern nur als Zweck? unterscheiden sollen. Die erste Formel beschreibe ein Rechts¬verhältnis zwischen zwei sich gegenseitig anerkennenden selbstbestimmten Subjekten; die zweite Formel hingegen beziehe sich auf Situationen, in denen mir ein auf Hilfe angewiesenes vernünftiges Wesen gegenübertritt. Lediglich in dem zweiten Fall verdiene (...) die sittliche Pflicht moralisch genannt zu werden. Die Abhandlung zeichnet Prauss' Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von Recht und Moral sowie zur Rolle des säkularen Staats bei deren Verwirklichung nach und bewertet sie als überaus anregenden Versuch, der kantischen These von der für sich selbst praktischen Vernunft einen systematischen Sinn zu verleihen.The categorical imperative, in the formula of humanity as end in itself, demands to use every person always at the same time as end, never merely as a means. According to Gerold Prauss, Kant should have distinguished more carefully between 'not merely as a means, but at the same time as end' and 'not as means at all, but only as end'. Whereas the first formula describes a legal relationship between two self-determining subjects who mutually recognize one another, the second formula applies to situations in which I face a rational being that depends on my help. For Prauss, only in the second case the ethical duty deserves to be called moral. The paper traces Prauss' considerations regarding right and morals as well as regarding the role played by the secular state in their realization. These considerations are discussed as an extremely stimulating attempt to make sense of the Kantian thesis that reason is practical of itself. (shrink)

In his treatise On Intellectual Knowledge, Matteo Liberatore compares some «modern philosophical systems» to the «theory of S. Thomas». However, by examining thoroughly Liberatore's criticisms of the modern doctrine of ideas, his presentation of Descartes, Locke and Kant — the most prominent representatives of modern thought -is shown to be inadequate. Firstly, neither Locke nor Kant accepted Descartes' claim regarding the epistemic primacy of the «I think». Further, it does not seem that ideas, or representations, for either of them did (...) constitute the direct objects of knowledge. Finally, Liberatore is mistaken in maintaining that modern philosophers did not distinguish between intellect and sensibility. As a result, the differences between Liberatore's Neo-Thomism and the modern theory of ideas are less profound than he suggests. (shrink)

Na primeira analogia da experiência, o locus classicus da sua teoria da substancialidade, Kant introduz a substância como algo que permanece através do tempo, como para compensar a alteração dos estados de consciência. O conflito de interpretações a propósito desta questão é provocado sobretudo pela questão de saber até que ponto Kant identifica este substrato permanente de todas as manifestações com a matéria no sentido físico do termo. Nesse sentido, o autor do presente artigo desenvolve um argumento em ordem a (...) mostrar que, segundo Kant, apenas os objectos materials que ocupam espaço podem possuir o estatuto de substância (enquanto fenómeno). Para além disso, no entanto, mostra-se também que o critério da permanência temporal não exaure o conceito de substância. Com efeito, o artigo demonstra até que ponto Kant suplementa a noção de permanência mediante a sua compreensão da substância como sujeito de causalidade e de acção. Esta concepção está presente não apenas na sua metafísica da natureza, mas estende-se também à nossa própria auto-compreensão enquanto seres vivos capazes de agir em liberdade. /// In the first analogy of experience, the locus classicus for his theory of substantiality, Kant introduces substance as something that endures through time, as though to compensate for changing states of consciousness. The conflict of interpretations concerning this issue is provoked above all by the question as to whether Kant identifies this permanent substrate of all appearances with physical matter. This article argues that, according to Kant, only material objects that occupy space can possess the status of substance (as phenomenon). However, it also contends that the criterion of temporal permanence does not exhaust the concept of substance. Kant supplements permanence by means of his understanding of substance as the subject of causality and action. This conception is not only echoed in his metaphysics of nature, but extends to our selfunderstanding as living and freely acting beings. (shrink)