The problem of measurement is often considered an inconsistency inside the quantum formalism. Many attempts to solve it have been made since the inception of quantum mechanics. The form of these attempts depends on the philosophical position that their authors endorse. I will review some of them and analyze their relevance. The phenomenon of decoherence is often presented as a solution lying inside the pure quantum formalism and not demanding any particular philosophical assumption. Nevertheless, a widely debated question is to (...) decide between two different interpretations. The first one is to consider that the decoherence process has the effect to actually project a superposed state into one of its classically interpretable component, hence doing the same job as the reduction postulate. For the second one, decoherence is only a way to show why no macroscopic superposed state can be observed, so explaining the classical appearance of the macroscopic world, while the quantum entanglement between the system, the apparatus and the environment never disappears. In this case, explaining why only one single definite outcome is observed remains to do. In this paper, I examine the arguments that have been given for and against both interpretations and defend a new position, the “Convivial Solipsism”, according to which the outcome that is observed is relative to the observer, different but in close parallel to the Everett’s interpretation and sharing also some similarities with Rovelli’s relational interpretation and Quantum Bayesianism. I also show how “Convivial Solipsism” can help getting a new standpoint about the EPR paradox providing a way out of the seemingly unavoidable non-locality of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Despite its importance in various fields, analogical reasoning has not yet received a unified formal representation. Our contribution proposes a general scheme of inference that is compatible with different types of logic (deductive, probabilistic, non-monotonic). Firstly, analogical assessment precisely defines the similarity of two objects according to their properties, in a relative rather than absolute way. Secondly, analogical inference transfers a new property from one object to a similar one, thanks to an over-hypothesis linking two sets of properties. The belief (...) strength in the conclusion is then directly related to the belief strength in this meta-hypothesis. (shrink)

A large number of physicists now admit that quantum mechanics is a non-local theory. The EPR argument and the many experiments showing the violation of Bell’s inequalities seem to have confirmed convincingly that quantum mechanics cannot be local. Nevertheless, this conclusion can only be drawn inside a standard realist framework assuming an ontic interpretation of the wave function and viewing the collapse of the wave function as a real change of the physical state of the system. We show that this (...) standpoint is not mandatory and that if the collapse is not considered an actual physical change it is possible to recover locality. (shrink)

A large number of physicists now admit that quantum mechanics is a non-local theory. The EPR argument and the many experiments showing the violation of Bell’s inequalities seem to have confirmed convincingly that quantum mechanics cannot be local. Nevertheless, this conclusion can only be drawn inside a standard realist framework assuming an ontic interpretation of the wave function and viewing the collapse of the wave function as a real change of the physical state of the system. We show that this (...) standpoint is not mandatory and that if the collapse is not considered an actual physical change it is possible to recover locality. (shrink)

A large number of physicists now admit that quantum mechanics is a non-local theory. The EPR argument and the many experiments showing the violation of Bell’s inequalities seem to have confirmed convincingly that quantum mechanics cannot be local. Nevertheless, this conclusion can only be drawn inside a standard realist framework assuming an ontic interpretation of the wave function and viewing the collapse of the wave function as a real change of the physical state of the system. We show that this (...) standpoint is not mandatory and that if the collapse is not considered an actual physical change it is possible to recover locality. (shrink)

A large number of physicists now admit that quantum mechanics is a non-local theory. The EPR argument and the many experiments showing the violation of Bell’s inequalities seem to have confirmed convincingly that quantum mechanics cannot be local. Nevertheless, this conclusion can only be drawn inside a standard realist framework assuming an ontic interpretation of the wave function and viewing the collapse of the wave function as a real change of the physical state of the system. We show that this (...) standpoint is not mandatory and that if the collapse is not considered an actual physical change it is possible to recover locality. (shrink)

Abduction was first introduced in the epistemological context of scientific discovery. It was more recently analyzed in artificial intelligence, especially with respect to diagnosis analysis or ordinary reasoning. These two fields share a common view of abduction as a general process of hypotheses formation. More precisely, abduction is conceived as a kind of reverse explanation where a hypothesis H can be abduced from events E if H is a good explanation of E. The paper surveys four known schemes for abduction (...) that can be used in both fields. Its first contribution is a taxonomy of these schemes according to a common semantic framework based on belief revision. Its second contribution is to produce, for each non-trivial scheme, a representation theorem linking its semantic framework to a set of postulates. Its third contribution is to present semantic and axiomatic arguments in favor of one of these schemes, ordered abduction, which has never been vindicated in the literature. (shrink)

In a recent paper (Zwirn in Phys Essays 30: 3, 2017), I argued against backward in time effects used by several authors to explain delayed choice experiments. I gave an explanation showing that there is no physical influence propagating from the present to the past and modifying the state of the system at a time previous to the measurement. However, though the solution is straightforward in the case of delayed choice experiments involving only one particle, it is subtler in the (...) case of experiments involving two entangled particles because they give rise to EPR-like situations. Considering that a measurement is not an actual change of the physical state of a system and is relative to the observer allows to understand that there is neither backward in time effects nor instantaneous collapse of the second system when the first one is measured, as is often postulated. This allows also to get rid of any non-locality (Zwirn in Found Phys 50:1–26, 2020). In this paper, I want to go further into the consequences of this way of considering the measurement, that I have called Convivial Solipsism, and show that even if, in the usual sense, there is no physical effect of the present or of the future on the past, we must nevertheless consider that the observer’s past is sometimes not entirely determined and that it becomes determined only when certain measurements are done latter. This apparent contradiction disappears if one understand that each observer builds, through her own measurements, her own world (that I call the phenomenal world in Convivial Solipsism) which is different from what we are used to consider as the common world shared by everybody. (shrink)

In this largely nontechnical book, eminent physicists and philosophers address the philosophical impact of recent advances in quantum physics. These are shown to shed new light on profound questions about realism, determinism, causality or locality. The participants contribute in the spirit of an open and honest discussion, reminiscent of the time when science and philosophy were inseparable. After the editors' introduction, the next chapter reveals the strangeness of quantum mechanics and the subsequent discussions examine our notion of reality. The spotlight (...) is then turned to the topic of decoherence. Bohm's theory is critically examined in two chapters, and the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics is likewise described and discussed. The penultimate chapter presents a proposal for resolving the measurement problem, and finally the topic of loop quantum gravity is presented by one of its founding fathers, Carlo Rovelli. The original presentations and discussions on which this volume is based took place under the auspices of the French "Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques". The book will appeal to everybody interested in knowing how our description of the world is impacted by the results of the most powerful and successful theory that physicists have ever built. (shrink)

RésuméEn dépit de son importance dans divers domaines, le raisonnement analogique n'a pas encore reçu de représentation formelle unifiée. Notre contribution propose un schéma d'inférence général, compatible avec différentes logiques (déductive, probabiliste, non monotone). Premièrement, un énoncé analogique définit précisément la similarité entre deux objets en fonction de leurs propriétés, de façon relative et non absolue. Deuxièmement, une inférence analogique transfère une propriété nouvelle d'un objet à un objet similaire, grâce à une hypothèse d'arrière-plan qui relie deux ensembles de propriétés. (...) Le degré de croyance dans la conclusion est alors directement relié au degré de croyance dans cette méta-hypothèse. (shrink)

A classification of different interpretations of the quantum formalism is examined and the concept of perspectival interpretation is presented. A perspectival interpretation implies that the truth is relative to the observer. The degree to which Convivial Solipsism and QBism in its different versions are perspectival is examined.

Karl Popper et David Miller ont soutenu l'idée selon laquelle le soutien probabiliste positif = p − p > 0) que e apporte á h, lorsque de h on déduit e, ne justifie en rien l'espoir de pouvoir construire une logique inductive fondée sur le calcul des probabilityés.