Recent scholarship on technology-induced ‘conceptual disruption’ has spotlighted the notion of a conceptual gap. Conceptual gaps have also been discussed in scholarship on epistemic injustice, yet up until now these bodies of work have remained disconnected. This article shows that ‘gaps’ of interest to both bodies of literature are closely related, and argues that a joint examination of conceptual disruption and epistemic injustice is fruitful for both fields. I argue that hermeneutical marginalization—a skewed division of hermeneutical resources, which serves to (...) diminish the experiences of marginalized folk—does not only transpire because of conceptual gaps, but also because of two other kinds of conceptual disruption: conceptual overlaps and conceptual misalignments. Hence, there are multiple kinds of conceptual disruption that can be usefully studied through the normative lens of epistemic injustice. Technology can play different roles vis-a-vis epistemic injustices, both as a causal trigger of conceptual disruption, but also as a mediator of hermeneutical resources. Its role is normatively significant, in particular because socially disruptive technologies can have different epistemic implications for different groups: they may amplify the epistemic resources of some groups, while diminishing those of others. (shrink)

_Practical Bioethics_ offers a mix of theory and readings, presented in a format that is succinct and approachable. Each chapter begins and ends with a case study, illustrating the core issues at play and emphasizing the practical nature of the dilemmas arising in medicine. Primary source texts are provided to flesh out the issues, and each of these is carefully edited and presented with interwoven explanatory comments to assist student readers. Throughout, J.K. Miles shows the importance of health-care ethics to (...) us all, whether we be medical providers, patients, or both. (shrink)

Medical ethics and medical practice -- Public health and the state-patient relationship -- Health rights and obligations in the European Union -- Consent to treatment -- Liability for medical injury -- Medical confidentiality -- Genetic information and the law -- The management of infertility and childlessness -- The control of fertility -- Civil and criminal liability in reproductive medicine -- Health resources and dilemmas in treatment -- Treatment of the aged -- Mental health and human rights -- The body as (...) property -- Medical futility -- The diagnosis of death -- The donation of organs and transplantation -- Euthanasia and assistance in dying -- Biomedical human research and experimentation -- Research on children, fetuses and embryos. (shrink)

Value-based education aims to train students with appropriate attitude and values when they are interacting with their friends, family and outside the school. It helps in developing the child’s Personality, Character, Citizenship, and Spirituality. Stories are an effective tool and an ideal medium through which children can be taught essential life lessons. In ancient India, children were taught values and ethics through the oral story-telling tradition. Stories from Indian Folk tales such as Panchatantra, Hitopodesha, Epics like Ramayana and Bhagavad Gita (...) were told to children during their childhood to teach them Ethics, Values which plays a significant role in their personality development. In this article, we have attempted to bring out the commonality between the values as given in Patanjali Yoga Sutras and HYP as Yamas (Social Discipline) and Niyamas (Personal Discipline) with the characters of Ramayana and the values given in Bhagavad Gita. It is easy to incorporate them in the curriculum with the help of stories class wise. (shrink)

This chapter clarifies important component of alignment in character creation and development. It demonstrates an application of moral philosophy and introduces ethical dilemmas that allow players to make meaningful moral choices leads to a more rewarding gaming experience. The chapter highlights philosophy's most enduring and frustrating questions. According to Dungeons Dragons (DD), the alignment is an element of the player's character sheet that clarifies their worldview and moral outlook. It is also a category that can limit character class and an (...) aura that allows spells or abilities to detect a character's moral outlook – and if necessary “smite” that evil (or good) into oblivion. The DD attracts imaginative players. A party is likely be filled with virtuous paragons, nefarious knaves, and pragmatists. (shrink)

It is shown that all the countable superatomic boolean algebras of finite rank have the small index property.

The revival of republicanism was meant to challenge the hegemony of liberalism in contemporary political theory on the grounds that liberals show insufficient concern with institutional protection against political misrule. This article challenges this view by showing how neorepublicanism, particularly on Philip Pettit’s formulation, demands no greater institutional protection than does political liberalism. By identifying neutrality between conceptions of the good as the constraint on institutional requirements that forces neorepublicanism into the liberal framework, the article shows that neutrality is what (...) neorepublicans must jettison to offer a tenable critique of liberalism. Only then can neorepublicans ensure greater protection against misrule by demanding that citizens participate more actively in politics. They can then also criticize liberalism for failing to appreciate the importance of such protection. (shrink)

Public reason liberals expect individuals to have justificatory reasons for their views of certain political issues. This paper considers how groups can, and whether they should, give collective public reasons for their political decisions. A problem is that aggregating individuals’ consistent judgments on reasons and a decision can produce inconsistent collective judgments. The group will then fail to give a reason for its decision. The paper considers various solutions to this problem and defends a deliberative procedure by showing how it (...) incentivizes information sharing and leads to outcomes most acceptable to the group members. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Why a Philosophy of Fatherhood? Role Responsibilities Autonomy Autonomy and Fatherhood Conclusion Notes.

In the debate on how we ought to define political freedom, some definitions are criticized for implying that no one can ever be free to perform any action. In this paper, I show how the possibility of freedom depends on a definition that finds an appropriate balance between absence of interference and protection against interference. To assess the possibility of different conceptions of freedom, I consider the trade-offs they make between these two dimensions. I find that pure negative freedom is (...) clearly possible. Republican freedom might also be possible, though its protection requirement is too vague for a definitive verdict. Finally, the recently proposed ‘freedom as independence’ is impossible since it is an attempt to avoid the unavoidable trade-off. (shrink)

Can groups really be agents or is group agency just a fiction? Christian List and Philip Pettit argue influentially for group-agent realism by showing how certain groups form and act on attitudes in ways they take to be unexplainable at the level of the individual agents constituting them. Group agency is therefore considered not a fiction or a metaphor but a reality we must account for in explanations of certain social phenomena. In this paper, I challenge this defence of group-agent (...) realism by showing how it is undermined by individual-level analysis of how individuals interact within groups. While group agency can be a useful fiction, real agents are at the individual level, not the collective level. (shrink)

This article aims to show that Locke’s discussion of tacit consent and the right to punish aliens in the Second Treatise of Government has important bearings on the moral status of undocumented immigrants. It argues that Locke conceptualized both friendly and hostile aliens, counting the former as tacit consenters to whom host states owed rights and protection. Moreover, it highlights how his approach, unlike theorists before and after him, was one that saw individuals as capable of shaping their own relationship (...) with the host. The article also examines Locke’s discussion of the federative power of the state, which includes the power to vet aliens within the country. Seen through this Lockean lens, the article argues that the vast majority of undocumented immigrants can be understood as tacit consenters or potential citizens who should be judged by how they choose to relate to the host, and not by their country of origin. While noting that the Lockean approach is not incompatible with border control, the article also shows how it puts the onus on the host to justify the power it exercises and to engage in dialogue with undocumented immigrants about what their status should be in the country. (shrink)

This article revisits long-standing questions about consent, membership and emigration in Locke’s thought. Commentators such as A John Simmons have argued that Locke opens political membership to both express consenters and some kind of tacit consenters, and not just to the former, as some have suggested. Simmons’s reading seems to render Locke more sensible in that it does not exclude large numbers of people from membership or burden the few members with all the civic duties, and also in that it (...) allows at least tacit-consenting members the right to relocate, while this right is denied to express-consenting members. Against this reading, the article shows, by resolving seemingly conflicting claims in the text, that people become members only by express consent. It also responds to the criticism that the express-consent-only reading would limit membership to a few and so would render Locke’s account implausible from a practical point of view. The article then addresses the purported restriction Locke imposes on express consenters’ right to emigrate, arguing that the restriction concerns the change of membership and not the right to relocate. (shrink)

A moralised conception of freedom is based on a normative theory. Understanding it therefore requires an analysis of this theory. In this paper, I show how republican freedom as non-domination is moralised, and why analysing this concept therefore involves identifying the basic components of the republican theory of justice. One of these components is the non-moralised pure negative conception of freedom as non-interference. Republicans therefore cannot keep insisting that their freedom concept conflicts with, and is superior to, this more basic (...) concept. I demonstrate how we can use pure negative freedom to formulate the republican theory more precisely. This exercise is more fruitful than the common focus on the alleged conflict between the two freedom concepts. (shrink)

This new edition of Law and Medical Ethics continues to chart the ever-widening field that the topics cover. The interplay between the health caring professions and the public during the period intervening since the last edition has, perhaps, been mainly dominated by wide-ranging changes in the administration of the National Health Service and of the professions themselves but these have been paralleled by important developments in medical jurisprudence.

Originally published in 1926, this book attempts to state 'what has been believed with regard to God's incapacity for suffering'. Mozley charts the development of the doctrine from the Apostolic Fathers through the Reformation to the modern influence of metaphysical philosophy and concludes with six questions intended to prompt further theological discussion on this point. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in the history of Christian theology.

The proliferation of personal data collection practices fundamentally reshapes how society is ordered and commercialized, and demands reconsideration of the possibilities for a just and equitable s...

In two important articles, Thomas Hurka applies his recursive account of value to virtue. Hurka’s contention is that being virtuous is merely a matter of having the proper pro-attitude toward what is objectively good. Hurka argues that the recursive framework honors much of our traditional conception of virtue, and even if it does not capture everything involved in virtue, it “describes at least part of what virtue involves.” I argue that the recursive account of virtue is not a partial description (...) of traditional virtue, however, but a reconception of virtue. Accepting the recursive account would require abandoning the most distinctive elements of traditional virtue ethics. (shrink)