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Paul L. Franco
University of Washington
  1.  23
    Hans Reichenbach's and C.I. Lewis's Kantian Philosophies of Science.Paul L. Franco - forthcoming - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A.
    Recent work in the history of philosophy of science details the Kantianism of philosophers often thought opposed to one another, e.g., Hans Reichenbach, C.I. Lewis, Rudolf Carnap, and Thomas Kuhn. Historians of philosophy of science in the last two decades have been particularly interested in the Kantianism of Reichenbach, Carnap, and Kuhn, and more recently, of Lewis. While recent historical work focuses on recovering the threatened-to-be-forgotten Kantian themes of early twentieth-century philosophy of science, we should not elide the differences between (...)
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  2.  11
    Assertion, Nonepistemic Values, and Scientific Practice.Paul L. Franco - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (1):160-180.
    This article motivates a shift in certain strands of the debate over legitimate roles for nonepistemic values in scientific practice from investigating what is involved in taking cognitive attitudes like acceptance toward an empirical hypothesis to looking at a social understanding of assertion, the act of communicating that hypothesis. I argue that speech act theory’s account of assertion as a type of doing makes salient legitimate roles nonepistemic values can play in scientific practice. The article also shows how speech act (...)
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  3.  14
    Speech Act Theory and the Multiple Aims of Science.Paul L. Franco - manuscript
    I draw upon speech act theory to understand the speech acts appropriate to the multiple aims of scientific practice and the role of nonepistemic values in evaluating speech acts made relative to those aims. First, I look at work that distinguishes explaining from describing within scientific practices. I then argue speech act theory provides a framework to make sense of how explaining, describing, and other acts have different felicity conditions. Finally, I argue that if explaining aims to convey understanding to (...)
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  4.  13
    Review of Pragmatism in Transition: Contemporary Perspectives on C.I. Lewis Ed. By Peter Olen and Carl Sachs. [REVIEW]Paul L. Franco - 2018 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 54 (2):273-280.
    In this review, I talk about the essays dealing with C.I. Lewis's place in the history of analytic philosophy and the history of philosophy of science.
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  5.  36
    Ordinary Language Criticisms of Logical Positivism.Paul L. Franco - 2018 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 8 (1):157-190.
    In this paper, I fill out the received view of logical positivism within professional philosophy against which Thomas Kuhn’s Structure appeared. To do this, I look at the methodological dimensions of ordinary language criticisms of logical positivist analysis from P.F. Strawson and J.L. Austin. While no one would confuse Strawson and Austin for philosophers of science, I look to their criticisms given the general porousness of sub-disciplinary boundaries in mid-20th century philosophy, the prominence of ordinary language philosophy in the 1950s, (...)
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  6.  41
    Are Kant’s Concepts and Methodology Inconsistent with Scientific Change? Constitutivity and the Synthetic Method in Kant.Paul L. Franco - 2012 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 2 (2):321-353.
    Sympathetic commentators on Kant’s account of physical knowledge agree that while philosophy of science has much to gain from Kant’s notion of constitutive a priori principles, Kant’s conceptual and methodological resources are inconsistent with the possibility of scientific change. In this article, I argue that this received view is lacking since Kant’s claim that a unique set of a priori principles structures our knowledge for all time is not central to his account of the constitutive a priori. Two underemphasized points (...)
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