Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 109 Heft: 1 Seiten: 147-169.

A distinguished group of scholars examines the crisis of faith in reason and reason in faith.

Kant's ethics do not include a discussion of justice as a specific virtue, and the "Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right" appear to deal only with private and public law, but not with justice. In fact, Kant's ethics in the three Critiques and later relevant writings is dependent on God's iustitia distributiva as the highest good and the institution of the state is labelled as "public justice". This article attempts to explain this connection and to provide a contribution (...) to the topic of Kantian justice. The Epilogue to this article discusses a letter dated November 6, 1790, which Kant wrote in one of his official capacities at the University of Königsberg and which as of yet has remained unpublished. Innerhalb der Kantischen Ethik wird die Gerechtigkeit nicht als besondere Tugend erörtert, und die "Metaphysischen Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre" scheinen nur vom privaten und öffentlichen Recht, nicht jedoch von der Gerechtigkeit zu handeln. Tatsächlich ist die Ethik in den drei Kritiken und den späteren einschlägigen Schriften auf eine iustitia distributiva Gottes als höchstem Gut angewiesen, und die rechtliche Institution des Staates wird als "öffentliche Gerechtigkeit" bezeichnet. Die Arbeit sucht diesen Zusammenhang zu klären und einen Beitrag zu dem im Titel angegebenen Thema zu leisten. (shrink)

In Hobbes' Theorie des Leviathan sind weder der Naturzustand noch der staatliche Zustand und das Strafrecht widersprüchlich. Der radikale Subjektivismus ist der archimedische Punkt, von dem aus sich die scheinbaren Widersprüche auflösen lassen. Locke kehrt zu einem Rechtsobjektivismus zurück, hat aber kein Prinzip der Begrenzung von Strafen.

Recent publications (Henrich, Seeberg) claim that Kant has been profoundly influenced by contemporary publications on juridical deductions. I try to show, that this cannot be right. The introductory note of the “Transcendental Deduction” (Critique of Pure Reason A 84) poses two questions: “quid facti?” and “quid juris?”. The first is answered by the demonstration of the possibility of relations between pure concepts and pure intuition und sensations, the second by the implicit refutation of David Hume. Kant and his interpreters sustain (...) the possibility of using juridical concepts, that are neither related to real juridical facts nor are only metaphers, but have a special philosophical signification. But what should that be? (shrink)

Beauty and its refusal are not merely a cipher of contemporaneity but a topic discussed since antiquity. The rivalry between lyre and flute, between harmony, mathematically determinable, and melody, gatherable only by hearing, arises from the myth, from the fight between Apollo and Marsia, where Greece and Phrygia, Europe and Asia are opposed in a civilisations collision. In modernity this collision arose again as political, whereas the egalitarian melody is opposed to the elitist harmony. Into this collision we find fine (...) arts, not beauty anymore: fine arts leave the territory of beaux arts of fine poetry but remain, for contemporaneity, works of art. But what do arts, not beauty anymore, or even ugly, want? Which aim do they pursue? How can we judge them? (shrink)

En la cultura europea hay muchas configuraciones con la forma 1,2,3/4. Kant utiliza esa constelación en muchas partes de su filosofía. En este ensayo muestro un ejemplo especialmente interesante: a finales de la década de los ochenta Kant concibe la Cuarta Crítica como base o conclusión de las tres Críticas llevadas a cabo.