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  1.  75
    Elements, Compounds and Other Chemical Kinds.Robin Findlay Hendry - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (5):864--875.
  2. Two Conceptions of the Chemical Bond.Robin Findlay Hendry - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):909-920.
    In this article I sketch G. N. Lewis’s views on chemical bonding and Linus Pauling’s attempt to preserve Lewis’s insights within a quantum‐mechanical theory of the bond. I then set out two broad conceptions of the chemical bond, the structural and the energetic views, which differ on the extent in which they preserve anything like the classical chemical bond in the modern quantum‐mechanical understanding of molecular structure. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, Durham University, 50 Old (...)
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  3. Le Poidevin on the Reduction of Chemistry.Robin Findlay Hendry & Paul Needham - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):339-353.
    In this article we critically evaluate Robin Le Poidevin's recent attempt to set out an argument for the ontological reduction of chemistry independently of intertheoretic reduction. We argue, firstly, that the argument he envisages applies only to a small part of chemistry, and that there is no obvious way to extend it. We argue, secondly, that the argument cannot establish the reduction of chemistry, properly so called.
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  4.  55
    Lavoisier and Mendeleev on the Elements.Robin Findlay Hendry - 2004 - Foundations of Chemistry 7 (1):31-48.
    Lavoisier defined an element as a chemicalsubstance that cannot be decomposed usingcurrent analytical methods. Mendeleev saw anelement as a substance composed of atoms of thesame atomic weight. These `definitions' doquite different things: Lavoisier'sdistinguishes the elements from the compounds,so that the elements may form the basis of acompositional nomenclature; Mendeleev's offersa criterion of sameness and difference forelemental substances, while Lavoisier's doesnot. In this paper I explore the historical andtheoretical background to each proposal.Lavoisier's and Mendeleev's explicitconceptions of elementhood differed from eachother, and (...)
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  5. Dispositional Essentialism and the Necessity of Laws.Robin Findlay Hendry & Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):668-677.
    We argue that the inference from dispositional essentialism about a property (in the broadest sense) to the metaphysical necessity of laws involving it is invalid. Let strict dispositional essentialism be any view according to which any given property’s dispositional character is precisely the same across all possible worlds. Clearly, any version of strict dispositional essentialism rules out worlds with different laws involving that property. Permissive dispositional essentialism is committed to a property’s identity being tied to its dispositional profile or causal (...)
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  6.  51
    Chemical Substances and the Limits of Pluralism.Robin Findlay Hendry - 2012 - Foundations of Chemistry 14 (1):55-68.
    In this paper I investigate the relationship between vernacular kind terms and specialist scientific vocabularies. Elsewhere I have developed a defence of realism about the chemical elements as natural kinds. This defence depends on identifying the epistemic interests and theoretical conception of the elements that have suffused chemistry since the mid-eighteenth century. Because of this dependence, it is a discipline-specific defence, and would seem to entail important concessions to pluralism about natural kinds. I argue that making this kind of concession (...)
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  7.  39
    Models and Approximations in Quantum Chemistry.Robin Findlay Hendry - 1998 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 63:123-142.
  8. Emergence Vs. Reduction in Chemistry.Robin Findlay Hendry - 2010 - In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind. Oxford University Press.
  9.  25
    Entropy and Chemical Substance.Robin Findlay Hendry - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (5):921-932.
  10.  20
    Substantial Confusion.Robin Findlay Hendry - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (2):322-336.
    In this paper I defend, against Eric Scerri’s objections, the following theses: that Lavoisier and Mendeleev shared a ‘core conception’ of chemical element, and that this core conception underwrites referential continuity in the names of particular elements.Keywords: Antoine Lavoisier; Dmitri Mendeleev; Chemical elements; Substance; Natural kinds; Reference.
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  11.  15
    Structure as Abstraction.Robin Findlay Hendry - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (5):1070-1081.
  12.  64
    Are Realism and Instrumentalism Methodologically Indifferent?Robin Findlay Hendry - 2001 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S25-.
    Arthur Fine and André Kukla have argued that realism and instrumentalism are indifferent with respect to scientific practice. I argue that this claim is ambiguous. One interpretation is that for any practice, the fact that that practice yields predictively successful theories is evidentially indifferent between scientific realism and instrumentalism. On the second construal, the claim is that for any practice, adoption of that practice by a scientist is indifferent between their being a realist or instrumentalist. I argue that there are (...)
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  13.  18
    Are Realism and Instrumentalism Methodologically Indifferent?Robin Findlay Hendry - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (S3):S25-S37.
    Arthur Fine and André Kukla have argued that realism and instrumentalism are indifferent with respect to scientific practice. I argue that this claim is ambiguous. One interpretation is that for any practice, the fact that that practice yields predictively successful theories is evidentially indifferent between scientific realism and instrumentalism. On the second construal, the claim is that for any practice, adoption of that practice by a scientist is indifferent between their being a realist or instrumentalist. I argue that there are (...)
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  14.  42
    Realism and Progress: Why Scientists Should Be Realists.Robin Findlay Hendry - 1995 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 38:53-72.
    For as long as realists and instrumentalists have disagreed, partisans of both sides have pointed in argument to the actions and sayings of scientists. Realists in particular have often drawn comfort from the literal understanding given even to very theoretical propositions by many of those who are paid to deploy them. The scientists' realism, according to the realist, is not an idle commitment: a literal understanding of past and present theories and concepts underwrites their employment in the construction of new (...)
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  15.  69
    Book Review: Jaap van Brakel: Philosophy of Chemistry: Between the Manifest and the Scientific Image Leuven University Press, Leuven, 2000, Xiv + 246 Pp., ISBN 90-5867-063-5. [REVIEW]Robin Findlay Hendry - 2004 - Foundations of Chemistry 7 (2):187-197.
  16.  44
    Introduction: Historiography and the Philosophy of the Sciences.Robin Findlay Hendry & Ian James Kidd - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 55:1-2.
    The history of science and the philosophy of science have a long and tangled relationship. On the one hand, philosophical reflection on science can be guided, shaped, and challenged by historical scholarship—a process begun by Thomas Kuhn and continued by successive generations of ‘post-positivist’ historians and philosophers of science. On the other hand, the activity of writing the history of science raises methodological questions concerning, for instance, progress in science, realism and antirealism, and the semantics of scientific theories, questions which (...)
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  17.  17
    Review. [REVIEW]Robin Findlay Hendry - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1):287-291.
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  18.  35
    Realism and Progress: Why Scientists Should Be Realists: Robin Findlay Hendry.Robin Findlay Hendry - 1995 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 38:53-72.
    For as long as realists and instrumentalists have disagreed, partisans of both sides have pointed in argument to the actions and sayings of scientists. Realists in particular have often drawn comfort from the literal understanding given even to very theoretical propositions by many of those who are paid to deploy them. The scientists' realism, according to the realist, is not an idle commitment: a literal understanding of past and present theories and concepts underwrites their employment in the construction of new (...)
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  19.  7
    Structure, Scale and Emergence.Robin Findlay Hendry - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 85:44-53.
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