Results for 'TFT'

6 found
  1.  11
    A New Simple Chaotic Lorenz-Type System and Its Digital Realization Using a TFT Touch-Screen Display Embedded System.Rodrigo Méndez-Ramírez, Adrian Arellano-Delgado, César Cruz-Hernández & Rigoberto Martínez-Clark - 2017 - Complexity 2017:1-13.
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  2. Spatialization and Greater Generosity in the Stochastic Prisoner's Dilemma.Patrick Grim - 1996 - Biosystems 37:3-17.
    The iterated Prisoners Dilemma has become the standard model for the evolution of cooperative behavior within a community of egoistic agents, frequently cited for implications in (...)both sociology and biology. Due primarily to the work of Axelrod (1980a, 198Ob, 1984, 1985), a strategy of tit for tat (TFT) has established a reputation as being particularly robust. Nowak and Sigmund (1992) have shown, however, that in a world of stochastic error or imperfect communication, it is not TFT that finally triumphs in an ecological model based on population percentages (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981), butgenerous tit for tat’ (GTFT), which repays cooperation with a probability of cooperation approaching 1 but forgives defection with a probability of l/3. In this paper, we consider a spatialized instantiation of the stochastic Prisoners Dilemma, using two-dimensional cellular automata (Wolfram, 1984, 1986; Gutowitz, 1990) to model the spatial dynamics of populations of competing strategies. The surprising result is that in the spatial model it is not GIFT but still more generous strategies that are favored. The optimal strategy within this spatial ecology appears to be a form ofbending over backwards’, which returns cooperation for defection with a probability of 2/3 - a rate twice as generous as GTFT. (shrink)
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  3. Ethical Decision-Making: A Case for the Triple Font Theory.Surendra Arjoon - 2007 - Journal of Business Ethics 71 (4):395-410.
    This paper discusses the philosophical argument and the application of the Triple Font Theory for moral evaluation of human acts and attempts to integrate the conceptual components (...)
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    Cooperation or Defection Strategies of Conduct in Conflict-Prone Situations.Jan Krawczyk - 2008 - Dialogue and Universalism 18 (4-6):119-125.
    The simple model of conflict-prone situations called Prisoners Dilemma is discussed. Whereas the best strategy for the model is to defect, in the case of its (...) iterated version (Iterated Prisoners DilemmaIPD) it is possible and more profitable to cooperate with the opponent.The simple strategy called Tit for Tat (TFT) which is easy to recognize, never defects first, punishes every defection but is also forgiving is presented. The TFT strategy is very successful being able to establish the cooperation with its opponents. The possible outcome of the competition between the TFT strategy and non-cooperative strategies is considered. It turns out that even small number of TFT strategies can overcome the greater number of moreegoisticstrategies.The described model can give the better understanding of some psychological, sociological and biological processes as well as help to propagate the altruistic attitudes in the society. (shrink)
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    The Emergence of Reactive Strategies in Simulated Heterogeneous Populations.Ilan Fischer - 2003 - Theory and Decision 55 (4):289-314.
    The computer simulation study explores the impact of the duration of social impact on the generation and stabilization of cooperative strategies. Rather than seeding the simulations with (...)
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    Evolutionary Equilibria: Characterization Theorems and Their Implications[REVIEW]Jonathan Bendor & Piotr Swistak - 1998 - Theory and Decision 45 (2):99-159.
    To understand the meaning of evolutionary equilibria, it is necessary to comprehend the ramifications of the evolutionary model. For instance, a full appreciation of Axelrod's The (...)Evolution of Cooperation requires that we identify assumptions under which conditionally cooperative strategies, like Tit For Tat, are and are not evolutionarily stable. And more generally, when does stability fail? To resolve these questions we re-examine the very foundations of the evolutionary model. The results of this paper can be analytically separated into three parts. The first part is conceptual: it identifies the evolutionary model's assumptions and shows how different assumptions imply different types of evolutionary stability. The second part is deductive: it establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for the types of evolutionary stability identified in the first part, and demonstrates in which games these kinds of stability can (and cannot) be attained. The third and final part is applied: it relates the general findings (which are independent of the specific payoffs of any particular evolutionary game) to the issue of the evolutionary stability of cooperation. Results on cooperation appear throughout the paper as they both exemplify and motivate the general results. These results essentially explain when cooperation is and is not stable, and why, thus shedding new light on the meaning and applicability of Axelrod's widely known claims. (shrink)
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