This paper comments on the tension between constant imitatio and refused aemulatio gloriae in Tiberius’ attitude towards Augustus in Velleius Paterculus’ History. I argue that Tiberius is equalling and eventually even surpassing Augustus precisely because he refuses to compete with him, let alone surpass him. In order to do so, I focus on two hitherto neglected Augustan intertexts, which are referenced at very distinct moments of Velleius’ portrayal of Tiberius. The first is the moment when Tiberius appears (...) on the political stage at the age of 19 ; the second is the last mentioned event of his life before he succeeds Augustus, namely his third triumph in ad 12. (shrink)

Velej Paterkul je bil rimski ekvit, vojaški poveljnik in senator, ki je svojo politično kariero opravljal pod Avgustom in Tiberijem. Vse, kar vemo o njem, nam je povedal sam v svojem zgodovinskem delu Historia Romana. Popisal je zgodovino vse do Tiberijeve vladavine, zaradi slabe ohranjenosti prve knjige pa je težko reči, kje je začel. Bil je prvi rimski zgodovinar, ki je svoje delo označil za transcursus, v katerem bo popisal samo najpomembnejše dogodke. Slednje na splošno opisuje bolj podrobno, če so (...) bili bližje času, v katerem je pisal. Kljub temu da je Velejevo delo pravzaprav edino ohranjeno prozno delo iz časa Avgustove in Tiberijeve vladavine, je malo antičnih del, ki so jih tako v antiki kot kasneje citirali tako malo. Zanemarjali so ga predvsem zaradi njegovega navdušenja nad Tiberijem in njegovo vladavino. (shrink)

When first confronted by the Historia Romana of Velleius Paterculus, it is easy for a reader to assume on the basis of the title and the surviving part of the text that it is a history of Rome, albeit a short one. In the following discussion I intend to demonstrate, first, why that initial assumption should be rejected and, secondly, how the work fits into the tradition of Roman historical writing.

The aim of this paper is to show the influence of chronographical works on ancient literary criticism and philology in Rome between the end of the first century BC and the beginnings of the first century AD. In the first part, the development of chronographic tradition in Rome at the end of the Republic is briefly sketched (par. 1). The second part of the paper deals with the relevance of this kind of works for the literary analyses exposed in Cicero’s (...) Brutus (par. 2), in Velleius Paterculus’ history (par. 3) and in Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ treatise On Dinarchus (par. 4). (shrink)

The last Latin colony in Italy named by Livy is Aquileia; but Velleius Paterculus in a well-known passage says that Luca received a colony in 177 B.C., and follows his usual practice of not stating whether it was of the Latin or of the citizen type. Livy does not know of a colony at Luca, but does mention a citizen colony planted at Luna in 177 b.c.

Towards the end of his list of colonial foundations, writing with apparent precision, dating the event not only by the consuls of the year but back from his time of writing, and using it as a means of fixing the colonization of Eporedia, Velleius Paterculus records the foundation of Narbo Martius: ‘Narbo autem Martius in Gallia Porcio Marcioque consulibus abhinc annos circiter centum quadraginta sex, deducta colonia est. Post duodeviginti annos in Bagiennis Eporedia Mario sextum Valerioque Flacco consulibus.’ (...) If this is the offering of a gift horse, it has not always been graciously received. Velleius’ date has been questioned and rejected in a searching article by Mr. H. B. Mattingly, and more than once Mr. Mattingly's conclusions have been quoted with approval by Professor E. Badian. Mr. Mattingly began his attack by casting doubt on the authority of Velleius’ list as a whole: Velleius did not consult Livy at first hand, or any semi-official list, but used sources of differing value, one of them perhaps Greek. Nor is his testimony really confirmed by any of the later writers who seem to agree with him: they lazily follow him without looking for independent evidence. (shrink)

Tacitus opens the Annals with a succinct sketch of the constitutional history of Rome from the kings to Augustus (1.1.1). The common interpretation holds that Tacitus adopts a cyclical view of this history which identifies the supremacy of Augustus with kingship, and chooses his vocabulary of power primarily with stylistic variation in mind. The terms employed, princeps and imperium, are also held to announce a major interpretative preoccupation of the Annals, the gap between the ‘appearance’ and the ‘reality’ of power (...) under the principate. This essay will demonstrate that these interpretations of the structure and language of the preface are misleading. Tacitus offers a sequential view of Roman constitutional history that casts Augustus as a pivot between the tradition stretching back to the foundation of the city and a new phase which he identifies in its own terms, not as a reversion to kingship. The introduction of the motif of ‘appearance v. reality’ comes not with the language of princeps and imperium, but at 1.2.1. An appendix analyses the use of the term principatus in Velleius Paterculus and Tacitus. (shrink)

Velleius text rests on a single manuscript, found at Murbach in 1515, which long ago disappeared. We know of it from three reports: the editio princeps by its discoverer Rhenanus, published in 1520, apparently from an inaccurate copy taken by an anonymous friend;1 notes on the manuscript taken by Rhenanus' secretary Burer , who compared it with proofs of the edition; and a copy , probably from the same source as P, taken in 1516 by B. Amerbach and discovered (...) by Orelli in 1834. Of this text one editor has written: 'While modern scholarship has made progress in solving its enigmas, the text of Velleius, unless some long-hidden manuscript shall unexpectedly come to light, will always continue to be one of the most corrupt among the surviving texts of classical authors. (shrink)

Velleius text rests on a single manuscript, found at Murbach in 1515, which long ago disappeared. We know of it from three reports: the editio princeps by its discoverer Rhenanus, published in 1520, apparently from an inaccurate copy taken by an anonymous friend;1 notes on the manuscript taken by Rhenanus' secretary Burer, who compared it with proofs of the edition; and a copy, probably from the same source as P, taken in 1516 by B. Amerbach and discovered by Orelli (...) in 1834. Of this text one editor has written: 'While modern scholarship has made progress in solving its enigmas, the text of Velleius, unless some long-hidden manuscript shall unexpectedly come to light, will always continue to be one of the most corrupt among the surviving texts of classical authors. (shrink)

There has been no major critical edition of Velleius with commentary since that of Kritz in 1840. Kritz, who took into account Sauppe's long essay on Velleius of three years earlier, was preceded by Ruhnken, whose commentary appeared in 1779. During the century which followed Kritz's work several valuable editions without commentary were produced, the last of which, by Stegmann de Pritzwald , almost coincided with the essay and bibliography devoted to Velleius in Schanz-Hosius . These two (...) contributions of the thirties remain standard to the present day. (shrink)

In Authority and Tradition in Ancient Historiography, John Marincola downplays the importance of an historian's choice to use first-, rather than third-, person verbs to represent his actions as an historical protagonist within his narrative. Marincola's justification for this rests on the incongruous groupings that arise if one divides first-person narrators from third: among the former we find Velleius, Eutropius and Ammianus representing Latin historians of the Empire. However, as part of a wider study which examines Ammianus' nuanced use (...) of allusion to earlier Latin authors, Gavin Kelly has recently argued for a series of close intertextual relationships between Eutropius and Ammianus. I argue here that Ammianus' relationship with Eutropius also extends to their personal roles within their narratives, and that Ammianus' use of the first person singular makes a bold statement about his historiographical programme. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Academic Skepticism in Hume and Kant: A Ciceronian Critique of Metaphysics by Catalina González QuinteroZuzana ParusnikováCatalina González Quintero. Academic Skepticism in Hume and Kant: A Ciceronian Critique of Metaphysics. Cham: Springer, 2022. Pp. 268. Hardcover. ISBN: 978-3-030-89749-9. £99.99.This book is a valuable contribution to the rapidly expanding field of research into the formative impact of ancient skepticism on early modern philosophy. This new paradigm was introduced several decades (...) ago, as González Quintero acknowledges, by the pioneering work of Richard Popkin; and while Popkin emphasized the constitutive role of Pyrrhonism in this process, recent philosophical debates have been characterized by a more measured approach, carefully differentiating between the Academics and the Pyrrhonists, and their respective influence on modern skeptics. Gonzáles Quintero opts for the Academic interpretation of Hume’s skepticism, applying it to both his Treatise and the first Enquiry, and extending it to both of Kant’s Critiques—an area much less explored in the context of ancient skepticism. She thus heads into a complex philosophical landscape.The reader may be somewhat puzzled by the book’s subtitle, one which seems to add yet another theme to its already broad structure. However, as Gonzáles Quintero explains in the Introduction, she wants to take the discussions of Academic skepticism beyond the field of empirical science and concentrate on the attitude of the skeptics towards metaphysics; her aim is to show how Cicero, Hume, and Kant “used skeptical means to examine the justification of metaphysical claims and to determine, in this way, which resulting beliefs could be held non-dogmatically and for practical purposes” (1). Perhaps then, the book may be more accurately titled Academic Skepticism and Metaphysics: Cicero, Hume and Kant.Though this may seem a reduction in the scope of the topics, in this particular case it is an expansion, since the author reconstructs how the attitude of the skeptics to metaphysics unfolds from their general epistemological skepticism concerning the limits of reason. She divides the book into three main parts (Cicero, Hume, and Kant), with the first chapter of each part describing the skeptical method of that particular philosopher or school, and the second examining its application to metaphysical matters. This is a huge undertaking for one book, requiring the author to navigate a vast field of philosophical material, including a significant amount of primary and secondary literature, while turning it all back toward the main question concerning the role played by Academic (Carneadean) skepticism in the ancient, Humean, and Kantian treatments of religion and other metaphysical issues. The danger of topic-overload arises and a selective approach is crucial to avoid “dropping the ball.” Gonzáles Quintero tackles this task with varying success. [End Page 346]The first chapter of the first part of the book provides a thorough analysis of Academic skepticism and how it differs from Pyrrhonism and stoicism. With an extensive knowledge of scholarly debates on ancient skepticism, the author discusses various nuances in the relationship between radical Pyrrhonism and Arciselaus of the Second Academy, moving on, predictably, to Carneades of the Third Academy, who proposed a moderate version of skepticism based on evaluating the degree of persuasiveness of impressions. Such impressions deserve non-dogmatic approval and can thus reduce the scope of epoché; they motivate our search for truth while admitting our fallibility; and they guide us in practical matters. Her argument that assenting to persuasive beliefs contains a rational (normative) aspect perhaps deserves further discussion; for the ancient skeptics the criterion of persuasiveness was subjective and unstable, reflecting our momentary feelings about appearances.In the chapter on metaphysics, the author compares Cicero’s skeptical method in De Natura Deorum (DND) and the Tusculan Disputations. In the former, Cicero (through the character of Cotta) abandons skeptical principles (which would prevent us from defining the nature of the gods) for the sake of the practical usefulness of religious rituals as endorsed by the Stoics; while for the Epicureans (Velleius) the gods (or some cosmic Deity) are utterly unconcerned by our world, for the Stoics (Balbus) they care about human affairs—thus this latter stance supports the state religion that Cicero... (shrink)

Alegorický výklad patří v dějinách evropského myšlení k nejstarším a nejvlivnějším interpretačním metodám. Jeho počátky sahají do 6. stol. př. Kr. a velkého rozkvětu dosáhl zejména v rukou stoiků a středoplatoniků i novoplatoniků, jejichž prostřednictvím posléze hluboce pronikl i do křes_anské a židovské filosofie. Z dnešního hlediska se nicméně na první pohled jedná o výkladovou metodu značně problematickou. Jejím základním předpokladem je, že básník chce svými obraznými vyjádřeními „říci něco jiného“ . Cílem interpretace je stanovit, jaký byl skutečný „skrytý úmysl“ (...) autora. Vykladači přitom zpravidla samozřejmě předpokládají, že nalezené hlubší významy byly básníkem opravdu zamýšleny. Alegorický výklad díky tomu z našeho hlediska trpí slabinou, jež bývá v moderní literární kritice označována jako „intencionální před- sudek“ . Ve většině případů totiž, jak se zdá, tvrdí, že básníci „ve skutečnosti“ sami zastávali složité filosofické koncepce, které z jakéhosi neznámého důvodu nevyjadřovali přímo, ale pouze je obrazně naznačovali. Moderní čtenář naopak nepochybuje, že Homér ani jiný starý básník neměl o platónských či stoických koncepcích ani ponětí a je nemístné mu je podsouvat. Podobná kritika ostatně není až objevem moderní doby. Nalezneme ji už v Ciceronově spise O přirozenosti bohů, kde ji v debatě předkládá epikúrejec Velleius. Stoik Chrysippos podle něho Homérovy a Hésiodovy mýty přizpůsobuje svým vlastním filosofickým koncepcím, „takže se zdá, že i ti nejstarší básníci, kteří o těchto naukách neměli ani ponětí, jsou ve skutečnosti vyznavači stoicismu“. (shrink)

"Wenn es auch viele Fragen in der Philosophie gibt, die bis heute noch nicht genügend geklärt sind, so ist doch die Frage nach dem Wesen der Götter ganz besonders schwierig und überaus dunkel..." (1,1). Um eine Klärung bemühen sich im Haus von Ciceros Freund C. Aurelius Cotta neben dem Hausherren, der die Schule der Akademiker vertritt, der Epikureer C. Velleius und der Stoiker Q. Lucilius Balbus. Cicero - zum fiktiven Datum der Unterredung (76 v.Chr.) mit etwa dreißig Jahren der (...) Jüngste - begnügt sich hauptsächlich mit der Rolle des stummen Zuhörers. Seine Gesprächswiedergabe besticht durch die Schärfe der Gedankenführung und die meisterhafte Komposition. Ihm verdanken die Römer zum großen Teil die lateinische Terminologie, die weiteren Kreisen den Zugang zur griechischen Philosophie erst ermöglichte. Olof Gigon und Laila Straume-Zimmermann haben den Text neu übertragen und mit profundem Detailwissen und philosophischem Weitblick kommentiert. (shrink)

"Wenn es auch viele Fragen in der Philosophie gibt, die bis heute noch nicht genügend geklärt sind, so ist doch die Frage nach dem Wesen der Götter ganz besonders schwierig und überaus dunkel...". Um eine Klärung bemühen sich im Haus von Ciceros Freund C. Aurelius Cotta neben dem Hausherren, der die Schule der Akademiker vertritt, der Epikureer C. Velleius und der Stoiker Q. Lucilius Balbus. Cicero - zum fiktiven Datum der Unterredung mit etwa dreißig Jahren der Jüngste - begnügt (...) sich hauptsächlich mit der Rolle des stummen Zuhörers. Seine Gesprächswiedergabe besticht durch die Schärfe der Gedankenführung und die meisterhafte Komposition. Ihm verdanken die Römer zum großen Teil die lateinische Terminologie, die weiteren Kreisen den Zugang zur griechischen Philosophie erst ermöglichte. Olof Gigon und Laila Straume-Zimmermann haben den Text neu übertragen und mit profundem Detailwissen und philosophischem Weitblick kommentiert. (shrink)

In 88 B.C. the dying embers of the Social War kindled an even more dangerous civil war. Violence with gangs was no longer the final solution in Roman political struggles, but war with a regular army took its place. The link between the two wars and the critical escalation of political conflict was created by the tribunate of P. Sulpicius Rufus. Most modern accounts differ little in describing the sequence of events in his tribunate, though they vary in the interpretation (...) of his motives and policy. They agree because they accept the common basis to the narratives of Appian, Plutarch, and Velleius as true, even though they usually discard the Tendenz in these authors, through which Sulpicius is portrayed as an unscrupulous man who put his services at Marius’ disposal. It is the aim of this paper to propose that the wheat in these authors cannot be so easily separated from the chaff: that in fact the bias, which is most obvious in Plutarch’s Lives, and there can be largely ascribed to the influence of Sulla’s fjown memoirs, has not only distorted motives but misplaced and misrepresented facts. Important inconsistencies in Appian, when taken in conjunction with the little information we have outside these sources, suggest a different outline for Sulpicius’ tribunate—one which involves more uncertainties than the commonly accepted view, because it is obtained by rejecting the validity of more of our scanty source material, but which may enable us to judge more fairly not only Sulpicius and Marius but also Sulla himself. (shrink)