A través de una comparación entre Vico y Hobbes se aborda la concepción de la política como un facere y el rol de las emociones, vinculadas a la biografía de los dos autores . El autor aplica el esquema de emociones rojas y blancas, basándose en la distinción de B. Williams y la utilización de A. Margalit. Esta herramienta la aplica a la clarificación de ciertas teorías políticas en Leviathan y en Scienza nuova.PALABRAS CLAVE: Vico, Scienza nuova, Hobbes, Leviathan, emociones, (...) miedo, vergüenza, filosofía política. By comparing Vico and Hobbes, the conception of politics as a facere is considered, as well as the role of emotions, which are here linked with the biographies of those two authors . The author applies B. Williams’ distinction between red and white emotions, following A. Margalit. This tool is used in order to clarify some political theories in Leviathan and in Scienza Nuova.KEYWORDS: Vico, New Science, Hobbes, Leviathan, emotions, fear, shame, political philosophy. (shrink)

Ratio Juris, Volume 35, Issue 1, Page 30-37, March 2022.

Abstract“Equality” is a notion about which disagreement arises not simply due to lack of clarity and precision (or intellectual dishonesty and bad faith). Rather, equality is an idea that implies and implicates some form of disagreement as a constitutive possibility of its horizon of discussion. This, in my view, is both a problem and an opportunity. I submit that equality is a plural notion: There are only equalities, practices aimed at removing situated circumstances of inequality and discrimination.

The subject of this paper is the relationship between marriage and equality in Giambattista Vico. In his writings Vico gives the notion of marriage a unique importance, not framed on any oversized notion of nature or natural law but on the political fight for the right to marry (a quest for full citizenship status). The right to marry is linked with complex dynamics of human equality, and to a notion of human nature shaped by belief-dependent institutions.

If speaking of justice were the same thing as banging on the table, then normative discourse could not be taken seriously. The aim of this paper, however, is to vindicate the meaningfulness, and rationality, of normative discourse, and to outline its conditions of possibility. Normative discourse can be understood as if there were, in its structure, different “stages,” or layers. In the transition from one stage to the next, complexity increases. Thus, I shall depict the emergence of normative discourse as (...) a kind of genetic process. (shrink)

The starting point of this paper is the idea of individual autonomy: Autonomy from the social body and from its influences, i.e., broadly speaking, autonomy from the “whole” of which the individual is a part. In particular, I shall address some of the problems arising out of the relations between the whole and its parts, basically problems of law and morality. We are accustomed to thinking that the relation between a particular individual and the universal whole to which the individual (...) belongs should be a happy relationship. Such “happiness,” however, will prove to be—from the liberal perspective here assumed—a problematic notion. From such premises as these, an argument will be developed, on behalf of social recognition and legal protection for out‐of‐the mainstream forms of behaviour or lifestyles, i.e., for individuals or groups that claim the “otherness” of their position together with a right of freedom from discrimination. (shrink)