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  1. Pro Tanto Rights and the Duty to Save the Greater Number.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2023 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 13:190-214.
    This paper has two aims. The first is to present and defend a new argument for rights contributionism – the view that the notion of a moral claim-right is a contributory (or pro tanto) rather than overall normative notion. The argument is an inference to the best explanation: it is argued that (i) there are contributory moral factors that contrast with standard moral reasons by way of having a number of formal properties that are characteristic of rights, even though they (...)
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  2. Can't Kant count? Innumerate Views on Saving the Many over Saving the Few.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2023 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 13:215-234.
    It seems rather intuitive that if I can save either one stranger or five strangers, I must save the five. However, Kantian (and other non-consequentialist) views have a difficult time explaining why this is the case, as they seem committed to what Parfit calls “innumeracy”: roughly, the view that the values of lives (or the reasons to save them) don’t get greater (or stronger) in proportion to the number of lives saved. This chapter first shows that in various cases, it (...)
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