Scientific progress and the prospects for culture-bound syndromes

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 41 (4):333-339 (2010)
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Abstract

This paper aims to show that the classification by the American Psychiatric Association in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of a distinct listing of disorders known as Culture-Bound Syndromes is misguided. I argue that the list of CBS comprises either genuine disorders that should be included within the main body of the DSM; or ersatz-disorders that serve a practical role for psychiatrists dealing with patients from certain cultures but will one day be eliminated or assimilated by bona fide DSM classifications. In support of these views I draw on claims from two key themes in the philosophy of science: the claim that all folk explanations for phenomena are thoroughly theoretical and therefore fallible; and the occurrence of theoretical elimination in the history of science. I contend that any ersatz-disorders located in the DSM that are judged to be radically false do not differ in kind from eliminated theories in the history of pre-science

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References found in this work

Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Wilfrid Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
A confutation of convergent realism.Larry Laudan - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):19-49.
A Confutation of Convergent Realism.Larry Laudan - 1980 - In Yuri Balashov & Alexander Rosenberg (eds.), Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 211.
Philosophy and the scientific image of man.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1962 - In Robert Colodny (ed.), Science, Perception, and Reality. Humanities Press/Ridgeview. pp. 35-78.

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