Phenomenal Continuity and the Bridge Problem

Philosophia 39 (2):289–296 (2011)
Abstract
Any theory that analyses personal identity in terms of phenomenal continuity needs to deal with the ordinary interruptions of our consciousness that it is commonly thought that a person can survive. This is the bridge problem. The present paper offers a novel solution to the bridge problem based on the proposal that dreamless sleep need not interrupt phenomenal continuity. On this solution one can both hold that phenomenal continuity is necessary for personal identity and that persons can survive dreamless sleep
Keywords Phenomenal continuity  Temporal gaps  The bridge problem  Personal identity  Barry Dainton  Psychological continuity
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