Philosophical Issues 13 (1):163-204 (2003)
|Abstract||widely held commitments: to phenomenal realism and to naturalism. Phenomenal realism is the view that (a) we are phenomenally consciousness, and that (b) there is no a priori or armchair sufficient condition for phenomenal consciousness that can be stated (non- circularly) in nonphenomenal terms (p.392).1,2 Block points out that while phenomenal realists reject|
|Keywords||Metaphysics Mind Naturalism Phenomena Realism Block, N|
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