A naturalist-phenomenal realist response to Block's harder problem

Philosophical Issues 13 (1):163-204 (2003)
widely held commitments: to phenomenal realism and to naturalism. Phenomenal realism is the view that we are phenomenally consciousness, and that there is no a priori or armchair sufficient condition for phenomenal consciousness that can be stated in nonphenomenal terms . 1,2 Block points out that while phenomenal realists reject
Keywords Metaphysics  Mind  Naturalism  Phenomena  Realism  Block, N
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DOI 10.1111/1533-6077.00011
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Thomas Nagel (1974). What is It Like to Be a Bat? Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.

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